godot/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c

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/*
* TLS 1.3 key schedule
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
#include "psa/crypto_sizes.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \
.name = string,
#define TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE (PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) ? \
PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE : PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels =
{
/* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one
* character too long due to the 0-termination. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST
};
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL
/*
* This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
*
* The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows:
*
* struct HkdfLabel {
* uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material
* opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 "
* opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash
* };
*
* Parameters:
* - desired_length: Length of expanded key material
* Even though the standard allows expansion to up to
* 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than
* 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most
* 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by
* hardcoding the writing of the high bytes.
* - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix
* The label length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3
* can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN().
* - (ctx, clen): context + context length
* The context length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure,
* This MUST be a writable buffer of size
* at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes.
* - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of
* the HkdfLabel structure on success.
*/
static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 ";
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \
(2 /* expansion length */ \
+ 1 /* label length */ \
+ label_len \
+ 1 /* context length */ \
+ context_len)
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \
sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN)
static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(
size_t desired_length,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen)
{
size_t total_label_len =
sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen;
size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len =
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, clen);
unsigned char *p = dst;
/* Add the size of the expanded key material.
* We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use
* TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255
#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \
value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN"
#endif
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(desired_length);
/* Add label incl. prefix */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len);
memcpy(p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix));
p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix);
memcpy(p, label, llen);
p += llen;
/* Add context value */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(clen);
if (clen != 0) {
memcpy(p, ctx, clen);
}
/* Return total length to the caller. */
*dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN];
size_t hkdf_label_len;
if (llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
/* Should never happen since this is an internal
* function, and we know statically which labels
* are allowed. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) {
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) {
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);
if (md == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(blen,
label, llen,
ctx, clen,
hkdf_label,
&hkdf_label_len);
return mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md,
secret, slen,
hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len,
buf, blen);
}
/*
* The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
*
* - One secret value per sender.
* - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
* - The desired lengths of key and IV.
*
* The expansion itself is based on HKDF:
*
* [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length )
* [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length )
*
* [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided
* by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side
* keys in a single function call.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *client_secret,
const unsigned char *server_secret,
size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
client_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key),
NULL, 0,
keys->client_write_key, key_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
server_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key),
NULL, 0,
keys->server_write_key, key_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
client_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv),
NULL, 0,
keys->client_write_iv, iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
server_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv),
NULL, 0,
keys->server_write_iv, iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
keys->key_len = key_len;
keys->iv_len = iv_len;
return 0;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
int ctx_hashed,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
unsigned char hashed_context[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);
if (md == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) {
ret = mbedtls_md(md, ctx, clen, hashed_context);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
clen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);
} else {
if (clen > sizeof(hashed_context)) {
/* This should never happen since this function is internal
* and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly.
* Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk
* of getting a stack overflow. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, clen);
}
return mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
secret, slen,
label, llen,
hashed_context, clen,
dstbuf, buflen);
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret_old,
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
unsigned char *secret_new)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t hlen, ilen;
unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp_input[TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE] = { 0 };
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);
if (md == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);
/* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "")
* on the old secret. */
if (secret_old != NULL) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
secret_old, hlen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived),
NULL, 0, /* context */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
tmp_secret, hlen);
if (ret != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (input != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp_input, input, input_len);
ilen = input_len;
} else {
ilen = hlen;
}
/* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material.
* The salt is the old secret, and the input key material
* is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */
ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md,
tmp_secret, hlen,
tmp_input, ilen,
secret_new);
if (ret != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input));
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */