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mbedtls: Update to upstream version 2.16.6 

Fixes https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-04

(cherry picked from commit 6b00357d53)
This commit is contained in:
Rémi Verschelde 2020-04-21 10:37:14 +02:00
parent 7fc2cba47d
commit 4b33388e5c
7 changed files with 93 additions and 18 deletions
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2
thirdparty/README.md vendored
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@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ changes are marked with `// -- GODOT --` comments.
## mbedtls
- Upstream: https://tls.mbed.org/
- Version: 2.16.5
- Version: 2.16.6
- License: Apache 2.0
File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):

21
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h vendored
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@ -546,6 +546,23 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) )
#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \
"but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@ -669,6 +686,10 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif

8
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h vendored
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@ -40,16 +40,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 5
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 6
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100500
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.5"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.5"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100600
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.6"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.6"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)

28
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c vendored
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@ -1938,6 +1938,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
final_norm:
#endif
/*
* Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
* of its input via side-channels [2].
*
* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
if( f_rng != 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) );
@ -2308,6 +2322,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) );
}
/*
* Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
* of its input via side-channels [2].
*
* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
if( f_rng != NULL )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
cleanup:

16
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c vendored
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@ -1417,6 +1417,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
/* Check that there is enough room for:
* - 2 bytes of version
* - 1 byte of cookie_len
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
/*
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
@ -1445,8 +1458,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
cookie_len = *p++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
@ -1455,6 +1466,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );

34
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c vendored
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@ -1004,8 +1004,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL )
{
int ret = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, transform->keylen,
@ -2885,15 +2883,18 @@ static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/*
* Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones
*/
static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
int ret;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) );
return;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) );
@ -2920,7 +2921,9 @@ static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
return( 0 );
}
/*
@ -2957,7 +2960,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12;
ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING;
}
@ -2980,7 +2984,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) );
ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
@ -3017,7 +3022,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) )
{
if( is_finished )
ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
{
if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -3997,17 +4005,23 @@ static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
{
int send_ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
ssl->out_buf, len );
/* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here.
* If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
* if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
(void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret );
(void) send_ret;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
}
if( ret == 0 )
{
/* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );

2
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c vendored
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@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ cleanup:
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert );
#else
((void) verbose);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
return( ret );
}