From 8ffb7699af98790b6a39c0d425945145e199e67a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabio Alessandrelli Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2024 16:37:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [mbedTLS] Enable TLS 1.3 support Move library initialization to module registration functions. Only set library debug threshold when verbose output is enabled. TLSv1.3 functions seems to be a bit more verbose then expected, and generate a lot of noise. Yet, some level of debugging without recompiling the engine would be nice. We should discuss this upstream. --- doc/classes/HTTPClient.xml | 2 +- modules/mbedtls/SCsub | 16 + modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp | 4 - modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp | 27 + .../include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h | 12 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c | 9233 +++++++++++++++++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c | 649 ++ .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c | 724 ++ .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c | 22 + .../psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c | 256 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 596 ++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 321 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c | 470 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c | 496 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c | 571 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 705 ++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c | 373 + .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 1131 ++ .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c | 481 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c | 254 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c | 608 ++ 21 files changed, 16934 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c diff --git a/doc/classes/HTTPClient.xml b/doc/classes/HTTPClient.xml index 864c29a2b5a..af98636056e 100644 --- a/doc/classes/HTTPClient.xml +++ b/doc/classes/HTTPClient.xml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ [b]Note:[/b] When exporting to Android, make sure to enable the [code]INTERNET[/code] permission in the Android export preset before exporting the project or using one-click deploy. Otherwise, network communication of any kind will be blocked by Android. [b]Note:[/b] It's recommended to use transport encryption (TLS) and to avoid sending sensitive information (such as login credentials) in HTTP GET URL parameters. Consider using HTTP POST requests or HTTP headers for such information instead. [b]Note:[/b] When performing HTTP requests from a project exported to Web, keep in mind the remote server may not allow requests from foreign origins due to [url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS]CORS[/url]. If you host the server in question, you should modify its backend to allow requests from foreign origins by adding the [code]Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *[/code] HTTP header. - [b]Note:[/b] TLS support is currently limited to TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2. Attempting to connect to a TLS 1.3-only server will return an error. + [b]Note:[/b] TLS support is currently limited to TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. Attempting to connect to a server that only supports older (insecure) TLS versions will return an error. [b]Warning:[/b] TLS certificate revocation and certificate pinning are currently not supported. Revoked certificates are accepted as long as they are otherwise valid. If this is a concern, you may want to use automatically managed certificates with a short validity period. diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/SCsub b/modules/mbedtls/SCsub index e217ca5ca47..6183fa59443 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/SCsub +++ b/modules/mbedtls/SCsub @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@ if env["builtin_mbedtls"]: "platform.c", "platform_util.c", "poly1305.c", + "psa_crypto.c", + "psa_crypto_aead.c", + "psa_crypto_cipher.c", + "psa_crypto_client.c", + "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c", + "psa_crypto_ecp.c", + "psa_crypto_ffdh.c", + "psa_crypto_hash.c", + "psa_crypto_mac.c", + "psa_crypto_pake.c", + "psa_crypto_rsa.c", + "psa_crypto_se.c", + "psa_crypto_slot_management.c", + "psa_crypto_storage.c", + "psa_its_file.c", + "psa_util.c", "ripemd160.c", "rsa.c", "rsa_alt_helpers.c", diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp index 0d97b5fc1a2..be7aaef9d45 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp +++ b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp @@ -314,10 +314,6 @@ Crypto *CryptoMbedTLS::create(bool p_notify_postinitialize) { } void CryptoMbedTLS::initialize_crypto() { -#ifdef DEBUG_ENABLED - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(1); -#endif - Crypto::_create = create; Crypto::_load_default_certificates = load_default_certificates; X509CertificateMbedTLS::make_default(); diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp b/modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp index df5bce05e46..bf65dfb0b76 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp +++ b/modules/mbedtls/register_types.cpp @@ -35,15 +35,34 @@ #include "packet_peer_mbed_dtls.h" #include "stream_peer_mbedtls.h" +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 +#include +#endif + #ifdef TESTS_ENABLED #include "tests/test_crypto_mbedtls.h" #endif +static bool godot_mbedtls_initialized = false; + void initialize_mbedtls_module(ModuleInitializationLevel p_level) { if (p_level != MODULE_INITIALIZATION_LEVEL_SCENE) { return; } +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 + int status = psa_crypto_init(); + ERR_FAIL_COND_MSG(status != PSA_SUCCESS, "Failed to initialize psa crypto. The mbedTLS modules will not work."); +#endif + +#ifdef DEBUG_ENABLED + if (OS::get_singleton()->is_stdout_verbose()) { + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(1); + } +#endif + + godot_mbedtls_initialized = true; + CryptoMbedTLS::initialize_crypto(); StreamPeerMbedTLS::initialize_tls(); PacketPeerMbedDTLS::initialize_dtls(); @@ -55,6 +74,14 @@ void uninitialize_mbedtls_module(ModuleInitializationLevel p_level) { return; } + if (!godot_mbedtls_initialized) { + return; + } + +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +#endif + DTLSServerMbedTLS::finalize(); PacketPeerMbedDTLS::finalize_dtls(); StreamPeerMbedTLS::finalize_tls(); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h index 2011827b7a2..58bf1d9d542 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h @@ -59,18 +59,6 @@ // Disable deprecated #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -// mbedTLS 3.6 finally enabled TLSv1.3 by default, but it requires some mobule -// changes, and to enable PSA crypto (new "standard" API specification). -// Disable it for now. -#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - -// Disable PSA Crypto. -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C -#undef MBEDTLS_LMS_C - #endif // GODOT_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_H #endif // GODOT_MODULE_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c4f41db10b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,9233 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "check_crypto_config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +/* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently + * stored keys. */ +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF 1 +#endif + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Global data, support functions and library management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static int key_type_is_raw_bytes(psa_key_type_t type) +{ + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type); +} + +/* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ +#define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 +#define RNG_SEEDED 2 + +/* IDs for PSA crypto subsystems. Starts at 1 to catch potential uninitialized + * variables as arguments. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS = 1, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION, +} mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem; + +/* Initialization flags for global_data::initialized */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED 0x01 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED 0x02 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED 0x04 + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED ( \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t initialized; + uint8_t rng_state; + mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +static uint8_t psa_get_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.rng_state == RNG_SEEDED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = + (initialized && (global_data.initialized == PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +static uint8_t psa_get_drivers_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) != 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ + if (psa_get_initialized() == 0) \ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + +/* Declare a local copy of an input buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local input copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_input is unused in the current scope + * - input_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_input_t LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer input and set the pointer input_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(input, length, \ + &LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + input_copy = LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input.buffer; + +/* Free the local input copy allocated previously by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * + * Assumptions: + * - input_copy is the name of the input copy pointer set by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * - input is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; \ + psa_crypto_local_input_free(&LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); + +/* Declare a local copy of an output buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local output copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_output is unused in the current scope + * - output_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_output_t LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer output and set the pointer output_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(output, length, \ + &LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + output_copy = LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output.buffer; + +/* Free the local output copy allocated previously by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * after first copying back its contents to the original buffer. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - output_copy is the name of the output copy pointer set by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * - output is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; \ + do { \ + psa_status_t local_output_status; \ + local_output_status = psa_crypto_local_output_free(&LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (local_output_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + /* Since this error case is an internal error, it's more serious than \ + * any existing error code and so it's fine to overwrite the existing \ + * status. */ \ + status = local_output_status; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + input_copy = input; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + output_copy = output; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ + + +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + (void) hash_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg) +{ + (void) key_type; + (void) cipher_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static int psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case 2048: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case 3072: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case 4096: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case 6144: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case 8192: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a + * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the + * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ + int low_level_ret = -(-ret & 0x007f); + switch (low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret) { + case 0: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + +#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)) + /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS: + return PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE; +#endif +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +/** + * \brief For output buffers which contain "tags" + * (outputs that may be checked for validity like + * hashes, MACs and signatures), fill the unused + * part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on + * error, the trailing part on success) with + * something that isn't a valid tag (barring an + * attack on the tag and deliberately-crafted + * input), in case the caller doesn't check the + * return status properly. + * + * \param output_buffer Pointer to buffer to wipe. May not be NULL + * unless \p output_buffer_size is zero. + * \param status Status of function called to generate + * output_buffer originally + * \param output_buffer_size Size of output buffer. If zero, \p output_buffer + * could be NULL. + * \param output_buffer_length Length of data written to output_buffer, must be + * less than \p output_buffer_size + */ +static void psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(uint8_t *output_buffer, psa_status_t status, + size_t output_buffer_size, size_t output_buffer_length) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + + if (output_buffer_size == 0) { + /* If output_buffer_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not + call memset because output_buffer may be NULL in this case */ + return; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + offset = output_buffer_length; + } + + memset(output_buffer + offset, '!', output_buffer_size - offset); +} + + +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits) +{ + /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ + switch (type) { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH: + break; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + if (bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + if (bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(algorithm)) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(algorithm)) { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if ((key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length) +{ + if (slot->key.data != NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + + slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc(1, buffer_length); + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, + data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + memcpy(slot->key.data, data, data_length); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ + if (data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); + + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(attributes->type, + *bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Copy the key material. */ + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length)) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +/** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. + * + * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg1, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ + if (alg1 == alg2) { + return alg1; + } + /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check + * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg1) && + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg2) && + (alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + if (PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg1) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return alg2; + } + if (PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return alg1; + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg1) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg2) && + (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg1, 0) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg2, 0))) { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg1); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg2); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + (alg1_len <= alg2_len)) { + return alg2; + } + if (((alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + (alg2_len <= alg1_len)) { + return alg1; + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg1) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg2) && + (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg1) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg2))) { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do(alg1, key_type)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, 0, alg1); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, 0, alg2); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(alg1, restricted_len); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if ((alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return (alg1_len <= alg2_len) ? alg2 : 0; + } + if ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return (alg2_len <= alg1_len) ? alg1 : 0; + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if (alg1_len == alg2_len) { + return PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg1, alg1_len); + } + } + /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ + return 0; +} + +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits(psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, + psa_algorithm_t requested_alg) +{ + /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ + if (requested_alg == policy_alg) { + return 1; + } + /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(requested_alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(policy_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return (policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == + (requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); + } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(requested_alg) && + (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(policy_alg, 0) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(requested_alg, 0)) && + ((policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(policy_alg) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(requested_alg); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(requested_alg) && + (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(policy_alg) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(requested_alg))) { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do(policy_alg, key_type)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(requested_alg)); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if (PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) == 0) { + return requested_output_length == default_output_length; + } + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if (PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(requested_alg) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) == default_output_length) { + return 1; + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if ((policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) <= + requested_output_length; + } + } + /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for + * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This + * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(requested_alg)) { + return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(requested_alg) == + policy_alg; + } + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ + return 0; +} + +/** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. + * + * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits(const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if (alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (psa_key_algorithm_permits(key_type, policy->alg, alg) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits(key_type, policy->alg2, alg)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } +} + +/** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy + * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. + * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of + * \c *policy and \c *constraint. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c *policy is unchanged. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_key_policy_t *policy, + const psa_key_policy_t *constraint) +{ + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection(key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg); + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection(key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2); + if (intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + policy->usage &= constraint->usage; + policy->alg = intersection_alg; + policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * the unregister with mutex lock and unlock operations. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + slot = *p_slot; + + /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags + * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public + * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as + * if they had the export flag. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) { + usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + + if ((slot->attr.policy.usage & usage) != usage) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto error; + } + + /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */ + if (alg != 0) { + status = psa_key_policy_permits(&slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +/** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. + * + * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly + * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element and/or to be used + * by a secure element. + * + * This is a temporary function that may be used instead of + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support + * for a cryptographic operation. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * psa_unregister_read() with mutex lock and unlock operations. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, p_slot, + usage, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external((*p_slot)->attr.lifetime)) { + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(*p_slot); + *p_slot = NULL; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if (slot->key.data != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + } + + slot->key.data = NULL; + slot->key.bytes = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * Persistent storage is not affected. */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers or + * an unexpected state. + * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the slot is valid for + * wiping. + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the + * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. + */ + switch (slot->state) { + case PSA_SLOT_FULL: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers != 1) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_FILLING: + /* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */ + if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers != 0) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 0); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_EMPTY: + /* The slot is already empty, it cannot be wiped. */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_EMPTY); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + default: + /* The slot's state is invalid. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + size_t slice_index = slot->slice_index; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + + /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe + * because all multipart operation objects are independent from + * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup + * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that + * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ + /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has + * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. + * This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */ + memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + /* If the slot is already corrupted, something went deeply wrong, + * like a thread still using the slot or a stray pointer leading + * to the slot's memory being used for another object. Let the slot + * leak rather than make the corruption worse. */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_free_key_slot(slice_index, slot); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ + psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + /* + * Get the description of the key in a key slot, and register to read it. + * In the case of a persistent key, this will load the key description + * from persistent memory if not done yet. + * We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by + * the current implementation. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We cannot unlock between setting the state to PENDING_DELETION + * and destroying the key in storage, as otherwise another thread + * could load the key into a new slot and the key will not be + * fully destroyed. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) { + /* Another thread has destroyed the key between us locking the slot + * and us gaining the mutex. Unregister from the slot, + * and report that the key does not exist. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE : status; + } +#endif + /* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to + * PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering + * to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access + * the key within the slot; the last registered reader will + * automatically wipe the slot when they call psa_unregister_read(). + * If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key + * from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to + * deal with the deletion. */ + overall_status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + + if (overall_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work + * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only + * by policy or actually physically read-only). + * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory + * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ + overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(slot->attr.lifetime); + if (driver != NULL) { + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: + * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these + * three actions. */ + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction(PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure + * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially + * important if the error is that the storage is full. + * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent + * state after a reset? + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 + */ + overall_status = status; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_destroy_se_key(driver, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot)); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from storage. + * The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader + * unregisters. */ + status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +exit: + /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader + * then this will wipe the slot. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over + * a storage error. */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Don't overwrite existing errors if the unlock fails. */ + status = overall_status; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return overall_status; +} + +/** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, 0, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + *attributes = slot->attr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (psa_get_se_driver_entry(slot->attr.lifetime) != NULL) { + psa_set_key_slot_number(attributes, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number) +{ + if (attributes->has_slot_number) { + *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal(const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + if (key_buffer_size > data_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { + return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length); + } else { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if (data_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, + * which don't require any flag, but + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key(&slot->attr, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type))) { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, + data_length); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else { + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if (data_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, 0, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +/** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. + * + * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the + * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key + * such as the key type. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy(const psa_key_policy_t *policy) +{ + if ((policy->usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. + * + * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not + * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may + * be involved in the creation of the key. + * + * Call this function early in the key creation process. + * + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id(attributes); + + status = psa_validate_key_location(lifetime, p_drv); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_validate_key_persistence(lifetime); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { + if (MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else { + if (!psa_is_valid_key_id(psa_get_key_id(attributes), 0)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + status = psa_validate_key_policy(&attributes->policy); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Refuse to create overly large keys. + * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't + * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so + * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. + * + * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * This function is intended to be used as follows: + * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare + * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it + * a volatile key identifier. + * -# Populate the slot with the key material. + * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. + * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call + * psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. + * + * \param method An identification of the calling function. + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key slot is ready to receive key material. + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + (void) method; + *p_drv = NULL; + + status = psa_validate_key_attributes(attributes, p_drv); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + int key_is_volatile = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->lifetime); + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot( + key_is_volatile ? &volatile_key_id : NULL, + p_slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + psa_key_slot_t *slot = *p_slot; + + /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each + * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. + * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as + * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size + * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the + * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its + * definition. */ + + slot->attr = *attributes; + if (key_is_volatile) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; +#else + slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things + * when creating or registering a persistent key: + * create the key file in internal storage, create the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will + * encompass these three actions. + * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate + * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating + * a transaction is not required. */ + /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. + * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the + * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power + * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure + * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the + * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet + * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, + * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ + if (*p_drv != NULL) { + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key(attributes, method, *p_drv, + &slot_number); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->lifetime)) { + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction(PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + return status; + } + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, (uint8_t *) (&slot_number), sizeof(slot_number)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + if (*p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER) { + /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. + * + * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * If the finalization succeeds, the function sets the key slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, and the key slot can no longer be accessed as part of the + * key creation process. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the + * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully created. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + (void) slot; + (void) driver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot); + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(slot_number) == + sizeof(data.slot_number), + "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t"); + + memcpy(&data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof(slot_number)); + status = psa_save_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + (uint8_t *) &data, + sizeof(data)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so + * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ + status = psa_save_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes); + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not + * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case + * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual + * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, + * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ + if (driver != NULL && + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY) { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *key = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +/** Abort the creation of a key. + * + * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), + * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this + * function may not clean up persistent storage. + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + */ +static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + (void) driver; + + if (slot == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* If the lock operation fails we still wipe the slot. + * Operations will no longer work after a failed lock, + * but we still need to wipe the slot of confidential data. */ + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure + * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata + * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure + * element. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 + */ + + /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if + * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the + * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). + * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any + * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data + * itself. */ + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif +} + +/** Validate optional attributes during key creation. + * + * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are + * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent + * with the data in the slot. + * + * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after + * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + if (attributes->type != 0) { + if (attributes->type != slot->attr.type) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + if (attributes->bits != 0) { + if (attributes->bits != slot->attr.bits) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t bits; + size_t storage_size = data_length; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). + * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, + * which is never valid. */ + if (data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion cannot overflow. */ + if (data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage ( thus not in the case of importing a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the imported key material. */ + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(attributes->lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + attributes, data, data_length, &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + bits = slot->attr.bits; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (slot->attr.bits == 0) { + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + } else if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type.*/ + if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes(slot, attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. + * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the + * secure element, but not all secure elements support this + * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Not usable with volatile keys, even with an appropriate location, + * due to the API design. + * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9253 + */ + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, &key); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ + psa_close_key(key); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; + psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t storage_size = 0; + + *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes(source_slot, + specified_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* The target key type and number of bits have been validated by + * psa_validate_optional_attributes() to be either equal to zero or + * equal to the ones of the source key. So it is safe to inherit + * them from the source key now." + * */ + actual_attributes.bits = source_slot->attr.bits; + actual_attributes.type = source_slot->attr.type; + + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy(source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.policy, + &source_slot->attr.policy); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, + &target_slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(target_slot->attr.lifetime) != + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(source_slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* + * If the source and target keys are stored in different locations, + * the source key would need to be exported as plaintext and re-imported + * in the other location. This has security implications which have not + * been fully mapped. For now, this can be achieved through + * appropriate API invocations from the application, if needed. + * */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + /* + * When the source and target keys are within the same location, + * - For transparent keys it is a blind copy without any driver invocation, + * - For opaque keys this translates to an invocation of the drivers' + * copy_key entry point through the dispatch layer. + * */ + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(actual_attributes.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&actual_attributes, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(target_slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key(&actual_attributes, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes, + target_slot->key.data, + target_slot->key.bytes, + &target_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(target_slot, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_finish_key_creation(target_slot, driver, target_key); +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(target_slot, driver); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(source_slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Message digests */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort(operation); + operation->id = 0; + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only + * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ + memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup(operation, alg); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if (input_length == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update(operation, input, input_length); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_finish_internal(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = 0; + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_hash_finish_internal(operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + status = psa_hash_finish_internal( + operation, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (actual_hash_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + *hash_length = 0; + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (actual_hash_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash)); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation) +{ + if (source_operation->id == 0 || + target_operation->id != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone(source_operation, + target_operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(target_operation); + } + + return status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* MAC */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort(operation); + operation->mac_size = 0; + operation->is_sign = 0; + operation->id = 0; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *mac_size) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do(alg, key_type); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ + *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg); + + if (*mac_size < 4) { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (*mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg))) { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (*mac_size > PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE) { + /* PSA_MAC_LENGTH returns the correct length even for a MAC algorithm + * that is disabled in the compile-time configuration. The result can + * therefore be larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which does take the + * configuration into account. In this case, force a return of + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED here. Otherwise psa_mac_verify(), or + * psa_mac_compute(mac_size=PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE), would return + * PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for an unsupported algorithm whose MAC size + * is larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which is misleading and which breaks + * systematically generated tests. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + int is_sign) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, + &operation->mac_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + operation->is_sign = is_sign; + /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ + if (is_sign) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, key, alg, 1); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, key, alg, 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return status; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if (input_length == 0) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(operation, input, input_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->is_sign) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) + * once all the error checks are done. */ + if (operation->mac_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_size < operation->mac_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish(operation, + mac, operation->mac_size, + mac_length); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation->mac_size = 0; + } + + if (mac != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); + } + + abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->is_sign) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->mac_size != mac_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish(operation, + mac, mac_length); + +exit: + abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length, + int is_sign) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, + &operation_mac_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_size < operation_mac_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + input, input_length, + mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation_mac_size = 0; + } + + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); + status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_mac_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, + input, input_length, + actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac), + &actual_mac_length, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_length != actual_mac_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac)); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg(int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + if (input_is_message) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + } else { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *signature_length = 0; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(input_is_message, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees + * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input + * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have + * to be a hash.) */ + if (signature_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (input_is_message) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } else { + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } + + +exit: + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(input_is_message, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (input_is_message) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; + +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt_external, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) && salt_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type))) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt_external, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) && salt_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static uint32_t psa_interruptible_max_ops = PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED; + +void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) +{ + psa_interruptible_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void) +{ + return psa_interruptible_max_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort_internal( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, alg, + hash, hash_length); +exit: + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + *signature_length = 0; + + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees that + * signature must be a valid pointer. */ + if (signature_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(operation, signature, + signature_size, + signature_length); + + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops(operation); + +exit: + + if (signature != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); + } + + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort_internal( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(operation); + + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + operation); + +exit: + + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography internal */ +/* implementations */ +/****************************************************************/ + +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + /* Internal implementation uses zero to indicate infinite number max ops, + * therefore avoid this value, and set to minimum possible. */ + if (max_ops == 0) { + max_ops = 1; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(max_ops); +#else + (void) max_ops; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + #if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t required_hash_length; + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + operation->coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + operation->ctx->grp.nbits); + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + operation->md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + operation->alg = alg; + + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < operation->coordinate_bytes ? + hash_length : operation->coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) status; + (void) required_hash_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r; + mbedtls_mpi s; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); + + if (signature_size < 2 * operation->coordinate_bytes) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(operation->alg)) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + operation->md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + } + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, + signature, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, + signature + + operation->coordinate_bytes, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *signature_length = operation->coordinate_bytes * 2; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + return status; + + #else + + (void) operation; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t coordinate_bytes = 0; + size_t required_hash_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->s); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(operation->ctx->grp.nbits); + + if (signature_length != 2 * coordinate_bytes) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->r, + signature, + coordinate_bytes)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->s, + signature + + coordinate_bytes, + coordinate_bytes)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < coordinate_bytes ? hash_length : + coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + (void) status; + (void) coordinate_bytes; + (void) required_hash_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + &operation->ctx->Q, + &operation->r, + &operation->s, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; + + return status; +#else + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->s); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_random_internal(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_length = 0; + status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(&global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the external RNG interface. */ + if (output_length != output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while (output_size > 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + size_t request_size = + (output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, usage, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { + operation->iv_required = 0; + } else { + operation->iv_required = 1; + } + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + if (iv_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, default_iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, default_iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *iv_length = default_iv_length; + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + *iv_length = 0; + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + if (iv != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv, default_iv_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, + iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update(operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish(operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } else { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + if (output_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, + psa_crypto_buffer_offset(output, default_iv_length), + output_size - default_iv_length, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + memcpy(output, local_iv, default_iv_length); + } + *output_length += default_iv_length; + } else { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Helper function to get the base algorithm from its variants. */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg); +} + +/* Helper function to perform common nonce length checks. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_nonce_length(psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t base_alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + + switch (base_alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Not checking max nonce size here as GCM spec allows almost + * arbitrarily large nonces. Please note that we do not generally + * recommend the usage of nonces of greater length than + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, as large nonces are hashed to a shorter + * size, which can then lead to collisions if you encrypt a very + * large number of messages.*/ + if (nonce_length != 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + if (nonce_length == 12) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else if (nonce_length == 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + (void) nonce_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_length, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0) { + memset(ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, + additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_length, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0) { + memset(plaintext, 0, plaintext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_validate_tag_length(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + const uint8_t tag_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + + switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.*/ + if (tag_len < 4 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. */ + if (tag_len != 4 && tag_len != 8 && (tag_len < 12 || tag_len > 16)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if (tag_len != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) tag_len; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + int is_encrypt, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || operation->lengths_set || + operation->ad_started || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } else { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, key_usage, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_validate_tag_length(alg)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + operation->alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + operation->is_encrypt = is_encrypt; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 1, key, alg); +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 0, key, alg); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(operation->alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce(operation, nonce, + nonce_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->nonce_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Generate a random nonce / IV for multipart AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t local_nonce[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t required_nonce_size = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_size, nonce); + + *nonce_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || !operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* For CCM, this size may not be correct according to the PSA + * specification. The PSA Crypto 1.0.1 specification states: + * + * CCM encodes the plaintext length pLen in L octets, with L the smallest + * integer >= 2 where pLen < 2^(8L). The nonce length is then 15 - L bytes. + * + * However this restriction that L has to be the smallest integer is not + * applied in practice, and it is not implementable here since the + * plaintext length may or may not be known at this time. */ + required_nonce_size = PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(operation->key_type, + operation->alg); + if (nonce_size < required_nonce_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, local_nonce, + required_nonce_size); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + memcpy(nonce, local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + *nonce_length = required_nonce_size; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Set the nonce for a multipart authenticated encryption or decryption + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, nonce, nonce_length); + +/* Exit label is only needed for buffer copying, prevent unused warnings. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for multipart AEAD. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set || operation->ad_started || + operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Lengths can only be too large for GCM if size_t is bigger than 32 + * bits. Without the guard this code will generate warnings on 32bit + * builds. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + if (((uint64_t) ad_length) >> 61 != 0 || + ((uint64_t) plaintext_length) > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } +#endif + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (ad_length > 0xFF00) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + /* No length restrictions for ChaChaPoly. */ + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + break; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths(operation, ad_length, + plaintext_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_remaining = ad_length; + operation->body_remaining = plaintext_length; + operation->lengths_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* No input to add (zero length), nothing to do. */ + if (input_length == 0) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + if (operation->ad_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->ad_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad(operation, input, + input_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + /* Additional data length was supplied, but not all the additional + data was supplied.*/ + if (operation->ad_remaining != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Too much data provided. */ + if (operation->body_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->body_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update(operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->body_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_final_checks(const psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0 || !operation->nonce_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set && (operation->ad_remaining != 0 || + operation->body_remaining != 0)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_size, tag); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + *tag_length = tag_size; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish(operation, ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, + tag, tag_size, tag_length); + +exit: + + + /* In case the operation fails and the user fails to check for failure or + * the zero tag size, make sure the tag is set to something implausible. + * Even if the operation succeeds, make sure we clear the rest of the + * buffer to prevent potential leakage of anything previously placed in + * the same buffer.*/ + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(tag, status, tag_size, *tag_length); + + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in a multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_length, tag); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify(operation, plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + tag, tag_length); + +exit: + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort(operation); + + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(hmac_key_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)); + + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + return status; +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(operation->alg); + } else { + return operation->alg; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + if (kdf_alg == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } else +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.hkdf.info); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret_length); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data, + sizeof(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data)); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt, + operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt_length); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation, sizeof(*operation)); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (capacity > operation->capacity) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + operation->capacity = capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + const uint8_t last_block = PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) ? 0 : 0xff; +#else + const uint8_t last_block = 0xff; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + + if (hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || + (!hkdf->info_set +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + && !PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + )) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + /* We can't be wanting more output after the last block, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (hkdf->block_number == last_block) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (hkdf->block_number != 1) { + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof(hkdf->output_block), + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 1) { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (hmac_output_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort(&hmac); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = cleanup_status; + } + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch (tls12_prf->state) { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(tls12_prf, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + continue; + } + + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length) { + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + } else { + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + } + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy(output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_size = 0; + + if (output_length != 32) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_256, ecjpake->data, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE, output, output_length, + &output_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (output_size != output_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg, + uint8_t prf_output_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_mac_operation_t mac_operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t mac_output_length; + uint8_t U_i[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t *U_accumulator = pbkdf2->output_block; + uint64_t i; + uint8_t block_counter[4]; + + mac_operation.is_sign = 1; + mac_operation.mac_size = prf_output_length; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(pbkdf2->block_number, block_counter, 0); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(&mac_operation, + attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, block_counter, sizeof(block_counter)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&mac_operation, U_i, sizeof(U_i), + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mac_output_length != prf_output_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + + for (i = 1; i < pbkdf2->input_cost; i++) { + /* We are passing prf_output_length as mac_size because the driver + * function directly sets mac_output_length as mac_size upon success. + * See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg, U_i, prf_output_length, + U_i, prf_output_length, + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_xor(U_accumulator, U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(U_i, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg; + uint8_t prf_output_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(pbkdf2->password_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg)); + prf_output_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(prf_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + } else if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_CMAC; + prf_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + switch (pbkdf2->state) { + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET: + /* Initially we need a new block so bytes_used is equal to block size*/ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = prf_output_length; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + uint8_t n = prf_output_length - pbkdf2->bytes_used; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, pbkdf2->output_block + pbkdf2->bytes_used, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + pbkdf2->bytes_used += n; + + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = 0; + pbkdf2->block_number++; + + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block(pbkdf2, prf_alg, + prf_output_length, + &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0) { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_length, output); + if (output_length > operation->capacity) { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + + { + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + operation->alg = alg; + if (output != NULL) { + memset(output, '!', output_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity(uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +{ + if (data_size >= 8) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data); + } + if (data_size >= 16) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 8); + } + if (data_size >= 24) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 16); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +/* + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve require the generation + * of a private key which is an integer + * in the range [1, N - 1], where N is the boundary of the private key domain: + * N is the prime p for Diffie-Hellman, or the order of the + * curve’s base point for ECC. + * + * Let m be the bit size of N, such that 2^m > N >= 2^(m-1). + * This function generates the private key using the following process: + * + * 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. + * 2. If m is not a multiple of 8, set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in the string to zero. + * 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a big-endian byte string. + * 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. + * + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically the methods titled + * Key-Pair Generation by Testing Candidates in the following publications: + * - NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment + * Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.1.4 for + * Diffie-Hellman keys. + * + * - [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.2.2 or FIPS Publication 186-4: Digital Signature + * Standard (DSS) [FIPS186-4] §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + unsigned key_out_of_range = 1; + mbedtls_mpi k; + mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t m; + size_t m_bytes; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2); + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + slot->attr.type); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits); + + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group ecp_group; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ecp_group); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp_group, grp_id)); + + /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */ + /* Let m be the bit size of N. */ + m = ecp_group.nbits; + + m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m); + + /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2)); + + /* Note: This function is always called with *data == NULL and it + * allocates memory for the data buffer. */ + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, m_bytes); + if (*data == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + while (key_out_of_range) { + /* 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. */ + if ((status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, m_bytes)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* 2. If m is not a multiple of 8 */ + if (m % 8 != 0) { + /* Set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in + * the string to zero. + */ + uint8_t clear_bit_mask = (1 << (m % 8)) - 1; + (*data)[0] &= clear_bit_mask; + } + + /* 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a + * big-endian byte string. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); + + /* 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * Result of comparison is returned. When it indicates error + * then this function is called again. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(&diff_N_2, &k, &key_out_of_range)); + } + + /* 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&k, &k, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free(*data); + *data = NULL; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&diff_N_2); + return status; +} + +/* ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve draws a byte string whose length + * is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): + * draw a 32-byte string and process it as specified in + * Elliptic Curves for Security [RFC7748] §5. + * + * - Curve448 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): + * draw a 56-byte string and process it as specified in [RFC7748] §5. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + size_t output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + output_length = 32; + break; + case 448: + output_length = 56; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, output_length); + + if (*data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, output_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + (*data)[0] &= 248; + (*data)[31] &= 127; + (*data)[31] |= 64; + break; + case 448: + (*data)[0] &= 252; + (*data)[55] |= 128; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + } + + return status; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) slot; + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t storage_size = bytes; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(slot->attr.type)) { + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(slot->attr.type); + if (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(curve)) { + /* Weierstrass elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(slot, bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + /* Montgomery elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper(bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) */ + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(slot->attr.type)) { + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + data = mbedtls_calloc(1, bytes); + if (data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, data, bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(data, bytes); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&slot->attr, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(&slot->attr, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits); + if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(data); + return status; +} + +static const psa_custom_key_parameters_t default_custom_production = + PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT; + +int psa_custom_key_parameters_are_default( + const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom, + size_t custom_data_length) +{ + if (custom->flags != 0) { + return 0; + } + if (custom_data_length != 0) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom, + const uint8_t *custom_data, + size_t custom_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + (void) custom_data; /* We only accept 0-length data */ + if (!psa_custom_key_parameters_are_default(custom, custom_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (!operation->can_output_key) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal(slot, + attributes->bits, + operation); + } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom( + attributes, operation, + (const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *) params, + params->data, params_data_length, + key); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(attributes, operation, + &default_custom_production, + NULL, 0, + key); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static int is_kdf_alg_supported(psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + return 1; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t) PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + + /* After this point, if kdf_alg is not valid then value of hash_alg may be + * invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + if (hash_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ + operation->capacity = 48U; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + { + (void) hash_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ + if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(operation, + kdf_alg); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_FFDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif + (void) alg; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static int psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input( + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 0; + } +#endif + (void) kdf_alg; + return 1; +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg); + status = psa_key_agreement_try_support(ka_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, kdf_alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->alg = alg; + } + return status; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + psa_status_t status; + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + /* We shouldn't be in different state as HKDF_EXPAND only allows + * two inputs: SECRET (this case) and INFO which does not modify + * the state. It could happen only if the hkdf + * object was corrupted. */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Allow only input that fits expected prk size */ + if (data_length != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + memcpy(hkdf->prk, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + { + /* HKDF: If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. + * HKDF-EXTRACT: salt is mandatory. */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof(hkdf->prk), + &data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + hkdf->block_number = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + /* The only block of output is the PRK. */ + memcpy(hkdf->output_block, hkdf->prk, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + { + /* Block 0 is empty, and the next block will be + * generated by psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(). */ + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg) && + hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (hkdf->info_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if (data_length != 0) { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (hkdf->info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(hkdf->info, data, data_length); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->seed == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->seed, data, data_length); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET && + prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->secret, data, data_length); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->label == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->label, data, data_length); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_label(prf, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const size_t pms_len = (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET ? + 4 + data_length + prf->other_secret_length : + 4 + 2 * data_length); + + if (data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + uint8_t *pms = mbedtls_calloc(1, pms_len); + if (pms == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + /* pure-PSK: + * Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + * + * mixed-PSK: + * In a DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK the premaster secret is formed as + * follows: concatenate a uint16 with the length of the other secret, + * the other secret itself, uint16 with the length of PSK, and the + * PSK itself. + * For details please check: + * - RFC 4279, Section 4 for the definition of RSA-PSK, + * - RFC 4279, Section 3 for the definition of DHE-PSK, + * - RFC 5489 for the definition of ECDHE-PSK. + */ + + if (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(prf->other_secret_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(prf->other_secret_length); + if (prf->other_secret_length != 0) { + memcpy(cur, prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + cur += prf->other_secret_length; + } + } else { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memset(cur, 0, data_length); + cur += data_length; + } + + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memcpy(cur, data, data_length); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, pms, (size_t) (cur - pms)); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(pms, pms_len); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->other_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->other_secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->other_secret, data, data_length); + prf->other_secret_length = data_length; + } else { + prf->other_secret_length = 0; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(prf, + data, data_length); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key(prf, + data, + data_length); + break; + default: + return psa_tls12_prf_input(prf, step, data, data_length); + break; + + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (data_length != PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE || + step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Check if the passed point is in an uncompressed form */ + if (data[0] != 0x04) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Only K.X has to be extracted - bytes 1 to 32 inclusive. */ + memcpy(ecjpake->data, data + 1, PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t data) +{ + if (step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data > PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (data == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->input_cost = data; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET) { + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET; + } else if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + /* Appending to existing salt. No state change. */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length == 0) { + /* Appending an empty string, nothing to do. */ + } else { + uint8_t *next_salt; + + next_salt = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length + pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (next_salt == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + if (pbkdf2->salt_length != 0) { + memcpy(next_salt, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + } + memcpy(next_salt + pbkdf2->salt_length, data, data_length); + pbkdf2->salt_length += data_length; + mbedtls_free(pbkdf2->salt); + pbkdf2->salt = next_salt; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len > PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, input, input_len, output, + PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE, output_len); + } else if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + } + *output_len = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len != PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC)) { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t zeros[16] = { 0 }; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(sizeof(zeros))); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + /* Passing PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC) as + * mac_size as the driver function sets mac_output_length = mac_size + * on success. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(&attributes, + zeros, sizeof(zeros), + PSA_ALG_CMAC, input, input_len, + output, + PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC), + output_len); + } else { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + *output_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_password(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + status = psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(hash_alg, data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_input(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(pbkdf2, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_password(pbkdf2, kdf_alg, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type(step, key_type); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_hkdf_input(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_input(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + &operation->ctx.pbkdf2, step, value); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + (void) step; + (void) value; + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal(operation, step, value); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + return status; + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET or PASSWORD input unlocks the + * permission to output to a key object. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET || + step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + return mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) + case PSA_ALG_FFDH: + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement(attributes, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +/** Internal function for raw key agreement + * Calls the driver wrapper which will hand off key agreement task + * to the driver's implementation if a driver is present. + * Fallback specified in the driver wrapper is built-in raw key agreement + * (psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin). + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement(&private_key->attr, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(operation->alg); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof(shared_secret), + &shared_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_length); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal(operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } else { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + size_t expected_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound + * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this + * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), + * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. + * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, + * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. + * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily + * be exact for it as well. */ + expected_length = + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits); + if (output_size < expected_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + /* Check for successful allocation of output, + * with an unsuccessful status. */ + if (output != NULL && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + if (output == NULL) { + /* output allocation failed. */ + *output_length = 0; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#endif + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if (rng->entropy_init == NULL) { + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + } + if (rng->entropy_free == NULL) { + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + } + + rng->entropy_init(&rng->entropy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(&rng->drbg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(&rng->drbg); + rng->entropy_free(&rng->entropy); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->drbg, &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof(drbg_seed) - 1); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + if (((seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM) || + (seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) || + (seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(seed, seed_size); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(type, bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (bits < PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(bits) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom, + const uint8_t *custom_data, + size_t custom_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + /* Only used for RSA */ + (void) custom; + (void) custom_data; + (void) custom_data_length; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_generate_random_internal(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(attributes, + custom_data, custom_data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + { + (void) key_buffer_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_custom(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom, + const uint8_t *custom_data, + size_t custom_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (custom->flags != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else +#endif + if (!psa_custom_key_parameters_are_default(custom, custom_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage ( thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the generated key material. */ + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->lifetime) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->type, attributes->bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key(attributes, + custom, + custom_data, custom_data_length, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + } + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_generate_key_custom( + attributes, + (const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *) params, + params->data, params_data_length, + key); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_generate_key_custom(attributes, + &default_custom_production, + NULL, 0, + key); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return status; +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Nothing to do to free transaction. */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) { + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + } + + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_wipe_all_key_slots(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + mbedtls_psa_random_free(&global_data.rng); + } + global_data.rng_state = RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&global_data.rng, sizeof(global_data.rng)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Terminate drivers */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_driver_wrapper_free(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +} + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction) +{ + switch (transaction->unknown.type) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ + default: + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem subsystem) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t driver_wrappers_initialized = 0; + + switch (subsystem) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED)) { + /* Init drivers */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_init(); + + /* Drivers need shutdown regardless of startup errors. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; + + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED)) { + status = psa_initialize_key_slots(); + + /* Need to wipe keys even if initialization fails. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + driver_wrappers_initialized = + (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Need to use separate mutex here, as initialisation can require + * testing of init flags, which requires locking the global data + * mutex. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + if (global_data.rng_state == RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED && driver_wrappers_initialized) { + mbedtls_psa_random_init(&global_data.rng); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed(&global_data.rng); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED)) { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction(); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction(&psa_crypto_transaction); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + } else if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Exit label only required when using threading macros. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +exit: +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. Early out if everything is + * done. */ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION); + +exit: + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); + } + + return status; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *password_len) +{ + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *password_len = inputs->password_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length) +{ + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (buffer_size < inputs->password_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(buffer, inputs->password, inputs->password_len); + *buffer_length = inputs->password_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *user_len) +{ + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *user_len = inputs->user_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len) +{ + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (user_id_size < inputs->user_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(user_id, inputs->user, inputs->user_len); + *user_id_len = inputs->user_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *peer_len) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *peer_len = inputs->peer_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (peer_id_size < inputs->peer_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(peer_id, inputs->peer, inputs->peer_len); + *peer_id_length = inputs->peer_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + if (inputs->cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *cipher_suite = inputs->cipher_suite; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(cipher_suite->algorithm) == 0 || + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(cipher_suite->hash) == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + memset(&operation->data.inputs, 0, sizeof(operation->data.inputs)); + + operation->alg = cipher_suite->algorithm; + operation->primitive = PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, + cipher_suite->family, cipher_suite->bits); + operation->data.inputs.cipher_suite = *cipher_suite; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + memset(computation_stage, 0, sizeof(*computation_stage)); + computation_stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +exit: + psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(password, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, + operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + + if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD && + type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.password = mbedtls_calloc(1, slot->key.bytes); + if (operation->data.inputs.password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + operation->data.inputs.password_len = slot->key.bytes; + operation->data.inputs.attributes = slot->attr; + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id_external, + size_t user_id_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(user_id_external, user_id); + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (user_id_len == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->data.inputs.user_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(user_id_external, user_id_len, user_id); + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.user, user_id, user_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.user_len = user_id_len; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(user_id_external, user_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id_external, + size_t peer_id_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_id_external, peer_id); + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (peer_id_len == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->data.inputs.peer_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_id_external, peer_id_len, peer_id); + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.peer, peer_id, peer_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.peer_len = peer_id_len; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_id_external, peer_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + if (role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; +#endif + default: + (void) role; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +exit: + psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +/* Auxiliary function to convert core computation stage to single driver step. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage) +{ + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t key_share_step; + if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST) { + int is_x1; + + if (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + is_x1 = (stage->outputs < 1); + } else { + is_x1 = (stage->inputs < 1); + } + + key_share_step = is_x1 ? + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + key_share_step = (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) ? + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + return PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + } + return (psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t) (key_share_step + stage->step - PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE); +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +static psa_status_t psa_pake_complete_inputs( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Create copy of the inputs on stack as inputs share memory + with the driver context which will be setup by the driver. */ + psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t inputs = operation->data.inputs; + + if (inputs.password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (inputs.user_len == 0 || inputs.peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + } + + /* Clear driver context */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&operation->data, sizeof(operation->data)); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup(operation, &inputs); + + /* Driver is responsible for creating its own copy of the password. */ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(inputs.password, inputs.password_len); + + /* User and peer are translated to role. */ + mbedtls_free(inputs.user); + mbedtls_free(inputs.peer); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } + return status; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_prologue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) +{ + if (step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FIRST && + computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Check that the step we are given is the one we were expecting */ + if (step != computation_stage->step) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + computation_stage->inputs == 0 && + computation_stage->outputs == 0) { + /* Start of the round, so function decides whether we are inputting + * or outputting */ + computation_stage->io_mode = io_mode; + } else if (computation_stage->io_mode != io_mode) { + /* Middle of the round so the mode we are in must match the function + * called by the user */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_epilogue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) +{ + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (stage->step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + /* End of an input/output */ + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_INPUT) { + stage->inputs++; + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT; + } + } + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + stage->outputs++; + if (stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_INPUT; + } + } + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round) && + stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + /* End of a round, move to the next round */ + stage->inputs = 0; + stage->outputs = 0; + stage->round++; + } + stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + stage->step++; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +psa_status_t psa_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (output_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output(operation, driver_step, + output, output_size, output_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + const size_t max_input_length = (size_t) PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(operation->alg, + operation->primitive, + step); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (input_length == 0 || input_length > max_input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input(operation, driver_step, + input, input_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t shared_key[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t shared_key_len = 0; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key(operation, + shared_key, + sizeof(shared_key), + &shared_key_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(output, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + shared_key, + shared_key_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_key, sizeof(shared_key)); +exit: + abort_status = psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort(operation); + } + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + if (operation->data.inputs.password != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->data.inputs.password, + operation->data.inputs.password_len); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.user != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.user); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.peer != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.peer); + } + } + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(psa_pake_operation_t)); + + return status; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE */ + +/* Memory copying test hooks. These are called before input copy, after input + * copy, before output copy and after output copy, respectively. + * They are used by memory-poisoning tests to temporarily unpoison buffers + * while they are copied. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +#endif + +/** Copy from an input buffer to a local copy. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] input_copy Pointer to a local copy in which to store the input data. + * \param[out] input_copy_len Length of the local copy buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the local + * copy is too small to hold contents of the + * input buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len) +{ + if (input_len > input_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_pre_copy_hook(input, input_len); + } +#endif + + if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(input_copy, input, input_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_post_copy_hook(input, input_len); + } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Copy from a local output buffer into a user-supplied one. + * + * \param[in] output_copy Pointer to a local buffer containing the output. + * \param[in] output_copy_len Length of the local buffer. + * \param[out] output Pointer to user-supplied output buffer. + * \param[out] output_len Length of the user-supplied output buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, if the + * user-supplied output buffer is too small to + * hold the contents of the local buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) +{ + if (output_len < output_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_pre_copy_hook(output, output_len); + } +#endif + + if (output_copy_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, output_copy, output_copy_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_post_copy_hook(output, output_len); + } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + *local_input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; + + if (input_len == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + local_input->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(input_len, 1); + if (local_input->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + /* From now on, we must free local_input->buffer on error. */ + + local_input->length = input_len; + + status = psa_crypto_copy_input(input, input_len, + local_input->buffer, local_input->length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; + return status; +} + +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) +{ + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + *local_output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; + + if (output_len == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + local_output->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(output_len, 1); + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + local_output->length = output_len; + local_output->original = output; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + local_output->length = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (local_output->original == NULL) { + /* We have an internal copy but nothing to copy back to. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + status = psa_crypto_copy_output(local_output->buffer, local_output->length, + local_output->original, local_output->length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + mbedtls_free(local_output->buffer); + local_output->buffer = NULL; + local_output->length = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a201985b4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + size_t key_bits = attributes->bits; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, attributes->type, + &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_ccm_init(&operation->ctx.ccm); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&operation->ctx.gcm); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if (alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + key_buffer)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + + operation->tag_length = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *tag; + + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* For all currently supported modes, the tag is at the end of the + * ciphertext. */ + if (ciphertext_size < (plaintext_length + operation.tag_length)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.ccm, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + tag, operation.tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.gcm, + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + operation.tag_length, tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (operation.tag_length != 16) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.chachapoly, + plaintext_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, + ciphertext, + tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) tag; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); + + return status; +} + +/* Locate the tag in a ciphertext buffer containing the encrypted data + * followed by the tag. Return the length of the part preceding the tag in + * *plaintext_length. This is the size of the plaintext in modes where + * the encrypted data has the same size as the plaintext, such as + * CCM and GCM. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag(size_t tag_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + size_t plaintext_size, + const uint8_t **p_tag) +{ + size_t payload_length; + if (tag_length > ciphertext_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + payload_length = ciphertext_length - tag_length; + if (payload_length > plaintext_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *p_tag = ciphertext + payload_length; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + const uint8_t *tag = NULL; + + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag(operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext_size, &tag); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.ccm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + ciphertext, plaintext, + tag, operation.tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.gcm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, plaintext)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (operation.tag_length != 16) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.chachapoly, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, + ciphertext, + plaintext)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + } + return status; +} + +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated encryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 1; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated decryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set a nonce for the multipart AEAD operation*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_starts(&operation->ctx.gcm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_starts(&operation->ctx.ccm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Note - ChaChaPoly allows an 8 byte nonce, but we would have to + * allocate a buffer in the operation, copy the nonce to it and pad + * it, so for now check the nonce is 12 bytes, as + * mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() assumes it can read 12 bytes from the + * passed in buffer. */ + if (nonce_length != 12) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + nonce, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(&operation->ctx.ccm, + ad_length, + plaintext_length, + operation->tag_length)); + + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + (void) operation; + (void) ad_length; + (void) plaintext_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.gcm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.ccm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input, + input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + * operation.*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + size_t update_output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + update_output_length = input_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update(&operation->ctx.gcm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update(&operation->ctx.ccm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input_length, + input, + output)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = update_output_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_output_size = 0; + + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_finish(&operation->ctx.gcm, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + /* tag must be big enough to store a tag of size passed into set + * lengths. */ + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_finish(&operation->ctx.ccm, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Belt and braces. Although the above tag_size check should have + * already done this, if we later start supporting smaller tag sizes + * for chachapoly, then passing a tag buffer smaller than 16 into here + * could cause a buffer overflow, so better safe than sorry. */ + if (tag_size < 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) ciphertext; + (void) ciphertext_size; + (void) ciphertext_length; + (void) tag; + (void) tag_size; + (void) tag_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* This will be zero for all supported algorithms currently, but left + * here for future support. */ + *ciphertext_length = finish_output_size; + *tag_length = operation->tag_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free(&operation->ctx.ccm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free(&operation->ctx.gcm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } + + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3216c948986 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,724 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa() below only checks if the proper build symbols + * are enabled, but it does not provide any compatibility check between them + * (i.e. if the specified key works with the specified algorithm). This helper + * function is meant to provide this support. + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa() might be used for the same purpose, but it + * requires CIPHER_C to be enabled. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_validate_values( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + /* Reduce code size - hinting to the compiler about what it can assume allows the compiler to + eliminate bits of the logic below. */ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CTR); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_OFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_XTS); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#endif + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CTR || + alg == PSA_ALG_CFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_OFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_XTS || + alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || + alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t *key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + /* Only DES modifies key_bits */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + (void) key_bits; +#endif + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0); + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) + case PSA_ALG_CTR: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) + case PSA_ALG_CFB: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) + case PSA_ALG_OFB: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + case PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else if (alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + switch (key_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, + * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ + if (*key_bits == 64) { + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; + } else { + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; + } + /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, + * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES + * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ + if (*key_bits == 128) { + *key_bits = 192; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (cipher_id != NULL) { + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_validate_values(alg, key_type); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, key_type, &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id_tmp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return NULL; + } + if (cipher_id != NULL) { + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher_id_tmp, (int) key_bits, mode); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->type; + + (void) key_buffer_size; + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&operation->ctx.cipher); + + operation->alg = alg; + key_bits = attributes->bits; + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(alg, key_type, + key_bits, NULL); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&operation->ctx.cipher, cipher_info); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128) { + /* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */ + uint8_t keys[24]; + memcpy(keys, key_buffer, 16); + memcpy(keys + 16, key_buffer, 8); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&operation->ctx.cipher, + keys, + 192, cipher_operation); + } else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&operation->ctx.cipher, key_buffer, + (int) key_bits, cipher_operation); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + switch (alg) { + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE); + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7); + break; + default: + /* The algorithm doesn't involve padding. */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + + operation->block_length = (PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) ? 1 : + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type)); + operation->iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg); + +exit: + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length) +{ + if (iv_length != operation->iv_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&operation->ctx.cipher, + iv, iv_length)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +/** Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. + * + * This requires manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being + * able to process arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, + * but the underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. + * + * \param ctx The mbedtls cipher context to use. It must have been + * set up for ECB. + * \param[in] input The input plaintext or ciphertext to process. + * \param input_length The number of bytes to process from \p input. + * This does not need to be aligned to a block boundary. + * If there is a partial block at the end of the input, + * it is stored in \p ctx for future processing. + * \param output The buffer where the output is written. It must be + * at least `BS * floor((p + input_length) / BS)` bytes + * long, where `p` is the number of bytes in the + * unprocessed partial block in \p ctx (with + * `0 <= p <= BS - 1`) and `BS` is the block size. + * \param output_length On success, the number of bytes written to \p output. + * \c 0 on error. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS or an error from a hardware accelerator + */ +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( + mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + size_t internal_output_length = 0; + *output_length = 0; + + if (input_length == 0) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) { + /* Fill up to block size, and run the block if there's a full one. */ + size_t bytes_to_copy = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + if (input_length < bytes_to_copy) { + bytes_to_copy = input_length; + } + + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), + input, bytes_to_copy); + input_length -= bytes_to_copy; + input += bytes_to_copy; + ctx->unprocessed_len += bytes_to_copy; + + if (ctx->unprocessed_len == block_size) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + } + + while (input_length >= block_size) { + /* Run all full blocks we have, one by one */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, input, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + input_length -= block_size; + input += block_size; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + /* Save unprocessed bytes for later processing */ + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), + input, input_length); + ctx->unprocessed_len += input_length; + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_output_size; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(operation->alg)) { + /* Take the unprocessed partial block left over from previous + * update calls, if any, plus the input to this call. Remove + * the last partial block, if any. You get the data that will be + * output in this call. */ + expected_output_size = + (operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len + input_length) + / operation->block_length * operation->block_length; + } else { + expected_output_size = input_length; + } + + if (output_size < expected_output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { + /* mbedtls_cipher_update has an API inconsistency: it will only + * process a single block at a time in ECB mode. Abstract away that + * inconsistency here to match the PSA API behaviour. */ + status = psa_cipher_update_ecb(&operation->ctx.cipher, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + if (input_length == 0) { + /* There is no input, nothing to be done */ + *output_length = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(&operation->ctx.cipher, input, + input_length, output, output_length)); + + if (*output_length > output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + uint8_t temp_output_buffer[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + if (operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len != 0) { + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_finish(&operation->ctx.cipher, + temp_output_buffer, + output_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (*output_length == 0) { + ; /* Nothing to copy. Note that output may be NULL in this case. */ + } else if (output_size >= *output_length) { + memcpy(output, temp_output_buffer, *output_length); + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(temp_output_buffer, + sizeof(temp_output_buffer)); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&operation->ctx.cipher); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t update_output_length, finish_output_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (iv_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation, iv, iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(&operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset(output, update_output_length), + output_size - update_output_length, &finish_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *output_length = update_output_length + finish_output_length; + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } else { + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation.iv_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation, + input, operation.iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(input, operation.iv_length), + input_length - operation.iv_length, + output, output_size, &olength); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + accumulated_length = olength; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset(output, accumulated_length), + output_size - accumulated_length, &olength); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } else { + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..72f671d63d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto client code + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + memset(attributes, 0, sizeof(*attributes)); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..de8a5269b34 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + + +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +/* END-common headers */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is declared with a lifetime not known to us. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key + (slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..95baff6a0fa --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,596 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid. + * + * Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated + * in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits). + */ +static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + case 224: + case 256: + case 384: + case 521: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 528: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 256: + case 384: + case 512: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (*bits) { + case 448: + case 255: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 256: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ + case 256: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + int explicit_bits = (curve_bits != 0); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * So its data length is 2m+1 where m is the curve size in bits. + */ + if ((data_length & 1) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + curve_bytes = data_length / 2; + + /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning + * their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + + /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer + * format, meaning their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + } + + if (explicit_bits) { + /* With an explicit bit-size, the data must have the matching length. */ + if (curve_bytes != PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else { + /* We need to infer the bit-size from the data. Since the only + * information we have is the length in bytes, the value of curve_bits + * at this stage is rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8. */ + curve_bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(curve_bytes); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */ + ecp = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair)); + if (ecp == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); + + status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the group. */ + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), + curve_bits); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp->grp, grp_id)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the key material. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + /* Load the public value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + data, + data_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Check that the point is on the curve. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + /* Load and validate the secret value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ecp->grp.id, + ecp, + data, + data_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + *p_ecp = ecp; +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + data, + data_length, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type) == + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; + } else { + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits; + } + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support + * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 + * copy operation. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(attributes->type, + ecp, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); +exit: + /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + /* Check whether the public part is loaded */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { + /* Calculate the public key */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + data_length, + data, + data_size)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + memset(data, 0, data_size); + } + + return status; + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ecp, data_length, data, data_size)); + return status; + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->type, attributes->bits, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type)), + ecp, data, data_size, data_length); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + attributes->type); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->bits); + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; + + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(grp_id, &ecp, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(&ecp, key_buffer_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp); + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDSA sign/verify */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.pbits); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + if (signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( + &ecp->grp, &r, &s, + &ecp->d, hash, + hash_length, md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); +#else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + (void) alg; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, + hash, hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, + signature, + curve_bytes)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + if (ret == 0) { + *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + (void) alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.pbits); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + if (signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, + signature, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecp->grp, hash, + hash_length, &ecp->Q, + &r, &s)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDH Key Agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(attributes->type) || + !PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ecp->grp.id, &bits); + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ecdh); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, ecp, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) != *shared_secret_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_size); + } + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ecdh); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(their_key); + mbedtls_free(their_key); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ae38f6d7c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* This header is only needed because it defines + * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in + * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module + * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */ +#include + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size, + mbedtls_mpi *P, + mbedtls_mpi *G) +{ + const unsigned char *dhm_P = NULL; + const unsigned char *dhm_G = NULL; + size_t dhm_size_P = 0; + size_t dhm_size_G = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (P == NULL && G == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + + switch (key_size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case sizeof(dhm_P_2048): + dhm_P = dhm_P_2048; + dhm_G = dhm_G_2048; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case sizeof(dhm_P_3072): + dhm_P = dhm_P_3072; + dhm_G = dhm_G_3072; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case sizeof(dhm_P_4096): + dhm_P = dhm_P_4096; + dhm_G = dhm_G_4096; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case sizeof(dhm_P_6144): + dhm_P = dhm_P_6144; + dhm_G = dhm_G_6144; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case sizeof(dhm_P_8192): + dhm_P = dhm_P_8192; + dhm_G = dhm_G_8192; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (P != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(P, dhm_P, + dhm_size_P)); + } + if (G != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(G, dhm_G, + dhm_size_G)); + } + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GX, G, X, P; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + if (key_buffer_size > data_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&GX); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); + + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_len, &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&GX, &G, &X, &P, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&GX, data, key_len)); + + *data_length = key_len; + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GX); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, P; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + (void) attributes; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_buffer_size, &P, NULL); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* RFC7919: Traditional finite field Diffie-Hellman has each peer choose their + secret exponent from the range [2, P-2]. + Select random value in range [3, P-1] and decrease it by 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&X, 3, &P, mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&X, &X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&X, key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + (void) attributes; + + if (key_buffer_size < data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi P, G, X, GY, K; + const size_t calculated_shared_secret_size = peer_key_length; + + if (peer_key_length != key_buffer_size || + calculated_shared_secret_size > shared_secret_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(psa_get_key_type(attributes))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator( + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits), &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&GY, peer_key, + peer_key_length)); + + /* Calculate shared secret public key: K = G^(XY) mod P = GY^X mod P */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &GY, &X, &P, NULL)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K, shared_secret, + calculated_shared_secret_size)); + + *shared_secret_length = calculated_shared_secret_size; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eeb7666c1cb --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,470 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation) +{ + switch (operation->alg) { + case 0: + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free(&operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_free(&operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_free(&operation->ctx.sha3); + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + operation->alg = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_init(&operation->ctx.md5); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_init(&operation->ctx.sha1); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 0); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 0); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) ? + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (ret == 0) { + operation->alg = alg; + } else { + mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation) +{ + switch (source_operation->alg) { + case 0: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone(&target_operation->ctx.md5, + &source_operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(&target_operation->ctx.ripemd160, + &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha1, + &source_operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha3, + &source_operation->ctx.sha3); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&operation->ctx.sha3, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t actual_hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(operation->alg); + + /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid hash + * (barring an attack on the hash and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + *hash_length = hash_size; + /* If hash_size is 0 then hash may be NULL and then the + * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */ + if (hash_size != 0) { + memset(hash, '!', hash_size); + } + + if (hash_size < actual_hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&operation->ctx.md5, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&operation->ctx.sha1, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&operation->ctx.sha3, hash, hash_size); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *hash_length = actual_hash_length; + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = hash_size; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_update(&operation, input, input_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_finish(&operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + abort_status = mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(&operation); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + return abort_status; + } else { + return status; + } + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8fe6218118b --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,496 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include + +#include +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hmac->opad, sizeof(hmac->opad)); + return psa_hash_abort(&hmac->hash_ctx); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + + hmac->alg = hash_alg; + + /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer + * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm + * is implemented correctly. */ + /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written + * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )` + * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */ + if (block_size > sizeof(ipad)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (block_size > sizeof(hmac->opad)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (block_size < hash_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (key_length > block_size) { + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, key, key_length, + ipad, sizeof(ipad), &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC, + * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for + * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be + * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */ + else if (key_length != 0) { + memcpy(ipad, key, key_length); + } + + /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36 + * to create the ipad value. */ + for (i = 0; i < key_length; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + } + memset(ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length); + + /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits, + * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */ + for (i = 0; i < key_length; i++) { + hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C; + } + memset(hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length); + + status = psa_hash_setup(&hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ipad, sizeof(ipad)); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + return psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size) +{ + uint8_t tmp[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg; + size_t hash_size = 0; + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */ + + status = psa_hash_setup(&hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(mac, tmp, mac_size); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, hash_size); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) +static psa_status_t cmac_setup(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept + * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */ + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && + (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 64 || + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 128)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + PSA_ALG_CMAC, + psa_get_key_type(attributes), + psa_get_key_bits(attributes), + NULL); + + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(&operation->ctx.cmac, + key_buffer, + psa_get_key_bits(attributes)); +exit: + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + +/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been + * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */ +static psa_status_t mac_init( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + operation->alg = alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + mbedtls_cipher_init(&operation->ctx.cmac); + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */ + operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) operation; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + mbedtls_cipher_free(&operation->ctx.cmac); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + psa_hmac_abort_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + goto bad_state; + } + + operation->alg = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +bad_state: + /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust + * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data. + * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten, + * but it's too late to do anything about this. */ + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = mac_init(operation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the + * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */ + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = cmac_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg)) { + status = psa_hmac_setup_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(&operation->ctx.cmac, + input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + return psa_hmac_update_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + input, input_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(&operation->ctx.cmac, tmp); + if (ret == 0) { + memcpy(mac, tmp, mac_size); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + return psa_hmac_finish_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + mac, mac_size); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(operation, mac, mac_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */ + if (mac_length > sizeof(actual_mac)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(operation, actual_mac, mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, mac_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac)); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + + status = psa_mac_setup(&operation, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_update(&operation, input, input_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(&operation, mac, mac_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(&operation); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9ac2e8c486e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c @@ -0,0 +1,571 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" + +#include +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * State sequence: + * + * psa_pake_setup() + * | + * |-- In any order: + * | | psa_pake_set_password_key() + * | | psa_pake_set_user() + * | | psa_pake_set_peer() + * | | psa_pake_set_role() + * | + * |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * psa_pake_abort() + */ + +/* + * Possible sequence of calls to implementation: + * + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&operation->ctx.jpake); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + operation->password, + operation->password_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->password, operation->password_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +/* The only two JPAKE user/peer identifiers supported in built-in implementation. */ +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t user_len = 0, peer_len = 0, password_len = 0; + uint8_t *peer = NULL, *user = NULL; + size_t actual_user_len = 0, actual_peer_len = 0, actual_password_len = 0; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(inputs, &password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(inputs, &user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(inputs, &peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(inputs, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + operation->password = mbedtls_calloc(1, password_len); + if (operation->password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_len); + if (user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_len); + if (peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(inputs, operation->password, + password_len, &actual_password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(inputs, user, + user_len, &actual_user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(inputs, peer, + peer_len, &actual_peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + operation->password_len = actual_password_len; + operation->alg = cipher_suite.algorithm; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (cipher_suite.type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC || + cipher_suite.family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 || + cipher_suite.bits != 256 || + cipher_suite.hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + const size_t user_peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); // client and server have the same length + if (actual_user_len != user_peer_len || + actual_peer_len != user_peer_len) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + if (memcmp(user, jpake_client_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_server_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } else + if (memcmp(user, jpake_server_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_client_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + + status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + /* Role has been set, release user/peer buffers. */ + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) operation; + (void) inputs; +#endif + { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } + +error: + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + /* In case of failure of the setup of a multipart operation, the PSA driver interface + * specifies that the core does not call any other driver entry point thus does not + * call mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(). Therefore call it here to do the needed clean + * up like freeing the memory that may have been allocated to store the password. + */ + mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t length; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of output sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data + * at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be + * retrieved in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, the whole X1+X2 or X2S steps + * data is stored in an intermediate buffer at first step output call, + * and data is sliced down by parsing the ECPoint records in order + * to return the right parts on each step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* Initialize & write round on KEY_SHARE sequences */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_xxx() outputs thing in the format + * defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. The summary is + * that the data for each step is prepended with a length byte, and + * then they're concatenated. Additionally, the server's second round + * output is prepended with a 3-bytes ECParameters structure. + * + * In PSA, we output each step separately, and don't prepend the + * output with a length byte, even less a curve identifier, as that + * information is already available. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + /* Skip ECParameters, with is 3 bytes (RFC 8422) */ + operation->buffer_offset += 3; + } + + /* Read the length byte then move past it to the data */ + length = operation->buffer[operation->buffer_offset]; + operation->buffer_offset += 1; + + if (operation->buffer_offset + length > operation->buffer_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + + if (output_size < length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(output, + operation->buffer + operation->buffer_offset, + length); + *output_length = length; + + operation->buffer_offset += length; + + /* Reset buffer after ZK_PROOF sequence */ + if ((step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) || + (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + operation, step, output, output_size, output_length); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of input sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data + * at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be + * given in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data + * is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the + * Mbed TLS JPAKE API on the last step. + * + * This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* + * Copy input to local buffer and format it as the Mbed TLS API + * expects, i.e. as defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. + * The summary is that the data for each step is prepended with a + * length byte, and then they're concatenated. Additionally, the + * server's second round output is prepended with a 3-bytes + * ECParameters structure - which means we have to prepend that when + * we're a client. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) { + /* We only support secp256r1. */ + /* This is the ECParameters structure defined by RFC 8422. */ + unsigned char ecparameters[3] = { + 3, /* named_curve */ + 0, 23 /* secp256r1 */ + }; + + if (operation->buffer_length + sizeof(ecparameters) > + sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + ecparameters, sizeof(ecparameters)); + operation->buffer_length += sizeof(ecparameters); + } + + /* + * The core checks that input_length is smaller than + * PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * Thus no risk of integer overflow here. + */ + if (operation->buffer_length + input_length + 1 > sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Write the length byte */ + operation->buffer[operation->buffer_length] = (uint8_t) input_length; + operation->buffer_length += 1; + + /* Finally copy the data */ + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + input, input_length); + operation->buffer_length += input_length; + + /* Load buffer at each last round ZK_PROOF */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + operation, step, input, input_length); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&operation->ctx.jpake, + output, + output_size, + output_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) output; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->password, operation->password_len); + operation->password = NULL; + operation->password_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&operation->ctx.jpake); + } +#endif + + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..38dc3b8edc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,705 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include "rsa_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes + * that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no + * way to return the exact bit size of a key. + * To keep things simple, reject non-byte-aligned key sizes. */ +static psa_status_t psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +{ + mbedtls_mpi n; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&n); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&n) % 8 != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&n); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t bits; + + *p_rsa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + if (*p_rsa == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_rsa_init(*p_rsa); + + /* Parse the data. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS + * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(*p_rsa)); + if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(*p_rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + data, + data_length, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)); + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export + * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is + * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up + * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, + rsa, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); +exit: + /* Always free the RSA object */ + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t *end = data + data_size; + + /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded + * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a + * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, data, &end); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, data, &end); + } + + if (ret < 0) { + /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */ + memset(data, 0, data_size); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer. + * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data + * at the original location. */ + if (2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size) { + memcpy(data, data + data_size - ret, ret); + memset(data + data_size - ret, 0, ret); + } else if ((size_t) ret < data_size) { + memmove(data, data + data_size - ret, ret); + memset(data + ret, 0, data_size - ret); + } + + *data_length = ret; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, + rsa, + data, + data_size, + data_length); + } + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent(const uint8_t *e_bytes, + size_t e_length, + int *exponent) +{ + size_t i; + uint32_t acc = 0; + + /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only + * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than + * int on just about every platform anyway. */ + if (e_length > sizeof(acc)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + for (i = 0; i < e_length; i++) { + acc = (acc << 8) | e_bytes[i]; + } + if (acc > INT_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + *exponent = acc; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *custom_data, size_t custom_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int exponent = 65537; + + if (custom_data_length != 0) { + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent(custom_data, custom_data_length, + &exponent); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + (unsigned int) attributes->bits, + exponent); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, + &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Sign/verify hashes */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + +/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in + * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */ +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type(psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t hash_length, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + + /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length + * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an + * overflow later. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (hash_length > UINT_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif + + /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ + if (alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) { + if (*md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(*md_alg) != hash_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) +static int rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + size_t hash_length) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY; + } + /* Otherwise: standard salt length, i.e. largest possible salt length + * up to the hash length. */ + int klen = (int) mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); // known to fit + int hlen = (int) hash_length; // known to fit + int room = klen - 2 - hlen; + if (room < 0) { + return 0; // there is no valid signature in this case anyway + } else if (room > hlen) { + return hlen; + } else { + return room; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + if (ret == 0) { + int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(alg, rsa, hash_length); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned) hash_length, + hash, + md_alg, + slen, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but + * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in + * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */ + status = (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) ? + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE : + mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static int psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + + /* Just to get the error status right, as rsa_set_padding() doesn't + * distinguish between "bad RSA algorithm" and "unknown hash". */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg) == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + } + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7a36a4f3a5f --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver lookup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* This structure is identical to psa_drv_se_context_t declared in + * `crypto_se_driver.h`, except that some parts are writable here + * (non-const, or pointer to non-const). */ +typedef struct { + void *persistent_data; + size_t persistent_data_size; + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_internal_context_t; + +struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s { + psa_key_location_t location; + const psa_drv_se_t *methods; + union { + psa_drv_se_internal_context_t internal; + psa_drv_se_context_t context; + } u; +}; + +static psa_se_drv_table_entry_t driver_table[PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS]; + +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + size_t i; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime); + /* In the driver table, location=0 means an entry that isn't used. + * No driver has a location of 0 because it's a reserved value + * (which designates transparent keys). Make sure we never return + * a driver entry for location 0. */ + if (location == 0) { + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].location == location) { + return &driver_table[i]; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + return driver->methods; +} + +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + return &driver->u.context; +} + +int psa_get_se_driver(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context) +{ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(lifetime); + if (p_methods != NULL) { + *p_methods = (driver ? driver->methods : NULL); + } + if (p_drv_context != NULL) { + *p_drv_context = (driver ? &driver->u.context : NULL); + } + return driver != NULL; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Persistent data management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_storage_uid_t *uid) +{ + if (driver->location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ + if (driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ + *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + size_t length; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid(driver, &uid); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Read the amount of persistent data that the driver requests. + * If the data in storage is larger, it is truncated. If the data + * in storage is smaller, silently keep what is already at the end + * of the output buffer. */ + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return psa_its_get(uid, 0, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + &length); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid(driver, &uid); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return psa_its_set(uid, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data(psa_key_location_t location) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + if (location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + location; + return psa_its_remove(uid); +} + +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_location_t key_location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); + + /* If the location is wrong, it's a bug in the library. */ + if (driver->location != key_location) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* If the driver doesn't support key creation in any way, give up now. */ + if (driver->methods->key_management == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (psa_get_key_slot_number(attributes, slot_number) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* The application wants to use a specific slot. Allow it if + * the driver supports it. On a system with isolation, + * the crypto service must check that the application is + * permitted to request this slot. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number = + driver->methods->key_management->p_validate_slot_number; + if (p_validate_slot_number == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + status = p_validate_slot_number(&driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + *slot_number); + } else if (method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER) { + /* The application didn't specify a slot number. This doesn't + * make sense when registering a slot. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else { + /* The application didn't tell us which slot to use. Let the driver + * choose. This is the normal case. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate = + driver->methods->key_management->p_allocate; + if (p_allocate == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + status = p_allocate(&driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + slot_number); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key(psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t storage_status; + /* Normally a missing method would mean that the action is not + * supported. But psa_destroy_key() is not supposed to return + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: if you can create a key, you should + * be able to destroy it. The only use case for a driver that + * does not have a way to destroy keys at all is if the keys are + * locked in a read-only state: we can use the keys but not + * destroy them. Hence, if the driver doesn't support destroying + * keys, it's really a lack of permission. */ + if (driver->methods->key_management == NULL || + driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + status = driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + slot_number); + storage_status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? storage_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers(void) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = &driver_table[i]; + if (driver->location == 0) { + continue; /* skipping unused entry */ + } + const psa_drv_se_t *methods = psa_get_se_driver_methods(driver); + if (methods->p_init != NULL) { + psa_status_t status = methods->p_init( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + driver->location); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver registration */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods) +{ + size_t i; + psa_status_t status; + + if (methods->hal_version != PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + /* Driver table entries are 0-initialized. 0 is not a valid driver + * location because it means a transparent key. */ + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, + "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key"); + + if (location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].location == 0) { + break; + } + /* Check that location isn't already in use up to the first free + * entry. Since entries are created in order and never deleted, + * there can't be a used entry after the first free entry. */ + if (driver_table[i].location == location) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + } + if (i == PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + driver_table[i].location = location; + driver_table[i].methods = methods; + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data_size = + methods->persistent_data_size; + + if (methods->persistent_data_size != 0) { + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data = + mbedtls_calloc(1, methods->persistent_data_size); + if (driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + /* Load the driver's persistent data. On first use, the persistent + * data does not exist in storage, and is initialized to + * all-bits-zero by the calloc call just above. */ + status = psa_load_se_persistent_data(&driver_table[i]); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + goto error; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + memset(&driver_table[i], 0, sizeof(driver_table[i])); + return status; +} + +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers(void) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data); + } + } + memset(driver_table, 0, sizeof(driver_table)); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9850d8c7505 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,1131 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + + + +/* Make sure we have distinct ranges of key identifiers for distinct + * purposes. */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX, + "Empty user key ID range"); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX, + "Empty vendor key ID range"); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX, + "Empty builtin key ID range"); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX, + "Empty volatile key ID range"); + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN || + PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN, + "Overlap between user key IDs and vendor key IDs"); + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN && + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX, + "Builtin key identifiers are not in the vendor range"); + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN && + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX, + "Volatile key identifiers are not in the vendor range"); + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN || + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN, + "Overlap between builtin key IDs and volatile key IDs"); + + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + +/* Dynamic key store. + * + * The key store consists of multiple slices. + * + * The volatile keys are stored in variable-sized tables called slices. + * Slices are allocated on demand and deallocated when possible. + * The size of slices increases exponentially, so the average overhead + * (number of slots that are allocated but not used) is roughly + * proportional to the number of keys (with a factor that grows + * when the key store is fragmented). + * + * One slice is dedicated to the cache of persistent and built-in keys. + * For simplicity, they are separated from volatile keys. This cache + * slice has a fixed size and has the slice index KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX, + * located after the slices for volatile keys. + */ + +/* Size of the last slice containing the cache of persistent and built-in keys. */ +#define PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + +/* Volatile keys are stored in slices 0 through + * (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1) inclusive. + * Each slice is twice the size of the previous slice. + * Volatile key identifiers encode the slice number as follows: + * bits 30..31: 0b10 (mandated by the PSA Crypto specification). + * bits 25..29: slice index (0...KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT-1) + * bits 0..24: slot index in slice + */ +#define KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH 25u +#define KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH 5u + +#define KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH 16u +#define KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT 22u +#define KEY_SLICE_COUNT (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT + 1u) +#define KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT + + +/* Check that the length of the largest slice (calculated as + * KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX below) does not overflow size_t. We use + * an indirect method in case the calculation of KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX + * itself overflows uintmax_t: if (BASE_LENGTH << c) + * overflows size_t then BASE_LENGTH > SIZE_MAX >> c. + */ +#if (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH > \ + SIZE_MAX >> (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1)) +#error "Maximum slice length overflows size_t" +#endif + +#if KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH + KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH > 30 +#error "Not enough room in volatile key IDs for slice index and slot index" +#endif +#if KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT > (1 << KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH) +#error "Too many slices to fit the slice index in a volatile key ID" +#endif +#define KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX \ + (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH << (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1)) +#if KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX > 1 << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH +#error "Not enough room in volatile key IDs for a slot index in the largest slice" +#endif +#if KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH > 8 +#error "Slice index does not fit in uint8_t for psa_key_slot_t::slice_index" +#endif + + +/* Calculate the volatile key id to use for a given slot. + * This function assumes valid parameter values. */ +static psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id_of_index(size_t slice_idx, + size_t slot_idx) +{ + /* We assert above that the slice and slot indexes fit in separate + * bit-fields inside psa_key_id_t, which is a 32-bit type per the + * PSA Cryptography specification. */ + return (psa_key_id_t) (0x40000000u | + (slice_idx << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) | + slot_idx); +} + +/* Calculate the slice containing the given volatile key. + * This function assumes valid parameter values. */ +static size_t slice_index_of_volatile_key_id(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + size_t mask = (1LU << KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH) - 1; + return (key_id >> KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) & mask; +} + +/* Calculate the index of the slot containing the given volatile key. + * This function assumes valid parameter values. */ +static size_t slot_index_of_volatile_key_id(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + return key_id & ((1LU << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) - 1); +} + +/* In global_data.first_free_slot_index, use this special value to + * indicate that the slice is full. */ +#define FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE ((size_t) -1) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +size_t psa_key_slot_volatile_slice_count(void) +{ + return KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT; +} +#endif + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + +/* Static key store. + * + * All the keys (volatile or persistent) are in a single slice. + * We only use slices as a concept to allow some differences between + * static and dynamic key store management to be buried in auxiliary + * functions. + */ + +#define PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT +#define KEY_SLICE_COUNT 1u +#define KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + +typedef struct { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + psa_key_slot_t *key_slices[KEY_SLICE_COUNT]; + size_t first_free_slot_index[KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT]; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + uint8_t key_slots_initialized; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +static uint8_t psa_get_key_slots_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.key_slots_initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + + + +/** The length of the given slice in the key slot table. + * + * \param slice_idx The slice number. It must satisfy + * 0 <= slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT. + * + * \return The number of elements in the given slice. + */ +static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx); + +/** Get a pointer to the slot where the given volatile key is located. + * + * \param key_id The key identifier. It must be a valid volatile key + * identifier. + * \return A pointer to the only slot that the given key + * can be in. Note that the slot may be empty or + * contain a different key. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id); + +/** Get a pointer to an entry in the persistent key cache. + * + * \param slot_idx The index in the table. It must satisfy + * 0 <= slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT. + * \return A pointer to the slot containing the given + * persistent key cache entry. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx); + +/** Get a pointer to a slot given by slice and index. + * + * \param slice_idx The slice number. It must satisfy + * 0 <= slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT. + * \param slot_idx An index in the given slice. It must satisfy + * 0 <= slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx). + * + * \return A pointer to the given slot. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +size_t (*mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length)(size_t slice_idx) = NULL; +#endif + +static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx) +{ + if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX) { + return PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT; + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length != NULL) { + return mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length(slice_idx); + } +#endif + return KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH << slice_idx; + } +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + size_t slice_idx = slice_index_of_volatile_key_id(key_id); + if (slice_idx >= KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) { + return NULL; + } + size_t slot_idx = slot_index_of_volatile_key_id(key_id); + if (slot_idx >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) { + return NULL; + } + psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx]; + if (slice == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + return &slice[slot_idx]; +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx) +{ + return &global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX][slot_idx]; +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx) +{ + return &global_data.key_slices[slice_idx][slot_idx]; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + +static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx) +{ + (void) slice_idx; + return ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots); +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots) <= + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + 1, + "The key slot array is larger than the volatile key ID range"); + return &global_data.key_slots[key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN]; +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx) +{ + return &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; +} + +static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx) +{ + (void) slice_idx; + return &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + + +int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok) +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); + + if ((PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= key_id) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX)) { + return 1; + } + + if (vendor_ok && + (PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= key_id) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Get the description in memory of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are + * stored in key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot + * containing the description of a key given its identifier. + * + * The function searches the key slots containing the description of the key + * with \p key identifier. The function does only read accesses to the key + * slots. The function does not load any persistent key thus does not access + * any storage. + * + * For volatile key identifiers, only one key slot is queried as a volatile + * key with identifier key_id can only be stored in slot of index + * ( key_id - #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ). + * + * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The pointer to the key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key was returned. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key in the key slots. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if (psa_key_id_is_volatile(key_id)) { + slot = get_volatile_key_slot(key_id); + + /* Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. */ + if (slot != NULL && + slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL && + mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + } else { + if (!psa_is_valid_key_id(key, 1)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + slot = get_persistent_key_slot(slot_idx); + /* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { + break; + } + } + status = (slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_register_read(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *p_slot = slot; + } + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX] = + mbedtls_calloc(PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT, + sizeof(*global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX])); + if (global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX] == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. The global + * data mutex is already held when calling this function, so no need to + * lock it here, to set the flag. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) +{ + for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) { + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + for (size_t slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx); slot_idx++) { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(slice_idx, slot_idx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + /* When MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled, calling + * psa_wipe_key_slot() on an unused slot is useless, but it + * happens to work (because we flip the state to PENDING_DELETION). + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled, + * psa_wipe_key_slot() needs to have a valid slice_index + * field, but that value might not be correct in a + * free slot, so we must not call it. + * + * Bypass the call to psa_wipe_key_slot() if the slot is empty, + * but only if MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled, to save + * a few bytes of code size otherwise. + */ + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { + continue; + } +#endif + slot->var.occupied.registered_readers = 1; + slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; + (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + mbedtls_free(global_data.key_slices[slice_idx]); + global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) { + global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + /* The global data mutex is already held when calling this function. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + +static psa_status_t psa_allocate_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + size_t slice_idx; + for (slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) { + if (global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] != FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE) { + break; + } + } + if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) { + global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] = + mbedtls_calloc(key_slice_length(slice_idx), + sizeof(psa_key_slot_t)); + if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + } + psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx]; + + size_t slot_idx = global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx]; + *key_id = volatile_key_id_of_index(slice_idx, slot_idx); + + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &slice[slot_idx]; + size_t next_free = slot_idx + 1 + slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next; + if (next_free >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) { + next_free = FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE; + } + global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = next_free; + /* The .next_free field is not meaningful when the slot is not free, + * so give it the same content as freshly initialized memory. */ + slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next = 0; + + psa_status_t status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, + PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* The only reason for failure is if the slot state was not empty. + * This indicates that something has gone horribly wrong. + * In this case, we leave the slot out of the free list, and stop + * modifying it. This minimizes any further corruption. The slot + * is a memory leak, but that's a lesser evil. */ + return status; + } + + *p_slot = slot; + /* We assert at compile time that the slice index fits in uint8_t. */ + slot->slice_index = (uint8_t) slice_idx; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_free_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, + psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + + if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX) { + /* This is a cache entry. We don't maintain a free list, so + * there's nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (slice_idx >= KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx]; + psa_key_slot_t *slice_end = slice + key_slice_length(slice_idx); + if (slot < slice || slot >= slice_end) { + /* The slot isn't actually in the slice! We can't detect that + * condition for sure, because the pointer comparison itself is + * undefined behavior in that case. That same condition makes the + * subtraction to calculate the slot index also UB. + * Give up now to avoid causing further corruption. + */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + size_t slot_idx = slot - slice; + + size_t next_free = global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx]; + if (next_free >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) { + /* The slot was full. The newly freed slot thus becomes the + * end of the free list. */ + next_free = key_slice_length(slice_idx); + } + global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = slot_idx; + slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next = + (int32_t) next_free - (int32_t) slot_idx - 1; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot; + + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + if (volatile_key_id != NULL) { + return psa_allocate_volatile_key_slot(volatile_key_id, p_slot); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + + /* With a dynamic key store, allocate an entry in the cache slice, + * applicable only to non-volatile keys that get cached in RAM. + * With a static key store, allocate an entry in the sole slice, + * applicable to all keys. */ + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX, slot_idx); + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { + selected_slot = slot; + break; + } + + if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && + (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) && + (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) { + unused_persistent_key_slot = slot; + } + } + + /* + * If there is no unused key slot and there is at least one unlocked key + * slot containing the description of a persistent key, recycle the first + * such key slot we encountered. If we later need to operate on the + * persistent key we are evicting now, we will reload its description from + * storage. + */ + if ((selected_slot == NULL) && + (unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot; + psa_register_read(selected_slot); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + } + + if (selected_slot != NULL) { + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + selected_slot->slice_index = KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + if (volatile_key_id != NULL) { + /* Refresh slot_idx, for when the slot is not the original + * selected_slot but rather unused_persistent_key_slot. */ + slot_idx = selected_slot - global_data.key_slots; + *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + slot_idx; + } +#endif + *p_slot = selected_slot; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + + status = psa_load_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + &key_data, &key_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Special handling is required for loading keys associated with a + * dynamically registered SE interface. */ + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + if (psa_get_se_driver(slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t *data; + + if (key_data_length != sizeof(*data)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + data = (psa_se_key_data_storage_t *) key_data; + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, data->slot_number, sizeof(data->slot_number)); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(slot, key_data, key_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + +static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = 0; + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + size_t key_buffer_length = 0; + + if (!psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id))) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + /* Check the platform function to see whether this key actually exists */ + status = mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + slot->attr.id, &lifetime, &slot_number); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Set required key attributes to ensure get_builtin_key can retrieve the + * full attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id(&attributes, slot->attr.id); + psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, lifetime); + + /* Get the full key attributes from the driver in order to be able to + * calculate the required buffer size. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + NULL, 0, NULL); + if (status != PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + /* Builtin keys cannot be defined by the attributes alone */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + return status; + } + + /* If the key should exist according to the platform, then ask the driver + * what its expected size is. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&attributes, + &key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Allocate a buffer of the required size and load the builtin key directly + * into the (now properly sized) slot buffer. */ + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &key_buffer_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ + slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; + slot->attr = attributes; +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *p_slot = NULL; + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + /* If the key is persistent and not loaded, we cannot unlock the mutex + * between checking if the key is loaded and setting the slot as FULL, + * as otherwise another thread may load and then destroy the key + * in the meantime. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + /* + * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller + * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(NULL, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + (*p_slot)->attr.id = key; + (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT; + + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Load keys in the 'builtin' range through their own interface */ + status = psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(*p_slot); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(*p_slot); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot); + + /* If the key does not exist, we need to return + * PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE. */ + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } else { + /* Add implicit usage flags. */ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage); + + psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + status = psa_register_read(*p_slot); + } + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *p_slot = NULL; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if (slot == NULL) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion, + * we must wipe the slot here. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) && + (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1)) { + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } + + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + slot->var.occupied.registered_readers--; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with + * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers: + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and + * the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. + */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)); + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(lifetime)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Check whether a driver is registered against this lifetime */ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(lifetime); + if (driver != NULL) { + if (p_drv != NULL) { + *p_drv = driver; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + (void) p_drv; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { + /* Volatile keys are always supported */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + /* Persistent keys require storage support */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + return status; + } + + *handle = key; + + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + (void) key; + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if (psa_key_handle_is_null(handle)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(handle, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && + (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1)) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; +} + +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) +{ + memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats)); + + for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) + if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) { + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */ + for (size_t slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx); slot_idx++) { + const psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(slice_idx, slot_idx); + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { + ++stats->empty_slots; + continue; + } + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + ++stats->locked_slots; + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + ++stats->volatile_slots; + } else { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id); + ++stats->persistent_slots; + if (id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id) { + stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id; + } + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id); + ++stats->external_slots; + if (id > stats->max_open_external_key_id) { + stats->max_open_external_key_id = id; + } + } + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7d1317b45a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +/* + * PSA persistent key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key storage */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Determine a file name (ITS file identifier) for the given key identifier. + * The file name must be distinct from any file that is used for a purpose + * other than storing a key. Currently, the only such file is the random seed + * file whose name is PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID and whose value is + * 0xFFFFFF52. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + /* Encode the owner in the upper 32 bits. This means that if + * owner values are nonzero (as they are on a PSA platform), + * no key file will ever have a value less than 0x100000000, so + * the whole range 0..0xffffffff is available for non-key files. */ + uint32_t unsigned_owner_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(key); + return ((uint64_t) unsigned_owner_id << 32) | + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); +#else + /* Use the key id directly as a file name. + * psa_is_key_id_valid() in psa_crypto_slot_management.c + * is responsible for ensuring that key identifiers do not have a + * value that is reserved for non-key files. */ + return key; +#endif +} + +/** + * \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a + * buffer. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This + * should be an occupied storage location. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + size_t data_length = 0; + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_its_get(data_identifier, 0, (uint32_t) data_size, data, &data_length); + if (data_size != data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + return status; +} + +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + + if (ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This + * should be an unoccupied storage location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored. + * \param data_length The number of bytes + * that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + if (psa_is_key_present_in_storage(key) == 1) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + + status = psa_its_set(data_identifier, (uint32_t) data_length, data, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (data_identifier_info.size != data_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Remove the file in case we managed to create it but something + * went wrong. It's ok if the file doesn't exist. If the file exists + * but the removal fails, we're already reporting an error so there's + * nothing else we can do. */ + (void) psa_its_remove(data_identifier); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + if (psa_its_remove(data_identifier) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (ret != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * \brief Get data length for given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length + * is to be obtained. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + *data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * Persistent key storage magic header. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH (sizeof(PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER)) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof(psa_key_lifetime_t)]; + uint8_t type[2]; + uint8_t bits[2]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof(psa_key_policy_t)]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data) +{ + psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + + memcpy(storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(0, storage_format->version, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE((uint16_t) attr->type, storage_format->type, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE((uint16_t) attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof(uint32_t)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0); + memcpy(storage_format->key_data, data, data_length); +} + +static psa_status_t check_magic_header(const uint8_t *data) +{ + if (memcmp(data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attr) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + uint32_t version; + + if (storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + status = check_magic_header(storage_data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->version, 0); + if (version != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + *key_data_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->data_len, 0); + if (*key_data_length > (storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format)) || + *key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + if (*key_data_length == 0) { + *key_data = NULL; + } else { + *key_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, *key_data_length); + if (*key_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(*key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length); + } + + attr->lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->lifetime, 0); + attr->type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(storage_format->type, 0); + attr->bits = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(storage_format->bits, 0); + attr->policy.usage = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, 0); + attr->policy.alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, sizeof(uint32_t)); + attr->policy.alg2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length) +{ + size_t storage_data_length; + uint8_t *storage_data; + psa_status_t status; + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if (data == NULL || data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof(psa_persistent_key_storage_format); + + storage_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, storage_data_length); + if (storage_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + psa_format_key_data_for_storage(data, data_length, attr, storage_data); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_store(attr->id, + storage_data, storage_data_length); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(storage_data, storage_data_length); + + return status; +} + +void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_data, key_data_length); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *loaded_data; + size_t storage_data_length = 0; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = attr->id; + + status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length(key, &storage_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, storage_data_length); + + if (loaded_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_crypto_storage_load(key, loaded_data, storage_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(loaded_data, storage_data_length, + data, data_length, attr); + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && + (*data == NULL || *data_length == 0)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(loaded_data, storage_data_length); + return status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Transactions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction(void) +{ + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + psa_status_t status; + status = psa_its_get_info(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, &p_info); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* This shouldn't happen: we're trying to start a transaction while + * there is still a transaction that hasn't been replayed. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return status; + } + return psa_its_set(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, + sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction), + &psa_crypto_transaction, + 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction(void) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t length; + status = psa_its_get(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, 0, + sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction), + &psa_crypto_transaction, &length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (length != sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction(void) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_its_remove(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID); + /* Whether or not updating the storage succeeded, the transaction is + * finished now. It's too late to go back, so zero out the in-memory + * data. */ + memset(&psa_crypto_transaction, 0, sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction)); + return status; +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generator state */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, &p_info); + + if (PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST == status) { /* No seed exists */ + status = psa_its_set(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, seed_size, seed, 0); + } else if (PSA_SUCCESS == status) { + /* You should not be here. Seed needs to be injected only once */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..95671374837 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * PSA ITS simulator over stdio files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#endif + +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + (sizeof(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX + +/* The maximum value of psa_storage_info_t.size */ +#define PSA_ITS_MAX_SIZE 0xffffffff + +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING "PSA\0ITS\0" +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH 8 + +/* As rename fails on Windows if the new filepath already exists, + * use MoveFileExA with the MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING flag instead. + * Returns 0 on success, nonzero on failure. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) +#define rename_replace_existing(oldpath, newpath) \ + (!MoveFileExA(oldpath, newpath, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING)) +#else +#define rename_replace_existing(oldpath, newpath) rename(oldpath, newpath) +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + uint8_t size[sizeof(uint32_t)]; + uint8_t flags[sizeof(psa_storage_create_flags_t)]; +} psa_its_file_header_t; + +static void psa_its_fill_filename(psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf(filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned) (uid >> 32), + (unsigned) (uid & 0xffffffff), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info, + FILE **p_stream) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + *p_stream = NULL; + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + *p_stream = fopen(filename, "rb"); + if (*p_stream == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(*p_stream, NULL); + + n = fread(&header, 1, sizeof(header), *p_stream); + if (n != sizeof(header)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + if (memcmp(header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, + PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + + p_info->size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.size, 0); + p_info->flags = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.flags, 0); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + status = psa_its_read_file(uid, p_info, &stream); + if (stream != NULL) { + fclose(stream); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + size_t n; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + status = psa_its_read_file(uid, &info, &stream); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (data_offset + data_length < data_offset) { + goto exit; + } +#if SIZE_MAX < 0xffffffff + if (data_offset + data_length > SIZE_MAX) { + goto exit; + } +#endif + if (data_offset + data_length > info.size) { + goto exit; + } + + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#if LONG_MAX < 0xffffffff + while (data_offset > LONG_MAX) { + if (fseek(stream, LONG_MAX, SEEK_CUR) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + data_offset -= LONG_MAX; + } +#endif + if (fseek(stream, data_offset, SEEK_CUR) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + n = fread(p_data, 1, data_length, stream); + if (n != data_length) { + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (p_data_length != NULL) { + *p_data_length = n; + } + +exit: + if (stream != NULL) { + fclose(stream); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags) +{ + if (uid == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + memcpy(header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(data_length, header.size, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(create_flags, header.flags, 0); + + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + stream = fopen(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb"); + + if (stream == NULL) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(stream, NULL); + + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + n = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), stream); + if (n != sizeof(header)) { + goto exit; + } + if (data_length != 0) { + n = fwrite(p_data, 1, data_length, stream); + if (n != data_length) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if (stream != NULL) { + int ret = fclose(stream); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (rename_replace_existing(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, filename) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + } + /* The temporary file may still exist, but only in failure cases where + * we're already reporting an error. So there's nothing we can do on + * failure. If the function succeeded, and in some error cases, the + * temporary file doesn't exist and so remove() is expected to fail. + * Thus we just ignore the return status of remove(). */ + (void) remove(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream; + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + stream = fopen(filename, "rb"); + if (stream == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + fclose(stream); + if (remove(filename) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..679d00ea9b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,608 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/* This is needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +#include +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include +#endif +#include + +/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since + * it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < local_errors_num; i++) { + if (status == local_translations[i].psa_status) { + return local_translations[i].mbedtls_error; + } + } + return fallback_f(status); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT: + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID: + case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + default: + return psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits) +{ + switch (grpid) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif + default: + *bits = 0; + return 0; + } +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1; +#endif + } + break; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +/** + * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der + * buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end). + * + * \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be + * converted. + * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. This must be > 0. + * \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which + * will be filled with the DER converted data. + * \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output. + * + * \return On success, the amount of data (in bytes) written to + * the DER buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if the provided der + * buffer is too small to contain all the converted data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input raw + * coordinate is null (i.e. all zeros). + * + * \warning Raw and der buffer must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der_buf_start, + unsigned char *der_buf_end) +{ + unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; + int len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still + * detect that and return error in case. */ + while (*raw_buf == 0x00) { + ++raw_buf; + --raw_len; + if (raw_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + len = (int) raw_len; + + /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ + if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + p -= len; + memcpy(p, raw_buf, len); + + /* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */ + if (*p & 0x80) { + if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + --p; + *p = 0x00; + ++len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der_buf_start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der_buf_start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); + + return len; +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len) +{ + unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + const size_t coordinate_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char *p = der + der_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + if (coordinate_len > sizeof(r)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting + * the conversion. */ + memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len); + memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len); + + /* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s + * first and then r. */ + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(s, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(r, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + /* Add ASN.1 header (len + tag). */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* memmove the content of der buffer to its beginnig. */ + memmove(der, p, len); + *der_len = len; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. + * + * \param der Buffer containing the DER integer value to be + * converted. + * \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the + * converted data. This should be at least + * coordinate_size bytes and it must be zeroed before + * calling this function. + * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw + * format. + * + * \return On success, the amount of DER data parsed from the + * provided der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the integer tag + * is missing in the der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the integer + * is null (i.e. all zeros) or if the output raw buffer + * is too small to contain the converted raw value. + * + * \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t coordinate_size) +{ + unsigned char *p = der; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; + + /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* It's invalid to have: + * - unpadded_len == 0. + * - MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is checked below). */ + if (((unpadded_len == 0) || (*p & 0x80) != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Skip possible leading zero */ + if (*p == 0x00) { + p++; + unpadded_len--; + /* It is not allowed to have more than 1 leading zero. + * Ignore the case in which unpadded_len = 0 because that's a 0 encoded + * in ASN.1 format (i.e. 020100). */ + if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + + if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { + /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; + /* raw buffer was already zeroed by the calling function so zero-padding + * operation is skipped here. */ + memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); + p += unpadded_len; + + return (int) (p - der); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len) +{ + unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der; + size_t data_len; + size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + int ret; + + /* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw + * coordinate in order to store r and s. */ + if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + if (2 * coordinate_size > sizeof(raw_tmp)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(raw_tmp, 0, 2 * coordinate_size); + + /* Extract r */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Extract s */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size, + coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */ + if ((size_t) (p - der) != der_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + memcpy(raw, raw_tmp, 2 * coordinate_size); + *raw_len = 2 * coordinate_size; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */