diff --git a/modules/openssl/SCsub b/modules/openssl/SCsub
index 89463bc4b6b..7a734b24760 100644
--- a/modules/openssl/SCsub
+++ b/modules/openssl/SCsub
@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ if env['builtin_openssl']:
         "crypto/evp/p_verify.c",
         "crypto/ex_data.c",
         "crypto/fips_ers.c",
+        "crypto/getenv.c",
         "crypto/hmac/hmac.c",
         "crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c",
         "crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c",
diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md
index 84b92cc4f85..0ba05e6bb84 100644
--- a/thirdparty/README.md
+++ b/thirdparty/README.md
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ Files extracted from the upstream source:
 ## openssl
 
 - Upstream: https://www.openssl.org
-- Version: 1.0.2o
+- Version: 1.0.2q
 - License: OpenSSL license / BSD-like
 
 Files extracted from the upstream source:
@@ -347,6 +347,8 @@ Files extracted from the upstream source:
 - LICENSE
 - Apply the Godot-specific patches in the `patches/` folder
   (make sure not to commit .orig/.rej files generated by `patch`).
+- Review `openssl/opensslconf.h` changes and make sure they make sense
+  for our "one size fits all" config.
 
 
 ## opus
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
index 1b85bc9e61c..3bf676eb6fb 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c
@@ -63,17 +63,31 @@
 int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a, unsigned char **pp)
 {
     int r;
-    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
 
     r = ASN1_object_size(0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN);
     if (pp == NULL)
         return (r);
-    p = *pp;
+
+    if (*pp == NULL) {
+        if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(r)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        p = *pp;
+    }
 
     ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
-    *(p++) = (unsigned char)a;
-    *pp = p;
-    return (r);
+    *p = (unsigned char)a;
+
+
+    /*
+     * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
+     * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
+     */
+    *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + 1;
+    return r;
 }
 
 int d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index ad6b12a5366..ce05cf4c4b9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 
 int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
 {
-    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
     int objsize;
 
     if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
@@ -76,13 +76,24 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
     if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
         return objsize;
 
-    p = *pp;
+    if (*pp == NULL) {
+        if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        p = *pp;
+    }
+
     ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
     memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
-    p += a->length;
 
-    *pp = p;
-    return (objsize);
+    /*
+     * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
+     * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
+     */
+    *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length;
+    return objsize;
 }
 
 int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 95f04162073..11b21c2af7b 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2000.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -194,18 +194,38 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
                   int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch,
                   void *arg)
 {
-    int i, outlen, len;
+    int i, outlen, len, charwidth;
     unsigned char orflags, *p, *q;
     unsigned long c;
     p = buf;
     q = buf + buflen;
     outlen = 0;
+    charwidth = type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK;
+
+    switch (charwidth) {
+    case 4:
+        if (buflen & 3) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+    case 2:
+        if (buflen & 1) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
     while (p != q) {
         if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253)
             orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253;
         else
             orflags = 0;
-        switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) {
+
+        switch (charwidth) {
         case 4:
             c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24;
             c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16;
@@ -226,6 +246,7 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
             i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c);
             if (i < 0)
                 return -1;      /* Invalid UTF8String */
+            buflen -= i;
             p += i;
             break;
         default:
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index 43ddebba33a..cc8f9a8243e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -305,6 +305,18 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
     } else
         ameth->info = NULL;
 
+    /*
+     * One of the following must be true:
+     *
+     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+     *
+     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+     */
+    if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+          || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
+        goto err;
+
     if (pem_str) {
         ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str);
         if (!ameth->pem_str)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index cfc1512f9d0..9e273dcf5f2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -166,7 +166,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509), "D2I_X509"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF), "D2I_X509_CINF"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY), "d2i_X509_PKEY"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_DO_BUF), "DO_BUF"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM), "i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN), "i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "i2d_ASN1_OBJECT"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET), "i2d_ASN1_SET"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME), "I2D_ASN1_TIME"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"},
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index 081a9d534f8..1824b2fc80f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2000.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
         otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
         cont = otmp->data;
         len = otmp->length;
+        if (cont == NULL || len == 0)
+            return -1;
         break;
 
     case V_ASN1_NULL:
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
index 5bad0a2bada..d32b76bc8ff 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -83,6 +86,11 @@ NETDB_DEFINE_CONTEXT
 static int wsa_init_done = 0;
 # endif
 
+# if defined(__GLIBC__)
+#  define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+#  define GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF     (2 * 1024)
+# endif
+
 /*
  * WSAAPI specifier is required to make indirect calls to run-time
  * linked WinSock 2 functions used in this module, to be specific
@@ -116,7 +124,12 @@ int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
     int i;
     int err = 1;
     int locked = 0;
-    struct hostent *he;
+    struct hostent *he = NULL;
+# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+    char buf[GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF];
+    struct hostent hostent;
+    int h_errnop;
+# endif
 
     i = get_ip(str, ip);
     if (i < 0) {
@@ -138,10 +151,18 @@ int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
     if (i > 0)
         return (1);
 
+    /* if gethostbyname_r is supported, use it. */
+# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+    memset(&hostent, 0x00, sizeof(hostent));
+    /* gethostbyname_r() sets |he| to NULL on error, we check it further down */
+    gethostbyname_r(str, &hostent, buf, sizeof(buf), &he, &h_errnop);
+# else
     /* do a gethostbyname */
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME);
     locked = 1;
     he = BIO_gethostbyname(str);
+# endif
+
     if (he == NULL) {
         BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_BAD_HOSTNAME_LOOKUP);
         goto err;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
index 1283a525b44..1b063fc2813 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/bio/bss_log.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
     if ((buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(inl + 1)) == NULL) {
         return (0);
     }
-    strncpy(buf, in, inl);
+    memcpy(buf, in, inl);
     buf[inl] = '\0';
 
     i = 0;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
index b0394a960da..6ccb8e27886 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
     }
 
     BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+    if (inl == 0)
+        return 0;
     blen = bm->length;
     if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bm, blen + inl) != (blen + inl))
         goto end;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index 1729b479d43..aa94a13d3b1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -55,12 +55,6 @@
  *    machine.
  */
 
-# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__)
-#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
-# else
-#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long
-# endif
-
 # undef mul
 # undef mul_add
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index d448daa3c77..a1e5e139d12 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_blind.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -206,10 +206,15 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
         if (!BN_BLINDING_create_param(b, NULL, NULL, ctx, NULL, NULL))
             goto err;
     } else if (!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE)) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx))
-            goto err;
+        if (b->m_ctx != NULL) {
+            if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->m_ctx, ctx)
+                || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx)
+                || !BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
     }
 
     ret = 1;
@@ -241,13 +246,13 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
     else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b, ctx))
         return (0);
 
-    if (r != NULL) {
-        if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai))
-            ret = 0;
-    }
+    if (r != NULL && (BN_copy(r, b->Ai) == NULL))
+        return 0;
 
-    if (!BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
-        ret = 0;
+    if (b->m_ctx != NULL)
+        ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx);
+    else
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx);
 
     return ret;
 }
@@ -264,14 +269,29 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,
 
     bn_check_top(n);
 
-    if (r != NULL)
-        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
-    else {
-        if (b->Ai == NULL) {
-            BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-            return (0);
+    if (r == NULL && (r = b->Ai) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (b->m_ctx != NULL) {
+        /* ensure that BN_mod_mul_montgomery takes pre-defined path */
+        if (n->dmax >= r->top) {
+            size_t i, rtop = r->top, ntop = n->top;
+            BN_ULONG mask;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < rtop; i++) {
+                mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+                n->d[i] &= mask;
+            }
+            mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((rtop - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(ntop) - 1));
+            /* always true, if (rtop >= ntop) n->top = r->top; */
+            n->top = (int)(rtop & ~mask) | (ntop & mask);
+            n->flags |= (BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP & ~mask);
         }
-        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
+        ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx);
+    } else {
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
     }
 
     bn_check_top(n);
@@ -366,14 +386,19 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
     } while (1);
 
     if (ret->bn_mod_exp != NULL && ret->m_ctx != NULL) {
-        if (!ret->bn_mod_exp
-            (ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx))
+        if (!ret->bn_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx))
             goto err;
     } else {
         if (!BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
 
+    if (ret->m_ctx != NULL) {
+        if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->Ai, ret->Ai, ret->m_ctx, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->A, ret->A, ret->m_ctx, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
     return ret;
  err:
     if (b == NULL && ret != NULL) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index bc37671cf13..460d8b7396f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
     wnum.neg = 0;
     wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
     wnum.top = div_n;
+    wnum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
     /*
      * only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max
      */
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 40115fc7205..36b7ba69ade 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
     if (bits == 0) {
-        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
-        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
             ret = 1;
             BN_zero(r);
         } else {
@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     }
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
     if (bits == 0) {
-        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
-        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
             ret = 1;
             BN_zero(rr);
         } else {
@@ -473,17 +473,17 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
         ret = 1;
         goto err;
     }
-    if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
+    if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
         goto err;               /* 1 */
 
     window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
     if (window > 1) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
+        if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
             goto err;           /* 2 */
         j = 1 << (window - 1);
         for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
             if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
-                !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+                !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
                 goto err;
         }
     }
@@ -505,19 +505,15 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
         for (i = 1; i < j; i++)
             r->d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
         r->top = j;
-        /*
-         * Upper words will be zero if the corresponding words of 'm' were
-         * 0xfff[...], so decrement r->top accordingly.
-         */
-        bn_correct_top(r);
+        r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     } else
 #endif
-    if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+    if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
         goto err;
     for (;;) {
         if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
             if (!start) {
-                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
                     goto err;
             }
             if (wstart == 0)
@@ -548,12 +544,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
         /* add the 'bytes above' */
         if (!start)
             for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
-                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+                if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
                     goto err;
             }
 
         /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
-        if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
+        if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
             goto err;
 
         /* move the 'window' down further */
@@ -563,6 +559,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
         if (wstart < 0)
             break;
     }
+    /*
+     * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery
+     * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public
+     * API consumer.
+     */
 #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
     if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
         j = mont->N.top;        /* borrow j */
@@ -681,7 +682,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
     }
 
     b->top = top;
-    bn_correct_top(b);
+    b->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -733,8 +734,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
      */
     bits = p->top * BN_BITS2;
     if (bits == 0) {
-        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
-        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
             ret = 1;
             BN_zero(rr);
         } else {
@@ -852,16 +853,16 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
         tmp.top = top;
     } else
 #endif
-    if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+    if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
         goto err;
 
     /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
     if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
         if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
             goto err;
-        if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
+        if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
             goto err;
-    } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
+    } else if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, a, mont, ctx))
         goto err;
 
 #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
@@ -1128,14 +1129,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
          * performance advantage of sqr over mul).
          */
         if (window > 1) {
-            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
+            if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
                 goto err;
             if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
                                               window))
                 goto err;
             for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
                 /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
-                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+                if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
                     goto err;
                 if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
                                                   window))
@@ -1159,7 +1160,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 
             /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */
             for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
-                if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+                if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
                     goto err;
                 wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
             }
@@ -1172,12 +1173,16 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
                 goto err;
 
             /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
-            if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
+            if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
                 goto err;
         }
     }
 
-    /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */
+    /*
+     * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery
+     * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public
+     * API consumer.
+     */
 #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
     if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) {
         am.d[0] = 1;            /* borrow am */
@@ -1247,8 +1252,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
     if (bits == 0) {
-        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
-        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
             ret = 1;
             BN_zero(rr);
         } else {
@@ -1369,9 +1374,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     }
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-   if (bits == 0) {
-        /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
-        if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */
+        if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
             ret = 1;
             BN_zero(r);
         } else {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index 2c61da11093..1d8a271c028 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -103,30 +103,32 @@
  */
 # define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
 
-static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
-    64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
-};
+# define SQR_nibble(w)   ((((w) & 8) << 3) \
+                       |  (((w) & 4) << 2) \
+                       |  (((w) & 2) << 1) \
+                       |   ((w) & 1))
+
 
 /* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
 # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
 #  define SQR1(w) \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 60) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 56) << 48 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 52) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 48) << 32 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 44) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 40) << 16 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 36) <<  8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 32)
 #  define SQR0(w) \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >>  8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >>  4 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w)       & 0xF]
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 48 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) << 32 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >>  8) << 16 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >>  4) <<  8 | SQR_nibble((w)      )
 # endif
 # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
 #  define SQR1(w) \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 16 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) <<  8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16)
 #  define SQR0(w) \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >>  8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
-    SQR_tb[(w) >>  4 & 0xF] <<  8 | SQR_tb[(w)       & 0xF]
+    SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >>  8) << 16 | \
+    SQR_nibble((w) >>  4) <<  8 | SQR_nibble((w)      )
 # endif
 
 # if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
index 00f4f09945b..6f7335b7a5c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
 # define HEADER_BN_LCL_H
 
 # include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include "bn_int.h"
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 27b9bdbc3c2..9b95e5f2bd9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -263,8 +263,6 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
     const BN_ULONG *B;
     int i;
 
-    bn_check_top(b);
-
     if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) {
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
         return NULL;
@@ -398,8 +396,6 @@ BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
 
 BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
 {
-    bn_check_top(b);
-
     if (words > b->dmax) {
         BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words);
         if (!a)
@@ -433,7 +429,6 @@ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
         assert(A == &(b->d[b->dmax]));
     }
 #endif
-    bn_check_top(b);
     return b;
 }
 
@@ -497,12 +492,18 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
     memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
 #endif
 
-    a->top = b->top;
     a->neg = b->neg;
+    a->top = b->top;
+    a->flags |= b->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     bn_check_top(a);
     return (a);
 }
 
+#define FLAGS_DATA(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \
+                                    | BN_FLG_CONSTTIME   \
+                                    | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP))
+#define FLAGS_STRUCT(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_MALLOCED))
+
 void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
 {
     int flags_old_a, flags_old_b;
@@ -530,10 +531,8 @@ void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
     b->dmax = tmp_dmax;
     b->neg = tmp_neg;
 
-    a->flags =
-        (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
-    b->flags =
-        (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA);
+    a->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_a) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_b);
+    b->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_b) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_a);
     bn_check_top(a);
     bn_check_top(b);
 }
@@ -545,6 +544,7 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
         OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
     a->top = 0;
     a->neg = 0;
+    a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
 }
 
 BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
     a->neg = 0;
     a->d[0] = w;
     a->top = (w ? 1 : 0);
+    a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     bn_check_top(a);
     return (1);
 }
@@ -613,6 +614,55 @@ BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
 }
 
 /* ignore negative */
+static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    int n;
+    size_t i, lasti, j, atop, mask;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+
+    /*
+     * In case |a| is fixed-top, BN_num_bytes can return bogus length,
+     * but it's assumed that fixed-top inputs ought to be "nominated"
+     * even for padded output, so it works out...
+     */
+    n = BN_num_bytes(a);
+    if (tolen == -1) {
+        tolen = n;
+    } else if (tolen < n) {     /* uncommon/unlike case */
+        BIGNUM temp = *a;
+
+        bn_correct_top(&temp);
+        n = BN_num_bytes(&temp);
+        if (tolen < n)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Swipe through whole available data and don't give away padded zero. */
+    atop = a->dmax * BN_BYTES;
+    if (atop == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen);
+        return tolen;
+    }
+
+    lasti = atop - 1;
+    atop = a->top * BN_BYTES;
+    for (i = 0, j = 0, to += tolen; j < (size_t)tolen; j++) {
+        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
+        mask = 0 - ((j - atop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        *--to = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & mask);
+        i += (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); /* stay on last limb */
+    }
+
+    return tolen;
+}
+
+int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    if (tolen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen);
+}
+
 int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
 {
     int n, i;
@@ -711,6 +761,7 @@ int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
         for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++)
             a->d[k] = 0;
         a->top = i + 1;
+        a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     }
 
     a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j);
@@ -852,6 +903,38 @@ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
     a->top ^= t;
     b->top ^= t;
 
+    t = (a->neg ^ b->neg) & condition;
+    a->neg ^= t;
+    b->neg ^= t;
+
+    /*-
+     * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA: indicates that data may not be written to. Intention
+     * is actually to treat it as it's read-only data, and some (if not most)
+     * of it does reside in read-only segment. In other words observation of
+     * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA in BN_consttime_swap should be treated as fatal
+     * condition. It would either cause SEGV or effectively cause data
+     * corruption.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_MALLOCED: refers to BN structure itself, and hence must be
+     * preserved.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_SECURE: must be preserved, because it determines how x->d was
+     * allocated and hence how to free it.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME: sufficient to mask and swap
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP: indicates that we haven't called bn_correct_top() on
+     * the data, so the d array may be padded with additional 0 values (i.e.
+     * top could be greater than the minimal value that it could be). We should
+     * be swapping it
+     */
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS (BN_FLG_CONSTTIME | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP)
+
+    t = ((a->flags ^ b->flags) & BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS) & condition;
+    a->flags ^= t;
+    b->flags ^= t;
+
 #define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
         do { \
                 t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
index ffbce890cf2..255e6e47239 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -149,16 +149,72 @@ int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
 
 /*
  * BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
- * less than m
+ * less than m. The original algorithm was
+ *
+ *    if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
+ *       return 0;
+ *    if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0)
+ *       return BN_usub(r, r, m);
+ *
+ * which is replaced with addition, subtracting modulus, and conditional
+ * move depending on whether or not subtraction borrowed.
  */
+int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top;
+    BN_ULONG storage[1024 / BN_BITS2];
+    BN_ULONG carry, temp, mask, *rp, *tp = storage;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (mtop > sizeof(storage) / sizeof(storage[0])
+        && (tp = OPENSSL_malloc(mtop * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : tp;
+    bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : tp;
+
+    for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, carry = 0; i < mtop;) {
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        temp = ((ap[ai] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry = (temp < carry);
+
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        tp[i] = ((bp[bi] & mask) + temp) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry += (tp[i] < temp);
+
+        i++;
+        ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+        bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+    }
+    rp = r->d;
+    carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, tp, m->d, mtop);
+    for (i = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+        rp[i] = (carry & tp[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]);
+        ((volatile BN_ULONG *)tp)[i] = 0;
+    }
+    r->top = mtop;
+    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+    r->neg = 0;
+
+    if (tp != storage)
+        OPENSSL_free(tp);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                      const BIGNUM *m)
 {
-    if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b))
-        return 0;
-    if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0)
-        return BN_usub(r, r, m);
-    return 1;
+    int ret = bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r, a, b, m);
+
+    if (ret)
+        bn_correct_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
 }
 
 int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
@@ -169,6 +225,70 @@ int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
     return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }
 
+/*
+ * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative,
+ * a is less than m, while b is of same bit width as m. It's implemented
+ * as subtraction followed by two conditional additions.
+ *
+ * 0 <= a < m
+ * 0 <= b < 2^w < 2*m
+ *
+ * after subtraction
+ *
+ * -2*m < r = a - b < m
+ *
+ * Thus it takes up to two conditional additions to make |r| positive.
+ */
+int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top;
+    BN_ULONG borrow, carry, ta, tb, mask, *rp;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    rp = r->d;
+    ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : rp;
+    bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : rp;
+
+    for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, borrow = 0; i < mtop;) {
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        ta = ap[ai] & mask;
+
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        tb = bp[bi] & mask;
+        rp[i] = ta - tb - borrow;
+        if (ta != tb)
+            borrow = (ta < tb);
+
+        i++;
+        ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+        bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+    }
+    ap = m->d;
+    for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+        ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry = (ta < carry);
+        rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry += (rp[i] < ta);
+    }
+    borrow -= carry;
+    for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+        ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry = (ta < carry);
+        rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry += (rp[i] < ta);
+    }
+
+    r->top = mtop;
+    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+    r->neg = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
  * less than m
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index c1703650ef1..76eca50d32f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -123,11 +123,22 @@
 #define MONT_WORD               /* use the faster word-based algorithm */
 
 #ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
 #endif
 
 int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                           BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, b, mont, ctx);
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     BIGNUM *tmp;
     int ret = 0;
@@ -140,8 +151,8 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
         if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
             r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
             r->top = num;
-            bn_correct_top(r);
-            return (1);
+            r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+            return 1;
         }
     }
 #endif
@@ -153,21 +164,20 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
 
     bn_check_top(tmp);
     if (a == b) {
-        if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx))
+        if (!bn_sqr_fixed_top(tmp, a, ctx))
             goto err;
     } else {
-        if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx))
+        if (!bn_mul_fixed_top(tmp, a, b, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
     /* reduce from aRR to aR */
 #ifdef MONT_WORD
-    if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
+    if (!bn_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
         goto err;
 #else
     if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx))
         goto err;
 #endif
-    bn_check_top(r);
     ret = 1;
  err:
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -175,11 +185,12 @@ int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
 }
 
 #ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
 {
     BIGNUM *n;
     BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
     int nl, max, i;
+    unsigned int rtop;
 
     n = &(mont->N);
     nl = n->top;
@@ -197,14 +208,13 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     rp = r->d;
 
     /* clear the top words of T */
-# if 1
-    for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */
-        rp[i] = 0;
-# else
-    memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-# endif
+    for (rtop = r->top, i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+        v = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - rtop) >> (8 * sizeof(rtop) - 1));
+        rp[i] &= v;
+    }
 
     r->top = max;
+    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     n0 = mont->n0[0];
 
     /*
@@ -223,6 +233,7 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL)
         return (0);
     ret->top = nl;
+    ret->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     ret->neg = r->neg;
 
     rp = ret->d;
@@ -233,20 +244,16 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
      */
     ap = &(r->d[nl]);
 
+    carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl);
     /*
-     * |v| is one if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v|
-     * cannot be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |nl| words,
-     * and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
+     * |carry| is -1 if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note
+     * |carry| cannot be 1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in
+     * |nl| words, and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
      */
-    v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
-    v = 0 - v;
     for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) {
-        rp[i] = (v & ap[i]) | (~v & rp[i]);
+        rp[i] = (carry & ap[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]);
         ap[i] = 0;
     }
-    bn_correct_top(r);
-    bn_correct_top(ret);
-    bn_check_top(ret);
 
     return (1);
 }
@@ -254,14 +261,27 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
 
 int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
                        BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int retn;
+
+    retn = bn_from_mont_fixed_top(ret, a, mont, ctx);
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+
+    return retn;
+}
+
+int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int retn = 0;
 #ifdef MONT_WORD
     BIGNUM *t;
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a))
-        retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) {
+        retn = bn_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+    }
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
 #else                           /* !MONT_WORD */
     BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
@@ -299,6 +319,12 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
     return (retn);
 }
 
+int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx);
+}
+
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void)
 {
     BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
@@ -335,7 +361,7 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
 
 int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
+    int i, ret = 0;
     BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
 
     if (BN_is_zero(mod))
@@ -466,6 +492,11 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
     if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx))
         goto err;
 
+    for (i = mont->RR.top, ret = mont->N.top; i < ret; i++)
+        mont->RR.d[i] = 0;
+    mont->RR.top = ret;
+    mont->RR.flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+
     ret = 1;
  err:
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
index 6b455a755f7..f44e5e5c1e0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -935,6 +935,16 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
 #endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */
 
 int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = bn_mul_fixed_top(r, a, b, ctx);
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int top, al, bl;
@@ -1042,7 +1052,7 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION)
  end:
 #endif
-    bn_correct_top(rr);
+    rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
index 256d26e8dbe..44bc55473f1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -65,6 +65,16 @@
  * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96
  */
 int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = bn_sqr_fixed_top(r, a, ctx);
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int max, al;
     int ret = 0;
@@ -135,14 +145,8 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
     }
 
     rr->neg = 0;
-    /*
-     * If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then the
-     * square of 'a' will max-1 words.
-     */
-    if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l))
-        rr->top = max - 1;
-    else
-        rr->top = max;
+    rr->top = max;
+    rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
     if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
index f444af3feab..e40241ffc99 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -223,8 +223,10 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
     for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
         if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
             goto err;
+
         /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
-        BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
+        if (!BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq))
+            goto err;
         if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
             break;
     }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn_int.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a552cc20be9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Some BIGNUM functions assume most significant limb to be non-zero, which
+ * is customarily arranged by bn_correct_top. Output from below functions
+ * is not processed with bn_correct_top, and for this reason it may not be
+ * returned out of public API. It may only be passed internally into other
+ * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs.
+ */
+int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m);
+int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m);
+int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
index 4cf7553376e..480781d205c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/conf_api.h>
 #include "e_os.h"
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
             if (v != NULL)
                 return (v->value);
             if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) {
-                p = getenv(name);
+                p = ossl_safe_getenv(name);
                 if (p != NULL)
                     return (p);
             }
@@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
         else
             return (NULL);
     } else
-        return (getenv(name));
+        return (ossl_safe_getenv(name));
 }
 
 #if 0                           /* There's no way to provide error checking
@@ -290,6 +291,8 @@ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section)
 
     vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v);
     OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL);
+    if (lh_CONF_VALUE_error(conf->data) > 0)
+        goto err;
     ok = 1;
  err:
     if (!ok) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
index e2a9a81678e..1df463dd1bc 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2001.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void)
     char *file;
     int len;
 
-    file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
+    file = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
     if (file)
         return BUF_strdup(file);
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.h
index fba180a6b2f..cdbddf17350 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.h
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...);
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void);
 extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated;
 
+char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *);
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 387558f1467..f235e0d682b 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
     int ok = 0;
     int generate_new_key = 0;
     unsigned l;
-    BN_CTX *ctx;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
 
+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index 6452482c87d..162753af071 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
         return ret;
     }
 #endif
-    return 1;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
index f5ddc66b8a7..7e507faa36c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG), "i2d_DSA_SIG"},
     {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
     {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR"},
     {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN), "PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN"},
     {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_SIG_CB), "SIG_CB"},
     {0, NULL}
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 21af2e159fb..e55d585890d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -146,9 +146,16 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
         /* invalid q size */
         return 0;
 
-    if (evpmd == NULL)
-        /* use SHA1 as default */
-        evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+    if (evpmd == NULL) {
+        if (qsize == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+        else if (qsize == SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            evpmd = EVP_sha224();
+        else
+            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+    } else {
+        qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+    }
 
     if (bits < 512)
         bits = 512;
@@ -428,6 +435,12 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
 
+    /* make sure L > N, otherwise we'll get trapped in an infinite loop */
+    if (L <= N) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if (evpmd == NULL) {
         if (N == 160)
             evpmd = EVP_sha1();
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index aa10dd12f6f..c887c3c34e3 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
 static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
 static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx);
 
 static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
     "OpenSSL DSA method",
@@ -133,17 +135,13 @@ const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
 static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
 {
     BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-    BIGNUM m;
-    BIGNUM xr;
+    BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
     DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
     int noredo = 0;
 
-    BN_init(&m);
-    BN_init(&xr);
-
-    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
         reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
         goto err;
     }
@@ -154,6 +152,13 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
+    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (tmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
  redo:
     if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL)) {
         if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r))
@@ -173,20 +178,52 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
          * 4.2
          */
         dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
-    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, &m) == NULL)
+    if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    /* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
-    if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx))
-        goto err;               /* s = xr */
-    if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m))
-        goto err;               /* s = m + xr */
-    if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0)
-        if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q))
+    /*
+     * The normal signature calculation is:
+     *
+     *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
+     *
+     * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+     *
+     *   s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
+     */
+
+    /* Generate a blinding value */
+    do {
+        if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0))
             goto err;
+    } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+    BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* blindm := blind * m mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
     if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
         goto err;
 
+    /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
+    if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
     /*
      * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
      * unlikely.
@@ -210,13 +247,9 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
         BN_free(r);
         BN_free(s);
     }
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    BN_clear_free(&m);
-    BN_clear_free(&xr);
-    if (kinv != NULL)           /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
-        BN_clear_free(kinv);
-    return (ret);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    return ret;
 }
 
 static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
@@ -248,7 +281,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         goto err;
 
     /* Preallocate space */
-    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q) + sizeof(dsa->q->d[0]) * 16;
     if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
         || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
         || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
@@ -262,9 +295,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 
     if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
         BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(&l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     }
 
-
     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
                                     CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
@@ -302,8 +335,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
         goto err;
 
-    /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
-    if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+    /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+    if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(&k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (*kinvp != NULL)
@@ -437,3 +470,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
         BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
     return (1);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
+ * mod-exp operation.  Both the exponent and modulus are public information
+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient.  A newly allocated
+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *r, e;
+
+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BN_init(&e);
+
+    if (BN_set_word(r, 2)
+            && BN_sub(&e, q, r)
+            && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, &e, q, ctx, NULL))
+        res = r;
+    else
+        BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(&e);
+    return res;
+}
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
index 78724839b52..7f00e97036f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -230,10 +230,16 @@ static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
                                  EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS, qbits,
                                  NULL);
     }
-    if (!strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md")) {
+    if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) {
+        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
+
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN,
                                  EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD, 0,
-                                 (void *)EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
+                                 (void *)md);
     }
     return -2;
 }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
index 2c41c6e7a9f..aa5f3056af7 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,19 +143,19 @@ static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, void *pval)
 {
     EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+
     if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
-        ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval;
-        const unsigned char *pm = NULL;
-        int pmlen;
-        pm = pstr->data;
-        pmlen = pstr->length;
-        if (!(eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) {
+        const ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval;
+        const unsigned char *pm = pstr->data;
+        int pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+        if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
             ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
             goto ecerr;
         }
     } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
-        ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval;
-        EC_GROUP *group;
+        const ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval;
 
         /*
          * type == V_ASN1_OBJECT => the parameters are given by an asn1 OID
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, void *pval)
     return eckey;
 
  ecerr:
-    if (eckey)
-        EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
     return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index 969fd147ef9..8665a4c9c7d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct ec_group_st {
     int asn1_flag;              /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */
     /*
      * Kludge: upper bit of ans1_flag is used to denote structure
-     * version. Is set, then last field is present. This is done
+     * version. If set, then last field is present. This is done
      * for interoperation with FIPS code.
      */
 #define EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK 0x7fffffff
@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
 void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
                                      unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in);
 #endif
-int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *);
 
 #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
 /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication, with x86-64 optimized
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 3241aa51d9f..df56484b5ee 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
 
 const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
+/* local function prototypes */
+
+static int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group);
+
 /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */
 
 EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth)
@@ -318,12 +322,24 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
     } else
         BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
 
-    /*
-     * We ignore the return value because some groups have an order with
-     * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
-     * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
+    /*-
+     * Access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP struct should always be
+     * guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid OOB accesses, as the
+     * group might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the
+     * `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure.
      */
-    ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+    if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)) {
+        /*-
+         * Some groups have an order with
+         * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
+         * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
+         */
+        if (BN_is_odd(&group->order))
+            return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+        group->mont_data = NULL;
+    }
 
     return 1;
 }
@@ -1094,18 +1110,23 @@ int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
                                  * been performed */
 }
 
-/*
+/*-
  * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and
  * returns one on success. On error it returns zero.
+ *
+ * Note: this function must be called only after verifying that
+ * EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) returns true.
+ * The reason for this is that access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP
+ * struct should always be guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid
+ * OOB accesses, as the group might come from the FIPS module, which does not
+ * define the `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure.
  */
+static
 int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group)
 {
     BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     int ret = 0;
 
-    if (!EC_GROUP_VERSION(group))
-        goto err;
-
     if (group->mont_data) {
         BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
         group->mont_data = NULL;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
index 2231f9957ef..da71526818f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -310,6 +310,224 @@ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len)
     return r;
 }
 
+#define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->X, (flags)); \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->Y, (flags)); \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->Z, (flags)); \
+} while(0)
+
+/*-
+ * This functions computes (in constant time) a point multiplication over the
+ * EC group.
+ *
+ * At a high level, it is Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps.
+ *
+ * It performs either a fixed scalar point multiplication
+ *          (scalar * generator)
+ * when point is NULL, or a generic scalar point multiplication
+ *          (scalar * point)
+ * when point is not NULL.
+ *
+ * scalar should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all constant time bets are off.
+ *
+ * NB: This says nothing about EC_POINT_add and EC_POINT_dbl,
+ * which of course are not constant time themselves.
+ *
+ * The product is stored in r.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                            const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point,
+                            BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one;
+    EC_POINT *s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *lambda = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    s = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (point == NULL) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, group->generator))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, point))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (k == NULL || !BN_mul(cardinality, &group->order, &group->cofactor, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary.
+     * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might
+     * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries.
+     * So expand ahead of time.
+     */
+    cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
+    group_top = cardinality->top;
+    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_copy(k, scalar))
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) {
+        /*-
+         * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+         * constant-timeness
+         */
+        if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * lambda := scalar + cardinality
+     * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
+     */
+    kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
+    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
+
+    group_top = group->field.top;
+    if ((bn_wexpand(&s->X, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&s->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&s->Z, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->X, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->Z, group_top) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, s))
+        goto err;
+
+    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, s, s, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    pbit = 0;
+
+#define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do {         \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->X, &(b)->X, w); \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Y, &(b)->Y, w); \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Z, &(b)->Z, w); \
+        t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \
+        (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t);                      \
+        (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t);                      \
+} while(0)
+
+    /*-
+     * The ladder step, with branches, is
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S
+     * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R
+     *
+     * Then perform the ECC ops.
+     *
+     * U = add(T, U)
+     * T = dbl(T)
+     *
+     * Which leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U
+     * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T
+     *
+     * Which leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a
+     * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap.
+     *
+     * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like
+     *
+     * ...
+     * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+     * ECC
+     * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+     * (next iteration)
+     * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+     * ECC
+     * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+     * ...
+     *
+     * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition
+     * bits and do a single swap.
+     *
+     * k[i]   k[i-1]    Outcome
+     * 0      0         No Swap
+     * 0      1         Swap
+     * 1      0         Swap
+     * 1      1         No Swap
+     *
+     * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k.
+     */
+
+    for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit;
+        EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, s, r, s, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the
+         * next iteration
+         */
+        pbit ^= kbit;
+    }
+    /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */
+    EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+#undef EC_POINT_CSWAP
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EC_POINT_free(s);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags
+
 /*
  * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
  * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the
@@ -369,6 +587,34 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
         return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
     }
 
+    if (!BN_is_zero(&group->order) && !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor)) {
+        /*-
+         * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a constant
+         * time scalar multiplication algorithm.
+         */
+        if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {
+            /*-
+             * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this
+             * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key generation
+             * of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup, ECDH
+             * keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This is why
+             * we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we always call the
+             * constant time version.
+             */
+            return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx);
+        }
+        if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1)) {
+            /*-
+             * In this case we want to compute scalar * GenericPoint: this codepath
+             * is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH, where the
+             * secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point. To protect
+             * the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and
+             * we always call the constant time version.
+             */
+            return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx);
+        }
+    }
+
     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
         if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index 9a53a39a25b..0579cac3a96 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -1118,23 +1118,32 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
                                         const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in,
                                         BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    BIGNUM x, y;
-    BN_ULONG d_x[P256_LIMBS], d_y[P256_LIMBS];
+    BIGNUM x, y, z;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    memcpy(d_x, in->X, sizeof(d_x));
-    x.d = d_x;
+    /*
+     * |const| qualifier omission is compensated by BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+     * flag, which effectively means "read-only data".
+     */
+    x.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->X;
     x.dmax = x.top = P256_LIMBS;
     x.neg = 0;
     x.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
 
-    memcpy(d_y, in->Y, sizeof(d_y));
-    y.d = d_y;
+    y.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->Y;
     y.dmax = y.top = P256_LIMBS;
     y.neg = 0;
     y.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
 
-    ret = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, out, &x, &y, ctx);
+    z.d = (BN_ULONG *)ONE;
+    z.dmax = z.top = P256_LIMBS;
+    z.neg = 0;
+    z.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+
+    if ((ret = (BN_copy(&out->X, &x) != NULL))
+        && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Y, &y) != NULL))
+        && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Z, &z) != NULL)))
+        out->Z_is_one = 1;
 
     return ret;
 }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 16d4f59b9ba..63c18273fd8 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "bn_int.h"
 
 static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
                                 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
@@ -251,13 +252,14 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                                 EC_KEY *eckey)
 {
     int ok = 0, i;
-    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *order = NULL;
     const BIGNUM *ckinv;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     const EC_GROUP *group;
     ECDSA_SIG *ret;
     ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa;
     const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+    BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data;
 
     ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);
     group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
@@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
     s = ret->s;
 
     if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-        (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+        (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -285,6 +287,8 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
+    mont_data = EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group);
+
     i = BN_num_bits(order);
     /*
      * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
@@ -315,15 +319,27 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
             }
         }
 
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+        /*
+         * With only one multiplicant being in Montgomery domain
+         * multiplication yields real result without post-conversion.
+         * Also note that all operations but last are performed with
+         * zero-padded vectors. Last operation, BN_mod_mul_montgomery
+         * below, returns user-visible value with removed zero padding.
+         */
+        if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, ret->r, mont_data, ctx)
+            || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(s, s, priv_key, mont_data, ctx)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!bn_mod_add_fixed_top(s, s, m, order)) {
             ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
             goto err;
         }
-        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
-            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+        /*
+         * |s| can still be larger than modulus, because |m| can be. In
+         * such case we count on Montgomery reduction to tie it up.
+         */
+        if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, s, mont_data, ctx)
+            || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(s, s, ckinv, mont_data, ctx)) {
             ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -353,8 +369,6 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     if (m)
         BN_clear_free(m);
-    if (tmp)
-        BN_clear_free(tmp);
     if (order)
         BN_free(order);
     if (kinv)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
index dc2abd28ec6..e605b978ead 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2000.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -188,8 +188,10 @@ void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb)
     if (!int_cleanup_check(1))
         return;
     item = int_cleanup_item(cb);
-    if (item)
-        sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item);
+    if (item != NULL) {
+        if (sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item) <= 0)
+            OPENSSL_free(item);
+    }
 }
 
 /* The API function that performs all cleanup */
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
index 83c95d56f46..5d7eee40852 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2000.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  */
 
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "eng_int.h"
 
 /*
@@ -369,10 +370,10 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
      */
     if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
 # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-        if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+        if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
             load_dir = "SSLROOT:[ENGINES]";
 # else
-        if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+        if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
             load_dir = ENGINESDIR;
 # endif
         iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
index a1a9b88c43c..04cb466eb3e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void look_str_cb(int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg)
         ENGINE *e = sk_ENGINE_value(sk, i);
         EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
         e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nid);
-        if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) &&
+        if (ameth != NULL && ((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) &&
             !strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, lk->str, lk->len)) {
             lk->e = e;
             lk->ameth = ameth;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/getenv.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/getenv.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53f1dfd457a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/getenv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+
+char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
+#  define SECURE_GETENV
+    return secure_getenv(name);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECURE_GETENV
+    if (OPENSSL_issetugid())
+        return NULL;
+    return getenv(name);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/o_time.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/o_time.c
index 61927439eaf..a763b2ce202 100755
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
     if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL)
         return NULL;
     ts = result;
+#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400
+    if (gmtime_s(result, timer))
+        return NULL;
+    ts = result;
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(VMS_GMTIME_OK)
     ts = gmtime(timer);
     if (ts == NULL)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index 4d5f053e468..4ccc676ed74 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -82,51 +82,39 @@ static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num);
 static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name);
 int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
 
-int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata)
 {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-    /*
-     * We should not ever call the default callback routine from windows.
-     */
-    PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-    return (-1);
-#else
-    int i, j;
+    int i, min_len;
     const char *prompt;
-    if (key) {
-        i = strlen(key);
+
+    /* We assume that the user passes a default password as userdata */
+    if (userdata) {
+        i = strlen(userdata);
         i = (i > num) ? num : i;
-        memcpy(buf, key, i);
-        return (i);
+        memcpy(buf, userdata, i);
+        return i;
     }
 
     prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt();
     if (prompt == NULL)
         prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:";
 
-    for (;;) {
-        /*
-         * We assume that w == 0 means decryption,
-         * while w == 1 means encryption
-         */
-        int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
+    /*
+     * rwflag == 0 means decryption
+     * rwflag == 1 means encryption
+     *
+     * We assume that for encryption, we want a minimum length, while for
+     * decryption, we cannot know any minimum length, so we assume zero.
+     */
+    min_len = rwflag ? MIN_LENGTH : 0;
 
-        i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w);
-        if (i != 0) {
-            PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
-            memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
-            return (-1);
-        }
-        j = strlen(buf);
-        if (min_len && j < min_len) {
-            fprintf(stderr,
-                    "phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n",
-                    min_len);
-        } else
-            break;
+    i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, rwflag);
+    if (i != 0) {
+        PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD);
+        memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num);
+        return -1;
     }
-    return (j);
-#endif
+    return strlen(buf);
 }
 
 void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type)
@@ -459,7 +447,7 @@ int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen,
         klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
     else
         klen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
-    if (klen <= 0) {
+    if (klen < 0) {
         PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
         return (0);
     }
@@ -499,6 +487,7 @@ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher)
     char **header_pp = &header;
 
     cipher->cipher = NULL;
+    memset(cipher->iv, 0, sizeof(cipher->iv));
     if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n'))
         return (1);
     if (strncmp(header, "Proc-Type: ", 11) != 0) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
index daf210fde0f..ae18d26043e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
         klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
     else
         klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
-    if (klen <= 0) {
+    if (klen < 0) {
         PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
         X509_SIG_free(p8);
         return NULL;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
index e8b3a1b92c8..a189cd274c3 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
             klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
         else
             klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
-        if (klen <= 0) {
+        if (klen < 0) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
             X509_SIG_free(p8);
             goto err;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index 1ce5a1e319c..f376f594b12 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
             inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
         else
             inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
-        if (inlen <= 0) {
+        if (inlen < 0) {
             PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
             goto err;
         }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
index 370ddbd6e77..78c7f40350d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 1999.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(safebag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.other, ASN1_
 ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = {
         ADB_ENTRY(NID_keyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.keybag, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, 0)),
         ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.shkeybag, X509_SIG, 0)),
-        ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)),
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)),
         ADB_ENTRY(NID_certBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
         ADB_ENTRY(NID_crlBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)),
         ADB_ENTRY(NID_secretBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0))
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
index 0322df944a4..a074b94a0c5 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 1999.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode)
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
     }
-    ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3);
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3))
+        goto err;
     pkcs12->authsafes->type = OBJ_nid2obj(mode);
     switch (mode) {
     case NID_pkcs7_data:
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
index 0c5fcaa6aa2..866a863e54d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type)
         if ((p7->d.signed_and_enveloped = PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new())
             == NULL)
             goto err;
-        ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1);
         if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1))
             goto err;
         p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->content_type
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index a7af9f9d867..2983a3fda48 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
     static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
     int i, j, k;
     size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
-    int ok;
     long md_c[2];
     unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
     EVP_MD_CTX m;
@@ -400,14 +399,13 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
 
     if (!initialized) {
         RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
     }
 
     if (!stirred_pool)
         do_stir_pool = 1;
 
-    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-    if (!ok) {
+    if (!initialized) {
         /*
          * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
          * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
@@ -446,7 +444,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
             ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
             n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
         }
-        if (ok)
+        if (initialized)
             stirred_pool = 1;
     }
 
@@ -539,7 +537,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
         CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
-    if (ok)
+    if (initialized)
         return (1);
     else if (pseudo)
         return 0;
@@ -555,6 +553,18 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
     return (0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Returns ssleay_rand_bytes(), enforcing a reseeding from the
+ * system entropy sources using RAND_poll() before generating
+`* the random bytes.
+ */
+
+int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    initialized = 0;
+    return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 0);
+}
+
 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1);
@@ -600,10 +610,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 
     if (!initialized) {
         RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
     }
 
-    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+    ret = initialized;
 
     if (!do_not_lock) {
         /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index f9fda3eb89c..7b4dbcf5fb7 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -154,5 +154,5 @@
 # endif
 
 int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock);
-
+int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 #endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 88a78d35065..6094c83e407 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -185,11 +185,29 @@ int RAND_status(void)
 
 /*
  * Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather
- * entropy internally through RAND_poll().
+ * entropy internally through RAND_poll()).
  */
 
 static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
                                int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+    /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
+    min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
+    *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len);
+    if (!*pout)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Enforces a reseed of the SSLEAY PRNG before generating random bytes */
+    if (ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(*pout, min_len) <= 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(*pout);
+        *pout = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return min_len;
+}
+
+static size_t drbg_get_nonce(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+                               int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 {
     /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
     min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
@@ -281,7 +299,7 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)
 
     FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx,
                             drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20,
-                            drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy);
+                            drbg_get_nonce, drbg_free_entropy);
     FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0,
                                  drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add);
     /* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 728fd0a721b..c93812cfb92 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "e_os.h"
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
@@ -327,14 +328,12 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
     struct stat sb;
 #endif
 
-    if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
-        s = getenv("RANDFILE");
+    s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE");
     if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
         if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
             return NULL;
     } else {
-        if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
-            s = getenv("HOME");
+        s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
 #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
         if (s == NULL) {
             s = DEFAULT_HOME;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index b147fff8bd6..be948a4cf8b 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "bn_int.h"
 
 #ifndef RSA_NULL
 
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 {
     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
@@ -223,8 +224,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
     }
 
     if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
             goto err;
 
     if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
@@ -232,15 +233,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         goto err;
 
     /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
+     * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+     * the length of the modulus.
      */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
+    r = bn_bn2binpad(ret, to, num);
  err:
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -349,7 +345,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                                    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 {
     BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     int local_blinding = 0;
@@ -436,8 +432,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
             d = rsa->d;
 
         if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        rsa->n, ctx))
                 goto err;
 
         if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
@@ -459,15 +455,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         res = ret;
 
     /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
+     * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+     * the length of the modulus.
      */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(res);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
+    r = bn_bn2binpad(res, to, num);
  err:
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
@@ -485,7 +476,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 {
     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
     int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     int local_blinding = 0;
@@ -564,8 +554,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
             d = rsa->d;
 
         if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        rsa->n, ctx))
                 goto err;
         if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
                                    rsa->_method_mod_n))
@@ -576,8 +566,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
             goto err;
 
-    p = buf;
-    j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);      /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+    j = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 
     switch (padding) {
     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
@@ -592,7 +581,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
         break;
     case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+        memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
         break;
     default:
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
@@ -619,7 +608,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 {
     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
     int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
@@ -672,8 +660,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
     }
 
     if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
             goto err;
 
     if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
@@ -684,8 +672,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
             goto err;
 
-    p = buf;
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+    i = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 
     switch (padding) {
     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
@@ -695,7 +682,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
         break;
     case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+        memcpy(to, buf, (r = i));
         break;
     default:
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
@@ -721,7 +708,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
     BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
     BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
     BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
-    int ret = 0;
+    int ret = 0, smooth = 0;
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
     r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -750,20 +737,64 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
         }
 
         if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        p, ctx))
                 goto err;
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        q, ctx))
                 goto err;
+
+            smooth = (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont)
+                     && (BN_num_bits(q) == BN_num_bits(p));
         }
     }
 
     if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
             goto err;
 
+    if (smooth) {
+        /*
+         * Conversion from Montgomery domain, a.k.a. Montgomery reduction,
+         * accepts values in [0-m*2^w) range. w is m's bit width rounded up
+         * to limb width. So that at the very least if |I| is fully reduced,
+         * i.e. less than p*q, we can count on from-to round to perform
+         * below modulo operations on |I|. Unlike BN_mod it's constant time.
+         */
+        if (/* m1 = I moq q */
+            !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(m1, I, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(m1, m1, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            /* m1 = m1^dmq1 mod q */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, m1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_q)
+            /* r1 = I mod p */
+            || !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(r1, I, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            /* r1 = r1^dmp1 mod p */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r1, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_p)
+            /* r1 = (r1 - m1) mod p */
+            /*
+             * bn_mod_sub_fixed_top is not regular modular subtraction,
+             * it can tolerate subtrahend to be larger than modulus, but
+             * not bit-wise wider. This makes up for uncommon q>p case,
+             * when |m1| can be larger than |rsa->p|.
+             */
+            || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p)
+
+            /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p,
+                                      ctx)
+            /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */
+            || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx)
+            || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n))
+            goto err;
+
+        goto tail;
+    }
+
     /* compute I mod q */
     if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
         c = &local_c;
@@ -841,10 +872,18 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
     if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
         goto err;
 
+ tail:
     if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
-            goto err;
+        if (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) {
+            if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                 rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        }
         /*
          * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
          * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
@@ -853,6 +892,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
          */
         if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
             goto err;
+        if (BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;   /* not actually error */
+        }
         if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
             goto err;
         if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
@@ -878,6 +922,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 goto err;
         }
     }
+    /*
+     * It's unfortunate that we have to bn_correct_top(r0). What hopefully
+     * saves the day is that correction is highly unlike, and private key
+     * operations are customarily performed on blinded message. Which means
+     * that attacker won't observe correlation with chosen plaintext.
+     * Secondly, remaining code would still handle it in same computational
+     * time and even conceal memory access pattern around corrected top.
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(r0);
     ret = 1;
  err:
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 9ca5dfefb70..42b89a8dfaa 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
     if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
+    BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     /* generate p and q */
     for (;;) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 9a01b4afc11..3fb8f6b33d4 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                       int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
                                       const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 {
-    int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
     unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
     const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
     /*
@@ -153,32 +153,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
     dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
     db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
-    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
+    if (db == NULL) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
-     * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
-     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
-     * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
-     *
-     * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
-     */
-    memset(em, 0, num);
-    memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+    if (flen != num) {
+        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+        if (em == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
+         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
+         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
+         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
+         * |from|.
+         */
+        memset(em, 0, num);
+        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+        from = em;
+    }
 
     /*
      * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
      * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
      * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
      */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
 
-    maskedseed = em + 1;
-    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
+    maskedseed = from + 1;
+    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
 
     if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 50397c335a5..5d7882a3bfc 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -98,6 +98,27 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     const unsigned char *p;
 
     p = from;
+
+    /*
+     * The format is
+     * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D
+     * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF
+     * D  - data.
+     */
+
+    if (num < 11)
+        return -1;
+
+    /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
+    if (num == flen) {
+        if ((*p++) != 0x00) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+                   RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        flen--;
+    }
+
     if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
                RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
@@ -203,28 +224,31 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     if (num < 11)
         goto err;
 
-    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (em == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return -1;
+    if (flen != num) {
+        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+        if (em == NULL) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
+         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
+         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
+         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
+         * |from|.
+         */
+        memset(em, 0, num);
+        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+        from = em;
     }
-    memset(em, 0, num);
-    /*
-     * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
-     * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
-     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
-     * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
-     *
-     * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
-     */
-    memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
 
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
         zero_index =
             constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
                                      zero_index);
@@ -232,7 +256,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
@@ -261,7 +285,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         goto err;
     }
 
-    memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+    memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
 
  err:
     if (em != NULL) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 82ca8324dfb..b7fff43530f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
         return 0;
     }
 #endif
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+    if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
         return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
     }
     /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
                const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
 {
 
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+    if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
         return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
     }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 746e01f64a9..831f75aaf43 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -112,6 +112,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
+    /* Accept even zero-padded input */
+    if (flen == num) {
+        if (*(p++) != 0) {
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        flen--;
+    }
     if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
         return (-1);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 8a43590319f..4b4eb81a5e6 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * OpenSSL project 2001.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -509,6 +509,24 @@ static int open_console(UI *ui)
             is_a_tty = 0;
         else
 # endif
+# ifdef ENXIO
+            /*
+             * Solaris can return ENXIO.
+             * This should be ok
+             */
+        if (errno == ENXIO)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
+# ifdef EIO
+            /*
+             * Linux can return EIO.
+             * This should be ok
+             */
+        if (errno == EIO)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
 # ifdef ENODEV
             /*
              * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device),
@@ -567,17 +585,13 @@ static int echo_console(UI *ui)
 {
 #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
     memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig));
-    tty_new.TTY_FLAGS |= ECHO;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
     if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1))
         return 0;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
     if (is_a_tty) {
         tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0];
-        tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] & ~TT$M_NOECHO;
+        tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1];
         tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2];
         status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12,
                           0, 0, 0, 0);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 6f0209a275e..92120763838 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
     switch (cmd) {
     case X509_L_ADD_DIR:
         if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            dir = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+            dir = (char *)ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
             if (dir)
                 ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
             else
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
index 82ce4e8d87c..e6d0e6e1a64 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
     switch (cmd) {
     case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
         if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+            file = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+
             if (file)
                 ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
                                               X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 49c71b91280..2d82f8fa8b2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 
     ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
 
-    if (ret)
+    if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
         return ret;
 
     return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index b7424809fdb..3d18ea90beb 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -311,7 +311,11 @@ int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
     X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
     int i, j;
 
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
     tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
     CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
 
@@ -506,6 +510,10 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
     STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
     X509 *x;
     X509_OBJECT *obj;
+
+    if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
     sk = sk_X509_new_null();
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
     idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
@@ -551,6 +559,11 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
     STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk;
     X509_CRL *x;
     X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
+
+
+    if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
     sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
 
@@ -651,6 +664,9 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
     }
     X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
 
+    if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
     /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
     ret = 0;
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index b1472018baf..da778d47b1c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
+#include <ctype.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
          * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
          * happy
          */
-        if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+        if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
             allow_proxy_certs = 1;
         purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
     }
@@ -693,10 +694,9 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                     goto end;
             }
         }
-        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
-        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
-            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+        /* Check pathlen */
+        if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
             ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
             ctx->error_depth = i;
             ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -704,8 +704,8 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
             if (!ok)
                 goto end;
         }
-        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
-        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+        /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
+        if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
             plen++;
         /*
          * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
@@ -1937,119 +1937,67 @@ int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
 
 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 {
-    char *str;
-    ASN1_TIME atm;
-    long offset;
-    char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
-    int i, j, remaining;
+    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
+    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
 
-    p = buff1;
-    remaining = ctm->length;
-    str = (char *)ctm->data;
     /*
-     * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
-     * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
+     * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
      * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
      * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+     *
+     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
+     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
+     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
+     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
      */
-    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
-        /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
-        int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
-        int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
-        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+    switch (ctm->type) {
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
             return 0;
-        memcpy(p, str, 10);
-        p += 10;
-        str += 10;
-        remaining -= 10;
-    } else {
-        /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
-        int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
-        int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
-        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+        break;
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
             return 0;
-        memcpy(p, str, 12);
-        p += 12;
-        str += 12;
-        remaining -= 12;
-    }
-
-    if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
-        *(p++) = '0';
-        *(p++) = '0';
-    } else {
-        /* SS (seconds) */
-        if (remaining < 2)
-            return 0;
-        *(p++) = *(str++);
-        *(p++) = *(str++);
-        remaining -= 2;
-        /*
-         * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
-         * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
-         * Can we just kill them altogether?
-         */
-        if (remaining && *str == '.') {
-            str++;
-            remaining--;
-            for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
-                if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
-                    break;
-            }
-        }
-
-    }
-    *(p++) = 'Z';
-    *(p++) = '\0';
-
-    /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
-    if (!remaining)
+        break;
+    default:
         return 0;
-    if (*str == 'Z') {
-        if (remaining != 1)
-            return 0;
-        offset = 0;
-    } else {
-        /* (+-)HHMM */
-        if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
-            return 0;
-        /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
-        if (remaining != 5)
-            return 0;
-        if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
-            str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
-            return 0;
-        offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
-        offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
-        if (*str == '-')
-            offset = -offset;
     }
-    atm.type = ctm->type;
-    atm.flags = 0;
-    atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
-    atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-    if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+    /**
+     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
+     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
+     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
+        if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
         return 0;
 
-    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
-        i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
-        if (i < 50)
-            i += 100;           /* cf. RFC 2459 */
-        j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
-        if (j < 50)
-            j += 100;
+    /*
+     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
+     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
+     * so we go through ASN.1
+     */
+    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
+    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+        goto err;
 
-        if (i < j)
-            return -1;
-        if (i > j)
-            return 1;
-    }
-    i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
-    if (i == 0)                 /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
-        return -1;
-    else
-        return i;
+    /*
+     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
+     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+     */
+    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
+    return ret;
 }
 
 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 96e629a9301..6d3aa8f731d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2001.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -128,11 +128,10 @@ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
 {
     int idx;
     const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
-    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
-        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-        x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-    }
+
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+
+    /* Return if side-effect only call */
     if (id == -1)
         return 1;
     idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
@@ -397,10 +396,14 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
     ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
     EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
     X509_EXTENSION *ex;
-
     int i;
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
+
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
         return;
+    }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
     X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
 #endif
@@ -536,6 +539,7 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
         }
     }
     x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -578,11 +582,7 @@ static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
 
 int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
 {
-    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
-        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-        x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-    }
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
 
     return check_ca(x);
 }
@@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
     if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
                       X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
         return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+
     x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
     x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/asn1.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/asn1.h
index 35a2b2aa023..36e79d5ecd2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/asn1.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/asn1.h
@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
  * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+
 void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */
@@ -1264,7 +1265,10 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509                                  156
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF                             157
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY                             159
+# define ASN1_F_DO_BUF                                    221
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM                       211
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN                          223
+# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT                           222
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET                              188
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME                             160
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY                            161
@@ -1414,7 +1418,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG                                 168
 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE                                169
 
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
-#endif
+# endif
 #endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/bn.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/bn.h
index 633d1b1f601..d4b9f27bb39 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/bn.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/bn.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -375,25 +375,76 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
                                  * on the size of the number */
 
 /*
- * number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for
- * random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of
- * Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
- * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error
- * estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993)
- * 177-194)
+ * BN_prime_checks_for_size() returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations
+ * that will be done for checking that a random number is probably prime. The
+ * error rate for accepting a composite number as prime depends on the size of
+ * the prime |b|. The error rates used are for calculating an RSA key with 2 primes,
+ * and so the level is what you would expect for a key of double the size of the
+ * prime.
+ *
+ * This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4
+ * Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117.
+ * (https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4)
+ *
+ * The following magma script was used to generate the output:
+ * securitybits:=125;
+ * k:=1024;
+ * for t:=1 to 65 do
+ *   for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do
+ *     S:=0;
+ *     // Sum over m
+ *     for m:=3 to M do
+ *       s:=0;
+ *       // Sum over j
+ *       for j:=2 to m do
+ *         s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j);
+ *       end for;
+ *       S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s;
+ *     end for;
+ *     A:=2^(k-2-M*t);
+ *     B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S;
+ *     pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B);
+ *     seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt));
+ *     if seclevel ge securitybits then
+ *       printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits  (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M;
+ *       break;
+ *     end if;
+ *   end for;
+ *   if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if;
+ * end for;
+ *
+ * It can be run online at:
+ * http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc
+ *
+ * And will output:
+ * k:  1024, security: 129 bits  (t: 6, M: 23)
+ *
+ * k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level we want to
+ * reach.
+ *
+ * prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level
+ * -------------+--------------|------------+---------------
+ *  (b) >= 6394 |     >= 12788 |          3 |        256 bit
+ *  (b) >= 3747 |     >=  7494 |          3 |        192 bit
+ *  (b) >= 1345 |     >=  2690 |          4 |        128 bit
+ *  (b) >= 1080 |     >=  2160 |          5 |        128 bit
+ *  (b) >=  852 |     >=  1704 |          5 |        112 bit
+ *  (b) >=  476 |     >=   952 |          5 |         80 bit
+ *  (b) >=  400 |     >=   800 |          6 |         80 bit
+ *  (b) >=  347 |     >=   694 |          7 |         80 bit
+ *  (b) >=  308 |     >=   616 |          8 |         80 bit
+ *  (b) >=   55 |     >=   110 |         27 |         64 bit
+ *  (b) >=    6 |     >=    12 |         34 |         64 bit
  */
-# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ?  2 : \
-                                (b) >=  850 ?  3 : \
-                                (b) >=  650 ?  4 : \
-                                (b) >=  550 ?  5 : \
-                                (b) >=  450 ?  6 : \
-                                (b) >=  400 ?  7 : \
-                                (b) >=  350 ?  8 : \
-                                (b) >=  300 ?  9 : \
-                                (b) >=  250 ? 12 : \
-                                (b) >=  200 ? 15 : \
-                                (b) >=  150 ? 18 : \
-                                /* b >= 100 */ 27)
+
+# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 3747 ?  3 : \
+                                (b) >=  1345 ?  4 : \
+                                (b) >=  476 ?  5 : \
+                                (b) >=  400 ?  6 : \
+                                (b) >=  347 ?  7 : \
+                                (b) >=  308 ?  8 : \
+                                (b) >=  55  ? 27 : \
+                                /* b >= 6 */ 34)
 
 # define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8)
 
@@ -773,6 +824,16 @@ BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *a, int words); /* unused */
 /* We only need assert() when debugging */
 #  include <assert.h>
 
+/*
+ * The new BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP flag marks vectors that were not treated with
+ * bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to have zeros
+ * in most significant limbs. Such vectors are used internally to achieve
+ * execution time invariance for critical operations with private keys.
+ * It's BN_DEBUG-only flag, because user application is not supposed to
+ * observe it anyway. Moreover, optimizing compiler would actually remove
+ * all operations manipulating the bit in question in non-BN_DEBUG build.
+ */
+#  define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0x10000
 #  ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND
 /* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */
 #   ifndef RAND_pseudo_bytes
@@ -805,8 +866,10 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
         do { \
                 const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \
                 if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \
-                        assert((_bnum2->top == 0) || \
-                                (_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0)); \
+                        int _top = _bnum2->top; \
+                        assert((_top == 0) || \
+                               (_bnum2->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) || \
+                               (_bnum2->d[_top - 1] != 0)); \
                         bn_pollute(_bnum2); \
                 } \
         } while(0)
@@ -824,6 +887,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 
 # else                          /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
+#  define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0
 #  define bn_pollute(a)
 #  define bn_check_top(a)
 #  define bn_fix_top(a)           bn_correct_top(a)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dsa.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dsa.h
index 545358fd02b..3e6984eabdf 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dsa.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dsa.h
@@ -249,10 +249,12 @@ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x);
 int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
 # endif
 
-# define DSS_prime_checks 50
+# define DSS_prime_checks 64
 /*
- * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
- * Rabin-Miller
+ * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix C.3. Since we only
+ * have one value here we set the number of checks to 64 which is the 128 bit
+ * security level that is the highest level and valid for creating a 3072 bit
+ * DSA key.
  */
 # define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
         BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
@@ -307,6 +309,7 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
 # define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG                                111
 # define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE                        122
 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL                              120
+# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR                          127
 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN                            121
 # define DSA_F_SIG_CB                                     114
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslconf.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslconf.h
index 19fad234234..9eebdbee410 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslconf.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslconf.h
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ extern "C" {
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
 # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
 #endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h
index 77f124e2cb3..73d22b399a8 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100020ffL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000211fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips  27 Mar 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips  20 Nov 2018"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2o  27 Mar 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q  20 Nov 2018"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/pem.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/pem.h
index aac72fb21ed..9c1d939a919 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/pem.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/pem.h
@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ void PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt);
 int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
                   unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 
-int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key);
+/* The default pem_password_cb that's used internally */
+int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata);
 void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type);
 void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h
index 3cf96a239ba..4bc1f4e60b8 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
     const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
     unsigned long cipher_id;    /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used
                                  * to load the 'cipher' structure */
-    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* ciphers offered by the client */
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;     /* application specific data */
     /*
      * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
 int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
 int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
 const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size);
 int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
 int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
@@ -2954,6 +2954,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV                             294
 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW                            295
 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH                            159
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                            404
 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT                           160
 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG                                274
 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS                     161
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index e6bc761e8bf..8888beddc0a 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -656,7 +656,8 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 
         al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
 
-        if (al == 0) {          /* no alert */
+        /* al will be 0 if no alert */
+        if (al == 0  && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) {
             unsigned char *p =
                 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
             memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index f5deddf7706..23aa9dbce48 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -293,14 +293,12 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
         return (-1);
     }
 
-    /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
     if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
         if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
             OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
         OPENSSL_free(rdata);
         pitem_free(item);
-        return (-1);
     }
 
     return (1);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 7e27dae35b0..10c6db683b6 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -4228,8 +4228,13 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
     int have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
 #endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
     int nostrict = 1;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
     unsigned long alg_k;
+#endif
 
     /* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */
     if (s->cert->ctypes) {
@@ -4238,8 +4243,10 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
     }
     /* get configured sigalgs */
     siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sig);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
     if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
         nostrict = 0;
+#endif
     for (i = 0; i < siglen; i += 2, sig += 2) {
         switch (sig[1]) {
         case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
@@ -4257,7 +4264,10 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
         }
     }
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
     alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
     if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 96d973cd02b..70340181bf9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1959,11 +1959,12 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
         if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+            size_t len = strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+
             /* copy PSK identity hint */
-            s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
-            strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
-                    strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
-            p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+            s2n(len, p);
+            memcpy(p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, len);
+            p += len;
         }
 #endif
 
@@ -2090,6 +2091,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
         if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
             const unsigned char *psigs;
             nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+            if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                       SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                goto err;
+            }
             s2n(nl, p);
             memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
             p += nl;
@@ -2106,6 +2112,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
             for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
                 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
                 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+                if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                           SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
                     (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
@@ -2127,6 +2138,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                     n += j;
                     nl += j;
                 }
+                if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                           SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto err;
+                }
             }
         }
         /* else no CA names */
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index ccdf00fa1b3..58dcddfddc2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1406,11 +1406,17 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
                                     const char **prule_str)
 {
-    unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0;
+    unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+    unsigned int suiteb_comb2 = 0;
+#endif
+
     if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) {
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
     } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         suiteb_comb2 = 1;
+# endif
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
     } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) {
         suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 3a6c1b14d4a..cfcfe76b9ce 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1404,28 +1404,37 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
 }
 
 /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size)
 {
     char *p;
-    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk;
     SSL_CIPHER *c;
     int i;
 
-    if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
-        return (NULL);
-
-    p = buf;
-    sk = s->session->ciphers;
-
-    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+    if (!s->server
+            || s->session == NULL
+            || s->session->ciphers == NULL
+            || size < 2)
         return NULL;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+    p = buf;
+    clntsk = s->session->ciphers;
+    srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+    if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) {
         int n;
 
-        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i);
+        if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0)
+            continue;
+
         n = strlen(c->name);
-        if (n + 1 > len) {
+        if (n + 1 > size) {
             if (p != buf)
                 --p;
             *p = '\0';
@@ -1434,7 +1443,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
         strcpy(p, c->name);
         p += n;
         *(p++) = ':';
-        len -= n + 1;
+        size -= n + 1;
     }
     p[-1] = '\0';
     return (buf);
@@ -2250,10 +2259,10 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
     int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
     unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-    int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
+    int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     X509 *x = NULL;
@@ -2396,7 +2405,9 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
         if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
             ecdsa_ok = 0;
         ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+# endif
         EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
         if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
             signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
@@ -2458,7 +2469,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
         (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 
 int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
 {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index aeffc006347..43789ad757d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@
                           c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
                           c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff)),c+=3)
 
+# define SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN     (0xffff)
+
 /* LOCAL STUFF */
 
 # define SSL_DECRYPT     0
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 75c2f4154df..55f918d1085 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -500,7 +500,11 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
             } else
 # endif
             {
-                if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+                if (!s->server
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+                        || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto
+# endif
+                    ) {
                     *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
                     pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
                 } else {
@@ -2408,8 +2412,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 goto err;
             if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
                 goto err;
-        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
-
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && !s->hit) {
             if (size < 5)
                 goto err;
 
@@ -3166,7 +3169,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
         if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
                    SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
-            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
             goto err;
         }
     } else
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_trce.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_trce.c
index dc62df8f94c..3e6194a5356 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_trce.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_trce.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server,
         BIO_puts(bio, "No Extensions\n");
         return 1;
     }
+    if (msglen < 2)
+        return 0;
     extslen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
     if (extslen != msglen - 2)
         return 0;
@@ -1021,6 +1023,8 @@ static int ssl_print_cert_request(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s,
     msglen -= xlen + 2;
 
  skip_sig:
+    if (msglen < 2)
+        return 0;
     xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1];
     BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
     if (msglen < xlen + 2)
@@ -1209,7 +1213,15 @@ void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
     switch (content_type) {
     case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
         {
-            int hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2];
+            int hvers;
+
+            /* avoid overlapping with length at the end of buffer */
+            if (msglen < (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? 13 : 5)) {
+                        BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received");
+                        ssl_print_hex(bio, 0, " too short message", msg, msglen);
+                        break;
+                    }
+            hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2];
             BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received");
             BIO_printf(bio, " Record\nHeader:\n  Version = %s (0x%x)\n",
                        ssl_trace_str(hvers, ssl_version_tbl), hvers);