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mbedtls: Update to upstream version 2.16.5 

Fixes https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02

Drop patch to disable VIA padlock since we no longer use libwebsockets,
so there's no conflict anymore.
This commit is contained in:
Rémi Verschelde 2020-03-05 16:12:23 +01:00
parent bd553d072b
commit e435bed847
12 changed files with 126 additions and 125 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
thirdparty/README.md vendored
View File

@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ changes are marked with `// -- GODOT --` comments.
## mbedtls
- Upstream: https://tls.mbed.org/
- Version: 2.16.4
- Version: 2.16.5
- License: Apache 2.0
File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
@ -291,9 +291,6 @@ File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
- LICENSE and apache-2.0.txt files
- Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/1453.diff` (PR 1453).
Soon to be merged upstream. Check it out at next update.
- Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff`. This disables VIA
padlock support which defines a symbol `unsupported` which clashes with
a symbol in libwebsockets.
- Added 2 files `godot_core_mbedtls_platform.{c,h}` providing configuration
for light bundling with core.

4
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h vendored
View File

@ -2542,9 +2542,7 @@
*
* This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
*/
// -- GODOT start --
// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
// -- GODOT end --
#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C

8
thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h vendored
View File

@ -40,16 +40,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 4
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 5
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100400
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.4"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.4"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100500
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.5"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.5"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)

5
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c vendored
View File

@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs )
if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
/* Actually resize up in this case */
/* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */
if( X->n <= nblimbs )
return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) );
/* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */
for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- )
if( X->p[i] != 0 )
@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y )
if( X == Y )
return( 0 );
if( Y->p == NULL )
if( Y->n == 0 )
{
mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
return( 0 );

14
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c vendored
View File

@ -361,6 +361,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
*olen = 0;
block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx );
if ( 0 == block_size )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
}
if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB )
{
@ -396,11 +400,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
}
#endif
if ( 0 == block_size )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
}
if( input == output &&
( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) )
{
@ -459,11 +458,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
*/
if( 0 != ilen )
{
if( 0 == block_size )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
}
/* Encryption: only cache partial blocks
* Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block
* Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks

4
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c vendored
View File

@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;

29
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c vendored
View File

@ -61,43 +61,28 @@
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#endif
#include <windows.h>
#include <bcrypt.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
* <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
* These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
* warning when including intsafe.h.
*/
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
#endif
#include <intsafe.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
#include <wincrypt.h>
int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
size_t *olen )
{
ULONG len_as_ulong = 0;
HCRYPTPROV provider;
((void) data);
*olen = 0;
/*
* BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
* 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
* a ULONG.
*/
if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) )
if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL,
PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) )
if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE )
{
CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
*olen = len;
return( 0 );

122
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c vendored
View File

@ -677,6 +677,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero.
*
* The value zero is:
* - never a valid value for an RSA parameter
* - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete().
*
* Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to
* rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early.
*/
static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_mpi *X )
{
int ret;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key
*/
@ -729,54 +755,84 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
}
/* Import N */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p += len;
/* Import E */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, p, len ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p += len;
/* Import D */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
p, len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&T, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p += len;
/* Import P */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, p, len, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL,
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p += len;
/* Import Q */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p += len;
/* Complete the RSA private key */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T,
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/* Check optional parameters */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
/*
* The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
* that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
* parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
* recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
* RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
* can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
* are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
* description of one such attack.
*/
/* Import DP */
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/* Import DQ */
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/* Import QP */
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#else
/* Verify existance of the CRT params */
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#endif
/* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default
* implementation but is still called:
* - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to
* pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors)
* - as is also sanity-checks the key
*
* Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with
* mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example.
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 )
{
goto cleanup;
}
if( p != end )
{

11
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c vendored
View File

@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
{
int ret = 0;
int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
#endif
int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@ -259,6 +262,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
#endif
/*
* Check whether provided parameters are enough
* to deduce all others. The following incomplete
@ -324,7 +333,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
if( is_priv )
if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
{
ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );

32
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c vendored
View File

@ -65,19 +65,6 @@
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
* <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
* These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
* warning when including intsafe.h.
*/
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
#endif
#include <intsafe.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
#else
#include <time.h>
#endif
@ -1290,7 +1277,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
char filename[MAX_PATH];
char *p;
size_t len = strlen( path );
int lengthAsInt = 0;
WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
HANDLE hFind;
@ -1305,18 +1291,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
p = filename + len;
filename[len++] = '*';
if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
/*
* Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
* string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
* incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
* change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
* incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
* MultiByteToWideChar().
*/
w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir,
w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
MAX_PATH - 3 );
if( w_ret == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1333,11 +1308,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
continue;
if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
lengthAsInt,
lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
p, (int) len - 1,
NULL, NULL );
if( w_ret == 0 )

4
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c vendored
View File

@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
/*
* Prepare signature
*/
mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )

13
thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff vendored
View File

@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -2477,7 +2477,9 @@
*
* This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+// -- GODOT start --
+// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+// -- GODOT end --
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C