diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md index e9fdaa2a13f..33cd50edfb7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/README.md +++ b/thirdparty/README.md @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ Patch `godot-node-debug-fix.patch` workarounds shadowing of godot's Node class i ## mbedtls - Upstream: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls -- Version: 2.28.7 (555f84735aecdbd76a566cf087ec8425dfb0c8ab, 2024) +- Version: 2.28.8 (5a764e5555c64337ed17444410269ff21cb617b1, 2024) - License: Apache 2.0 File extracted from upstream release tarball: diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h index b636c100ae0..93f067304d8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ * macros that may change in future releases. */ #undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS -#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__) /* Visual Studio supports AESNI intrinsics since VS 2008 SP1. We only support * VS 2013 and up for other reasons anyway, so no need to check the version. */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ /* GCC-like compilers: currently, we only support intrinsics if the requisite * target flag is enabled when building the library (e.g. `gcc -mpclmul -msse2` * or `clang -maes -mpclmul`). */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) +#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h index ac2146ea114..4842fd494c9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h @@ -1570,6 +1570,26 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS + * + * Assume all buffers passed to PSA functions are owned exclusively by the + * PSA function and are not stored in shared memory. + * + * This option may be enabled if all buffers passed to any PSA function reside + * in memory that is accessible only to the PSA function during its execution. + * + * This option MUST be disabled whenever buffer arguments are in memory shared + * with an untrusted party, for example where arguments to PSA calls are passed + * across a trust boundary. + * + * \note Enabling this option reduces memory usage and code size. + * + * \note Enabling this option causes overlap of input and output buffers + * not to be supported by PSA functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS + /** * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index e4e40c003c7..33ea14d7e25 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1265,6 +1265,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * + * \note This function does not support Curve448 yet. + * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the @@ -1286,17 +1288,43 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, /** * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. * + * \note Note that although this function accepts an output + * buffer that is smaller or larger than the key, most key + * import interfaces require the output to have exactly + * key's nominal length. It is generally simplest to + * pass the key's nominal length as \c buflen, after + * checking that the output buffer is large enough. + * See the description of the \p buflen parameter for + * how to calculate the nominal length. + * + * \note If the private key was not set in \p key, + * the output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * + * \note This function does not support Curve448 yet. + * * \param key The private key. * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation - * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte - * string for Montgomery curves.) + * of the key. + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the big-endian + * representation, padded with null bytes at the beginning + * to reach \p buflen bytes. + * For Montgomery curves, this is the standard byte string + * representation (which is little-endian), padded with + * null bytes at the end to reach \p buflen bytes. * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * The length of the output is + * (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes + * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits. + * For Weierstrass keys, if the output buffer is smaller, + * leading zeros are trimmed to fit if possible. For + * Montgomery keys, the output buffer must always be large + * enough for the nominal length. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key - representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for - * the group is not implemented. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h index 2d3fe3f9493..1a12c9c8034 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char * * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer - * \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, + * \param cip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, * can be NULL if client_ip is null * * \return 0 if successful, or @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char * */ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, - void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len); + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len); /** * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h index 0533bca6812..bbe76b17392 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -26,16 +26,16 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 7 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 8 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0700 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.7" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.7" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0800 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.8" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.8" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c index 24d7ab92fbd..836367cea74 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; /* * Round constants */ -static const uint32_t RCON[10] = +static const uint32_t round_constants[10] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static uint32_t RT3[256]; /* * Round constants */ -static uint32_t RCON[10]; +static uint32_t round_constants[10]; /* * Tables generation code @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) * calculate the round constants */ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) { - RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; + round_constants[i] = (uint32_t) x; x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(XTIME(x)); } @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, case 10: for (i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { - RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[3])] << 16) ^ @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, case 12: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { - RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[5])] << 16) ^ @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, case 14: for (i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { - RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[7])] << 16) ^ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c index dd84c2b4ea6..74bae91f5e3 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c @@ -27,10 +27,12 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 -#if !defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(__GNUC__) #include -#else +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) #include +#else +#error "`__cpuid` required by MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is not supported by the compiler" #endif #include #endif @@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what) if (!done) { #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - static unsigned info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + static int info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; #if defined(_MSC_VER) __cpuid(info, 1); #else @@ -179,7 +181,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], const unsigned char a[16], const unsigned char b[16]) { - __m128i aa, bb, cc, dd; + __m128i aa = { 0 }, bb = { 0 }, cc, dd; /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h index bf18d725ccf..49e2c97ea04 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h @@ -350,4 +350,31 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( #define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) #endif +/* Suppress compiler warnings for unused functions and variables. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__has_attribute) +# if __has_attribute(unused) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__GNUC__) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && defined(__VER__) +/* IAR does support __attribute__((unused)), but only if the -e flag (extended language support) + * is given; the pragma always works. + * Unfortunately the pragma affects the rest of the file where it is used, but this is harmless. + * Check for version 5.2 or later - this pragma may be supported by earlier versions, but I wasn't + * able to find documentation). + */ +# if (__VER__ >= 5020000) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED _Pragma("diag_suppress=Pe177") +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(_MSC_VER) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __pragma(warning(suppress:4189)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c index 31a6b9e305f..cfe02b0d2c2 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t plen; ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || buf != NULL); if (ilen < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf_len == 0 || *buf != NULL); /* * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || *buf != NULL); if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, len)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || *buf != NULL); /* * We expect at least three bytes (see below) @@ -2614,8 +2614,8 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ MOD_ADD(RP.X); + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - /* Derandomize coordinates of the starting point */ if (f_rng == NULL) { have_rng = 0; } @@ -3358,10 +3358,10 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c index c7565cce5dc..61a1046f3a2 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -535,10 +535,10 @@ static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_ */ static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; X->s = 1; X->n = 1; - X->p = one; + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ } /* @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ cleanup: */ #define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P #define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R -static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p /* Init R */ R.s = 1; - R.p = Rp; + R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; /* Common setup for M */ @@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c index 4c5184686eb..727f848b934 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) /* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c index 86d5fa2b5fc..d3e773278fb 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, uint64_t iv_bits; GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int diff; GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c index 8140eeade42..5d985ef0011 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, - void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len) + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int type; @@ -404,22 +404,22 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, if (client_ip != NULL) { if (client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; - *ip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); + *cip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); - if (buf_size < *ip_len) { + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len); + memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *cip_len); } else { struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; - *ip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); + *cip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); - if (buf_size < *ip_len) { + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len); + memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *cip_len); } } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c index 14c6d3f99cd..dd460a6a0c8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -53,7 +53,23 @@ static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) { const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - return 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + /* Unfortunately, the rsa.h interface does not have a direct way + * to access the bit-length that works with MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT. + * So we have to do a little work here. + */ + mbedtls_mpi N; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + /* If the export fails for some reason (e.g. the RSA_ALT implementation + * does not support export, or there is not enough memory), + * we have no way of returning an error from this function. + * As a fallback, return the byte-length converted in bits, which is + * the correct value if the modulus size is a multiple of 8 bits, which + * is very often the case in practice. */ + size_t bitlen = (ret == 0 ? mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&N) : + 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + return bitlen; } static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c index 712488233f5..55de216edb1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c @@ -244,21 +244,22 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */ - - mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; + { + /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when - * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this - * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a - * password mismatch. - */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { - padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; - } + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { - goto exit; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c index 8e5b751a38c..90703c45f9d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c @@ -239,23 +239,25 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as - * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5 - * with 64-bit-block ciphers). - */ - mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; + { + /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as + * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5 + * with 64-bit-block ciphers). + */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when - * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this - * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a - * password mismatch. - */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { - padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; - } + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { - goto exit; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c index fafcf0e1a76..534290df4e9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c @@ -559,38 +559,49 @@ end_of_export: int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } size_t olen = 0; PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(key, output_buf, - sizeof(output_buf))) < 0) { - return ret; + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; } if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + output_buf + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto cleanup; } - return 0; + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(output_buf); + return ret; } int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } const char *begin, *end; size_t olen = 0; PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf))) < 0) { - return ret; + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) @@ -605,15 +616,22 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; } else #endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(begin, end, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, - ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { - return ret; + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; } - return 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(begin, end, + output_buf + PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + mbedtls_free(output_buf); + return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c index a86b07fa3fc..df34167a8f9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c @@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) #include #if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ - defined(__MACH__))) + defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__midipix__)) #include #endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || - * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) || __midipix__ */ #if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c index 1a2bc7bc9eb..c667a2923bf 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -992,8 +992,7 @@ static int ssl_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ - (void) ssl; + (void) ssl; /* ssl is unused except for those cases */ #endif /* @@ -5205,6 +5204,12 @@ const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_con #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 #else @@ -5242,6 +5247,7 @@ const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_con #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT 7 #define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ ((uint16_t) ( \ @@ -5253,9 +5259,11 @@ const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_con (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << \ SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT) | \ (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT))) + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT))) -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, @@ -5279,19 +5287,36 @@ static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { * // the setting of those compile-time * // configuration options which influence * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. - * uint64 start_time; - * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard - * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 - * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 - * opaque session_id[32]; - * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard - * uint32 verify_result; - * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert - * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket - * uint32 ticket_lifetime; - * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard - * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 - * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 start_time; + * #endif + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * #else + * uint8 peer_cert_digest_type; + * opaque peer_cert_digest<0..2^8-1> + * #endif + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * #endif * * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come @@ -6124,7 +6149,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ 0u)) -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, @@ -6655,7 +6680,7 @@ static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && - memcmp(p, cur, alpn_len) == 0) { + memcmp(p, *cur, alpn_len) == 0) { ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; break; } @@ -6822,7 +6847,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { +static const int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, #endif @@ -6840,14 +6865,14 @@ static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { }; #endif -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { +static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 0 }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { +static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE @@ -6855,7 +6880,7 @@ static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { +static const mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c index 7ef9f473b57..ec2cff1084d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c @@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ int mbedtls_timing_self_test(int verbose) uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n"); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c index 779325744b1..6f663b12a73 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c @@ -456,6 +456,9 @@ static const char * const features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */