832 lines
24 KiB
C
832 lines
24 KiB
C
/* pcy_tree.c */
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/*
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
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* 2004.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "pcy_int.h"
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/*
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* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
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* evaluation.
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*/
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/*
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* #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
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*/
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#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
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static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
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{
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if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
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BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
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else {
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int i;
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
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BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
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oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
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if (i)
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BIO_puts(err, ", ");
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i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
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}
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BIO_puts(err, "\n");
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}
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}
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static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int i;
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BIO *err;
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err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
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if (!curr)
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curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
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else
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curr++;
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BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
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BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
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for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
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BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
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plev - tree->levels, plev->flags);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
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expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
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BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
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}
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if (plev->anyPolicy)
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
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}
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BIO_free(err);
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}
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#else
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# define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */
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#endif
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/*-
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* Initialize policy tree. Return values:
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* 0 Some internal error occurred.
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* -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
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* 1 Tree initialized OK.
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* 2 Policy tree is empty.
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* 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
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* 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
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*/
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static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
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X509 *x;
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int ret = 1;
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int i, n;
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int explicit_policy;
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int any_skip;
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int map_skip;
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*ptree = NULL;
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n = sk_X509_num(certs);
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#if 0
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/* Disable policy mapping for now... */
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flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
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#endif
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
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explicit_policy = 0;
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else
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explicit_policy = n + 1;
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
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any_skip = 0;
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else
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any_skip = n + 1;
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if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
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map_skip = 0;
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else
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map_skip = n + 1;
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/* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
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if (n == 1)
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return 1;
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/*
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* First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
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* anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
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* explicit_policy value at this point.
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*/
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for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
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cache = policy_cache_set(x);
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/* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
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if (cache == NULL)
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return 0;
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/*
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* If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
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*/
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
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ret = -1;
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/*
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* Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
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* haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
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*/
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else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
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ret = 2;
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if (explicit_policy > 0) {
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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explicit_policy--;
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if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
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&& (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
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explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
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}
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}
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if (ret != 1) {
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if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
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return 6;
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return ret;
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}
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/* If we get this far initialize the tree */
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tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
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if (!tree)
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return 0;
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tree->flags = 0;
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tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
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tree->nlevel = 0;
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tree->extra_data = NULL;
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tree->auth_policies = NULL;
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tree->user_policies = NULL;
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if (!tree->levels) {
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OPENSSL_free(tree);
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return 0;
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}
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memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
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tree->nlevel = n;
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level = tree->levels;
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/* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
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if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
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goto bad_tree;
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for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
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level++;
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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cache = policy_cache_set(x);
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CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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level->cert = x;
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if (!cache->anyPolicy)
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
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/* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
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if (any_skip == 0) {
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/*
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* Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
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* last in the chain.
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*/
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
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} else {
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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any_skip--;
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if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
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&& (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
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any_skip = cache->any_skip;
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}
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if (map_skip == 0)
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
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else {
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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map_skip--;
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if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
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&& (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
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map_skip = cache->map_skip;
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}
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}
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*ptree = tree;
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if (explicit_policy)
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return 1;
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else
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return 5;
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bad_tree:
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X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
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return 0;
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}
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static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int i, matched = 0;
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/* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
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if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
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return 0;
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matched = 1;
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}
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}
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if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
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* CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
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*/
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static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
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{
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int i;
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
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data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
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/*
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* If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
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* CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
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* be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
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* no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
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* because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
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* it later.
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*/
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#if 0
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if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
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&& !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
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continue;
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#endif
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/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
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if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
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* policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
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*/
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static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
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if (id == NULL)
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id = node->data->valid_policy;
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/*
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* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
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* node.
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*/
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
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if (data == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
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policy_data_free(data);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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int i;
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if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
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/* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
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if (node->nchild)
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return 1;
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
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return 0;
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/* Add it */
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} else {
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/* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
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if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
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return 1;
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/* Locate unmatched nodes */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
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if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
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continue;
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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int i;
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/*
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* X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
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*/
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
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if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
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return 0;
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#if 0
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/*
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* Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
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* Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
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* may have multiple children
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*/
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if (node->nchild)
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continue;
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/*
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* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
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* unmatched node.
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*/
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data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
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node_critical(node));
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if (data == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
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if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
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policy_data_free(data);
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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}
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/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
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if (last->anyPolicy) {
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if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
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* then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
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* have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
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*/
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static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
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{
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int i;
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nodes = curr->nodes;
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if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
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/* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
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if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
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node->parent->nchild--;
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OPENSSL_free(node);
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(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
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}
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}
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}
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for (;;) {
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--curr;
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nodes = curr->nodes;
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
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if (node->nchild == 0) {
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|
node->parent->nchild--;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(node);
|
|
(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
|
|
if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
|
|
curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
|
|
curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (curr == tree->levels) {
|
|
/* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
|
|
if (!curr->anyPolicy)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!*pnodes) {
|
|
*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
|
|
if (!*pnodes)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
|
|
* is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
|
|
* set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
|
|
* the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
|
|
* of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
|
|
* value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
|
|
|
|
/* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
|
|
if (curr->anyPolicy) {
|
|
if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
addnodes = pnodes;
|
|
} else
|
|
/* Add policies to authority set */
|
|
addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
|
|
|
|
curr = tree->levels;
|
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
|
|
* levels so end search.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
|
|
break;
|
|
curr++;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
|
|
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
|
|
if ((node->parent == anyptr)
|
|
&& !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addnodes == pnodes)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
*pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
|
|
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
|
|
X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
|
|
* will happen if it is a leaf node.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
|
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
|
|
tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
|
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
|
|
node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
if (!anyPolicy)
|
|
continue;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
|
|
* from anyPolicy.
|
|
*/
|
|
extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
|
|
if (!extra)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
|
|
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
|
|
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
|
|
node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tree->user_policies) {
|
|
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
|
|
if (!tree->user_policies)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
|
|
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
|
|
cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
|
|
if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
|
|
&& !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
|
|
ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
|
|
if (ret != 1)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
|
|
{
|
|
if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
|
|
OPENSSL_free(node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
|
|
if (curr->cert)
|
|
X509_free(curr->cert);
|
|
if (curr->nodes)
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
|
|
if (curr->anyPolicy)
|
|
policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tree->extra_data)
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tree);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Application policy checking function.
|
|
* Return codes:
|
|
* 0 Internal Error.
|
|
* 1 Successful.
|
|
* -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
|
|
* -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
|
|
*ptree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 0;
|
|
ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
|
|
/* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
|
|
case 2:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Some internal error */
|
|
case -1:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* Some internal error */
|
|
case 0:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 1;
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
/* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
|
|
case 5:
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* Tree OK: continue */
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
/*
|
|
* tree_init() returns success and a null tree
|
|
* if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
|
|
* I'm not sure that returning success here is
|
|
* correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
|
|
* as an internal error which our caller
|
|
* interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
|
|
|
|
tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* Return value 2 means tree empty */
|
|
if (ret == 2) {
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
|
|
if (*pexplicit_policy)
|
|
return -2;
|
|
else
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tree is not empty: continue */
|
|
|
|
ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
*ptree = tree;
|
|
|
|
if (*pexplicit_policy) {
|
|
nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
|
|
if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|