godot/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
Fabio Alessandrelli e375cbd094 Bump mbedTLS version to 2.28.0 (new LTS).
Keep applying the windows entropy patch (UWP support).
Remove no longer needed padlock patch.
Update thirdparty README to reflect changes, and new source inclusion
criteria.
2021-12-21 13:26:02 +01:00

350 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
* TLS 1.3 key schedule
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \
.name = string,
struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels =
{
/* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one
* character too long due to the 0-termination. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST
};
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL
/*
* This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
*
* The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows:
*
* struct HkdfLabel {
* uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material
* opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 "
* opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash
* };
*
* Parameters:
* - desired_length: Length of expanded key material
* Even though the standard allows expansion to up to
* 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than
* 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most
* 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by
* hardcoding the writing of the high bytes.
* - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix
* The label length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3
* can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN().
* - (ctx, clen): context + context length
* The context length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure,
* This MUST be a writable buffer of size
* at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes.
* - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of
* the HkdfLabel structure on success.
*/
static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 ";
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \
( 2 /* expansion length */ \
+ 1 /* label length */ \
+ label_len \
+ 1 /* context length */ \
+ context_len )
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \
sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN )
static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(
size_t desired_length,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen )
{
size_t total_label_len =
sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen;
size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len =
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen );
unsigned char *p = dst;
/* Add the size of the expanded key material.
* We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use
* TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255
#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \
value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN"
#endif
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( desired_length );
/* Add label incl. prefix */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_label_len );
memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) );
p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix);
memcpy( p, label, llen );
p += llen;
/* Add context value */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( clen );
if( clen != 0 )
memcpy( p, ctx, clen );
/* Return total length to the caller. */
*dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ];
size_t hkdf_label_len;
if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN )
{
/* Should never happen since this is an internal
* function, and we know statically which labels
* are allowed. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN )
{
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN )
{
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
if( md == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen,
label, llen,
ctx, clen,
hkdf_label,
&hkdf_label_len );
return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md,
secret, slen,
hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len,
buf, blen ) );
}
/*
* The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
*
* - One secret value per sender.
* - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
* - The desired lengths of key and IV.
*
* The expansion itself is based on HKDF:
*
* [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length )
* [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length )
*
* [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided
* by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side
* keys in a single function call.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *client_secret,
const unsigned char *server_secret,
size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys )
{
int ret = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
client_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
NULL, 0,
keys->client_write_key, key_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
server_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
NULL, 0,
keys->server_write_key, key_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
client_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
NULL, 0,
keys->client_write_iv, iv_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
server_secret, slen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
NULL, 0,
keys->server_write_iv, iv_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
keys->key_len = key_len;
keys->iv_len = iv_len;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
int ctx_hashed,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
if( md == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED )
{
ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md );
}
else
{
if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) )
{
/* This should never happen since this function is internal
* and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly.
* Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk
* of getting a stack overflow. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen );
}
return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
secret, slen,
label, llen,
hashed_context, clen,
dstbuf, buflen ) );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret(
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret_old,
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
unsigned char *secret_new )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t hlen, ilen;
unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 };
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
if( md == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md );
/* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "")
* on the old secret. */
if( secret_old != NULL )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
secret_old, hlen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ),
NULL, 0, /* context */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
tmp_secret, hlen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
}
if( input != NULL )
{
memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len );
ilen = input_len;
}
else
{
ilen = hlen;
}
/* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material.
* The salt is the old secret, and the input key material
* is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */
ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md,
tmp_secret, hlen,
tmp_input, ilen,
secret_new );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */