678948068b
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= -Begin work on Navigation Meshes (simple pathfinding for now, will improve soon) -More doc on theme overriding -Upgraded OpenSSL to version without bugs -Misc bugfixes
669 lines
18 KiB
C
669 lines
18 KiB
C
/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */
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/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp.
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* Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com
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* Jim Guilford
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* Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com
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* Maxim.Perminov@intel.com
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* Ying.Huang@intel.com
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*
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* More information about algorithm used can be found at:
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* http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*/
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */
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#undef COMPILE_RSAX
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#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
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defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
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#define COMPILE_RSAX
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static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax (void);
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#endif
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void ENGINE_load_rsax (void)
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{
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/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
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#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
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ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax();
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if(!toadd) return;
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ENGINE_add(toadd);
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ENGINE_free(toadd);
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ERR_clear_error();
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#endif
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}
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#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
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#define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine"
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static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e);
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static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e);
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static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e);
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static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* RSA stuff */
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static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
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static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r);
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#endif
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static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = {
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{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
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};
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
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static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa =
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{
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"Intel RSA-X method",
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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e_rsax_rsa_finish,
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RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL
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};
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#endif
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/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
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static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax";
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static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support";
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/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */
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static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
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#endif
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if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) ||
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!ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) ||
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) ||
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#endif
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!ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) ||
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!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) ||
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!ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) ||
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!ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) ||
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!ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns))
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return 0;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
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e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
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e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
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e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
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e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
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e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp;
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void)
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{
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ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
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if(!ret)
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return NULL;
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if(!bind_helper(ret))
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{
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ENGINE_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */
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static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1;
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#endif
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static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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/* (de)initialisation functions. */
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static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
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rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
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NULL,
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NULL, NULL, NULL);
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#endif
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if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
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{
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int to_return = 1;
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switch(cmd)
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{
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/* The command isn't understood by this engine */
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default:
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to_return = 0;
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break;
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}
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return to_return;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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#ifdef _WIN32
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typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64;
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#else
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typedef unsigned long long UINT64;
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#endif
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typedef unsigned short UINT16;
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/* Table t is interleaved in the following manner:
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* The order in memory is t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ...
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* A particular 512-bit value is stored in t[][index] rather than the more
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* normal t[index][]; i.e. the qwords of a particular entry in t are not
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* adjacent in memory
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*/
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/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */
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static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array);
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/* Extract array elements from BIGNUM b
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* To set the whole array from b, call with n=8
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*/
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static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array);
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struct mod_ctx_512 {
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UINT64 t[8][8];
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UINT64 m[8];
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UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */
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UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */
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UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */
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};
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static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
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void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
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UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
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UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
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struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
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typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx
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{
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UINT64 type;
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union {
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struct mod_ctx_512 b512;
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} ctx;
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} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX;
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static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM* m)
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{
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E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr;
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if (idx < 0 || idx > 2)
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return NULL;
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hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
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if (!hptr) {
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hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3*sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX));
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if (!hptr) return NULL;
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hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type= hptr[0].type = 0;
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RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr);
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}
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if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m))
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return hptr+idx;
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if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
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UINT64 _m[8];
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bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m);
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memset( &hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512));
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mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512);
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}
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hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m);
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return hptr+idx;
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}
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static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
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{
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E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
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if(hptr)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(hptr);
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RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL);
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}
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if (rsa->_method_mod_n)
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
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if (rsa->_method_mod_p)
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
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if (rsa->_method_mod_q)
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
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return 1;
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}
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static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, E_RSAX_MOD_CTX* rsax_mod_ctx )
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{
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if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
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if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
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UINT64 _r[8];
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UINT64 _g[8];
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UINT64 _e[8];
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/* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */
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bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g);
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bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e);
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mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512);
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/* Return the result in the BIGNUM */
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interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r);
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont);
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}
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/* Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular
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* exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the
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* necessary values. These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in
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* the target openssl.
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*/
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/*
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* Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into
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* an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM
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*/
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static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array)
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{
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int i;
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UINT64 tmp;
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unsigned char bn_buff[64];
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memset(bn_buff, 0, 64);
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if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) {
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printf ("Can't support this byte size\n");
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return 0; }
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if (BN_num_bytes(b)!=0) {
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if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff+(64-BN_num_bytes(b)))) {
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printf ("Error's in bn2bin\n");
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/* We have to error, here */
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return 0; } }
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while (n-- > 0) {
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array[n] = 0;
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for (i=7; i>=0; i--) {
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tmp = bn_buff[63-(n*8+i)];
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array[n] |= tmp << (8*i); } }
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return 1;
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}
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/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */
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static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array)
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{
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unsigned char tmp[64];
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int n=8;
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int i;
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while (n-- > 0) {
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for (i = 7; i>=0; i--) {
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tmp[63-(n*8+i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n]>>(8*i)); } }
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BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b);
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return 0;
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}
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/* The main 512bit precompute call */
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static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data)
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{
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BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2;
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/* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */
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BN_CTX* ctx;
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/* Some tmps */
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UINT64 _t[8];
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int i, j, ret = 0;
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/* Init _m with m */
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BN_init(&_m);
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interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m);
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memset(_t, 0, 64);
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/* Inits */
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BN_init(&two_768);
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BN_init(&two_640);
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BN_init(&two_128);
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BN_init(&two_512);
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BN_init(&tmp);
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BN_init(&tmp2);
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/* Create our context */
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if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { goto err; }
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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/*
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* For production, if you care, these only need to be set once,
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* and may be made constants.
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*/
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BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768);
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BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640);
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BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128);
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BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512);
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if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) {
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exit(1);
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}
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if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */
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exit(1);
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}
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/* Precompute m1 */
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BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx);
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if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) {
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goto err; }
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/* Precompute m2 */
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BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx);
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if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) {
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goto err;
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}
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|
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/*
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* Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should
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* be non-negative.
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*/
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BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx);
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if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); }
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if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) {
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goto err; }
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/* Precompute t */
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for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
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BN_zero(&tmp);
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if (i & 1) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
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if (i & 2) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
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if (i & 4) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); }
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BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx);
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if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) {
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goto err; }
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for (j=0; j<8; j++) data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; }
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|
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/* Precompute m */
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for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
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data->m[i] = m[i]; }
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|
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ret = 1;
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err:
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/* Cleanup */
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); }
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BN_free(&two_768);
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BN_free(&two_640);
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BN_free(&two_128);
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BN_free(&two_512);
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BN_free(&tmp);
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BN_free(&tmp2);
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BN_free(&_m);
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return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
|
|
BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
|
|
BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
|
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
|
|
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery
|
|
* intialization uses the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
|
|
* (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
BN_init(&local_p);
|
|
p = &local_p;
|
|
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
|
|
BN_init(&local_q);
|
|
q = &local_q;
|
|
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
p = rsa->p;
|
|
q = rsa->q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
|
|
error = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* clean up */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
BN_free(&local_p);
|
|
BN_free(&local_q);
|
|
}
|
|
if ( error )
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
|
|
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* compute I mod q */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
c = &local_c;
|
|
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
|
|
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
|
|
|
|
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
|
|
rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, rsa->q) )) goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* compute I mod p */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
c = &local_c;
|
|
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
|
|
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
|
|
|
|
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
|
|
rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, rsa->p) )) goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
|
|
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
|
|
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
|
|
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
|
|
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
pr1 = &local_r1;
|
|
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
pr1 = r1;
|
|
if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
|
|
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
|
|
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
|
|
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
|
|
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
|
|
* they ensure p > q [steve]
|
|
*/
|
|
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
|
|
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
|
|
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
|
|
if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) ))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
|
|
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
|
|
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
|
|
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
|
|
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
|
|
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
|
|
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
|
|
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
|
|
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
|
|
{
|
|
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
|
|
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
|
|
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM local_d;
|
|
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
|
|
{
|
|
d = &local_d;
|
|
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
d = rsa->d;
|
|
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
|
|
rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) )) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
|
|
#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */
|