1760 lines
59 KiB
C
1760 lines
59 KiB
C
/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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# include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
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static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
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static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
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{
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if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
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return (DTLSv1_server_method());
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else
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return (NULL);
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}
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IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
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dtls1_accept,
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ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method)
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int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf;
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unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
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unsigned long alg_k;
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int ret = -1;
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int new_state, state, skip = 0;
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int listen;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
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char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
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#endif
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RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
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listen = s->d1->listen;
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/* init things to blank */
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
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SSL_clear(s);
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s->d1->listen = listen;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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/*
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* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
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* identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
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*/
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BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
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s->in_handshake, NULL);
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#endif
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if (s->cert == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
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return (-1);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
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/*
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* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
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* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
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* handshakes anyway.
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
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dtls1_stop_timer(s);
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s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
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s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
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}
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#endif
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for (;;) {
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state = s->state;
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switch (s->state) {
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->renegotiate = 1;
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/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
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case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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s->server = 1;
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if (cb != NULL)
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cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
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if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
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if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
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BUF_MEM_free(buf);
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_buf = buf;
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}
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_num = 0;
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
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/*
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* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
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*/
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
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/*
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* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
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* output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) ...but not with
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* SCTP :-)
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
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#endif
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
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} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
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!(s->options &
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SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
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/*
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* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
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* support secure renegotiation.
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*/
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,
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SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
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ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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} else {
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/*
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* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
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* HelloRequest
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*/
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
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}
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break;
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|
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
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s->shutdown = 0;
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dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
|
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
|
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s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
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s->init_num = 0;
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|
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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break;
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|
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
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s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
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|
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s->shutdown = 0;
|
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ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
|
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if (ret <= 0)
|
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goto end;
|
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dtls1_stop_timer(s);
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|
|
|
if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
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s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
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else
|
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while
|
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* listening
|
|
*/
|
|
if (listen) {
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence,
|
|
sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we're just listening, stop here */
|
|
if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
s->d1->listen = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
|
|
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
|
|
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
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goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
|
|
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
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s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
|
|
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = s->d1->next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
|
s->renegotiate = 2;
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
|
|
* SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
|
|
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
} else {
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
} else
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clear this, it may get reset by
|
|
* send_server_key_exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* only send if a DH key exchange or RSA but we have a sign only
|
|
* certificate
|
|
*/
|
|
if (0
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
|
|
* provided
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
|
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
|
|
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
|
|
8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
|
|
if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
|
|
* during re-negotiation:
|
|
*/
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
|
|
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
|
|
* RFC 2246):
|
|
*/
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
|
/*
|
|
* ... except when the application insists on
|
|
* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
|
|
* this for SSL 3)
|
|
*/
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
|
|
*/
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
|
|
/*
|
|
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
|
|
* are omitted
|
|
*/
|
|
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
/* no cert request */
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_server_done(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the write error was fatal, stop trying
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
|
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
|
|
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (ret == 2) {
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
|
* used.
|
|
*/
|
|
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
|
|
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
|
|
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
|
|
* not sent.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
|
|
* it can be verified
|
|
*/
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
NID_md5,
|
|
&(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.cert_verify_md
|
|
[0]));
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1,
|
|
&(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.cert_verify_md
|
|
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
|
|
state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
|
|
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
|
|
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
|
|
* first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
|
|
* cautious.
|
|
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
|
|
* processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
|
|
* the client's Finished message is read.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
{
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret = dtls1_send_finished(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
s->init_buf = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* remove buffering on output */
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
|
|
* HelloRequest */
|
|
s->renegotiate = 0;
|
|
s->new_session = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
s->handshake_func = dtls1_accept;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
|
|
/* next message is server hello */
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
|
|
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_ERR:
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
|
|
if (s->debug) {
|
|
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
|
|
new_state = s->state;
|
|
s->state = state;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
s->state = new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/*
|
|
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and prevent stream
|
|
* identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
s->in_handshake, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
|
|
* requests for it
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int msg_len;
|
|
unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) {
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
|
|
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (unsigned char)s->d1->cookie_len;
|
|
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
|
|
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
|
|
msg_len = p - msg;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
|
|
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
|
|
msg_len);
|
|
|
|
s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = p - buf;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned int sl;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = s->s3->server_random;
|
|
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the session id.
|
|
* If it is a re-use, we send back the old session-id, if it is a new
|
|
* session, we send back the new session-id or we send back a 0
|
|
* length session-id if we want it to be single use. Currently I will
|
|
* not implement the '0' length session-id 12-Jan-98 - I'll now
|
|
* support the '0' length stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++) = sl;
|
|
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
|
|
p += sl;
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p =
|
|
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
|
|
buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
|
|
NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
l = (p - d);
|
|
d = buf;
|
|
|
|
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = p - buf;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
int j, num;
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int al, i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
int n;
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
int nr[4], kn;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
|
|
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
cert = s->cert;
|
|
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
|
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = rsa->n;
|
|
r[1] = rsa->e;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
|
|
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (dhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
|
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = dh->p;
|
|
r[1] = dh->g;
|
|
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
|
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
|
ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
|
|
s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
}
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
|
|
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
|
|
* (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
|
|
* non-zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((curve_id =
|
|
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
|
|
== 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
|
|
* ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
|
|
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
|
* structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
n = 4 + encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
|
* can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0] = NULL;
|
|
r[1] = NULL;
|
|
r[2] = NULL;
|
|
r[3] = NULL;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
|
|
*/
|
|
n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
{
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
n += 2 + nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
|
|
== NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkey = NULL;
|
|
kn = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + kn)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
s2n(nr[i], p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
|
|
p += nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
|
|
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
|
|
* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
|
|
* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = curve_id;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = encodedlen;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
|
|
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
p += encodedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/* copy PSK identity hint */
|
|
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
|
|
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
|
|
p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* n is the length of the params, they start at
|
|
* &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space at the
|
|
* end.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
q = md_buf;
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
|
|
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),
|
|
n);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
|
|
q += i;
|
|
j += i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u, p);
|
|
n += u + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
|
|
/* lets do DSS */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i, p);
|
|
n += i + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
/* let's do ECDSA */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i, p);
|
|
n += i + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
|
|
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
|
|
*/
|
|
s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, j, nl, off, n;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
unsigned int msg_len;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
p++;
|
|
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
|
|
d[0] = n;
|
|
p += n;
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
off = n;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
|
|
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
nl = 0;
|
|
if (sk != NULL) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
|
|
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
|
|
(buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n + j + 2)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n]);
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
|
n += 2 + j;
|
|
nl += 2 + j;
|
|
} else {
|
|
d = p;
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
|
j -= 2;
|
|
s2n(j, d);
|
|
j += 2;
|
|
n += j;
|
|
nl += j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + off]);
|
|
s2n(nl, p);
|
|
|
|
d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
|
|
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
l2n3(n, d);
|
|
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, d);
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
/* XXX: what to do about this? */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
s->init_num += 4;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
|
|
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
|
|
msg_len);
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
|
|
x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, x);
|
|
if (!l) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
|
s->init_num = (int)l;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
|
|
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
|
|
int len, slen;
|
|
unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char key_name[16];
|
|
|
|
/* get session encoding length */
|
|
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
|
* long
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slen > 0xFF00)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows 12
|
|
* (DTLS handshake message header) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2
|
|
* (ticket length) + 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
|
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session length)
|
|
* + max_md_size (HMAC).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
|
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
|
|
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
|
|
if (!senc)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
|
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
|
|
&hctx, 1) < 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
|
|
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
|
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
|
|
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
|
|
/* Skip ticket length for now */
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
/* Output key name */
|
|
macstart = p;
|
|
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
|
|
p += 16;
|
|
/* output IV */
|
|
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
|
|
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
|
/* Encrypt session data */
|
|
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
|
|
p += len;
|
|
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
|
|
p += len;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
|
|
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
|
/* Total length */
|
|
len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
|
|
/* Ticket length */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
|
|
s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = len;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
|
|
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
|
|
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0,
|
|
msg_len);
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
|
|
return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|