1378 lines
47 KiB
C
1378 lines
47 KiB
C
/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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# include <openssl/comp.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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# include <openssl/des.h>
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#endif
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/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
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static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
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int sec_len,
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const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
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const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
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const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
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const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
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const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
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unsigned char *out, int olen)
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{
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int chunk;
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size_t j;
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
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EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
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unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t A1_len;
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int ret = 0;
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chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
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OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
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if (!mac_key)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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for (;;) {
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/* Reinit mac contexts */
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx))
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goto err;
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if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > chunk) {
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
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goto err;
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out += j;
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olen -= j;
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/* calc the next A1 value */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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} else { /* last one */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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memcpy(out, A1, olen);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
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return ret;
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}
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/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
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static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
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const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
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const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
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const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
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const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
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const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
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const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
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unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
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{
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int len, i, idx, count;
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const unsigned char *S1;
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long m;
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const EVP_MD *md;
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int ret = 0;
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/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
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count = 0;
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for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
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if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
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count++;
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}
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if (!count) {
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/* Should never happen */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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len = slen / count;
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if (count == 1)
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slen = 0;
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S1 = sec;
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memset(out1, 0, olen);
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for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
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if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
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if (!md) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
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seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
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seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
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out2, olen))
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goto err;
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S1 += len;
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for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
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out1[i] ^= out2[i];
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}
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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return ret;
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}
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static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
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unsigned char *tmp, int num)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
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TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
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TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
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SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
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NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
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s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
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s->session->master_key_length);
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
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fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
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}
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fprintf(stderr, "\n");
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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return ret;
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}
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int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
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{
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static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
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unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
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unsigned char *exp_label;
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unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
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unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
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unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
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int client_write;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
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const EVP_CIPHER *c;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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const SSL_COMP *comp;
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#endif
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const EVP_MD *m;
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int mac_type;
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int *mac_secret_size;
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EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
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EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
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int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
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int reuse_dd = 0;
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is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
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c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
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m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
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mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
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#endif
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|
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
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fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
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s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
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s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
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fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
|
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fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
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c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
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fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
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s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
|
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{
|
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int i;
|
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for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
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fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
|
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fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
|
|
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
|
|
else
|
|
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
|
|
|
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
|
|
reuse_dd = 1;
|
|
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
|
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OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
|
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goto err;
|
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else
|
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/*
|
|
* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
|
|
*/
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
|
|
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
|
|
if (mac_ctx == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
if (s->expand != NULL) {
|
|
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
|
|
s->expand = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (comp != NULL) {
|
|
s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
|
|
if (s->expand == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
|
|
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
|
|
s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
|
|
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
|
|
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
|
|
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
|
|
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
|
|
else
|
|
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
reuse_dd = 1;
|
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else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
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goto err;
|
|
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
|
if (mac_ctx == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
|
|
if (mac_ctx == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL) {
|
|
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
|
|
s->compress = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (comp != NULL) {
|
|
s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
|
|
if (s->compress == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
|
|
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
|
|
mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
|
|
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reuse_dd)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
|
|
|
|
p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
|
|
i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
|
|
|
|
cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
|
|
j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
|
|
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
|
|
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
|
|
/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
|
|
k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
|
|
else
|
|
k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
|
|
if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
|
|
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
|
|
ms = &(p[0]);
|
|
n = i + i;
|
|
key = &(p[n]);
|
|
n += j + j;
|
|
iv = &(p[n]);
|
|
n += k + k;
|
|
exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
|
|
exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
client_write = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
n = i;
|
|
ms = &(p[n]);
|
|
n += i + j;
|
|
key = &(p[n]);
|
|
n += j + k;
|
|
iv = &(p[n]);
|
|
n += k;
|
|
exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
|
|
exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
client_write = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
|
|
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
|
|
mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
|
|
if (mac_key == NULL
|
|
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (is_export) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
|
|
* since only the correct one will be used :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
exp_label, exp_label_len,
|
|
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
key = tmp1;
|
|
|
|
if (k > 0) {
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
if (client_write)
|
|
iv = iv1;
|
|
else
|
|
iv = &(iv1[k]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
|
|
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|
|
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
|
|
&& !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
|
|
*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
|
|
if (*mac_secret_size)
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
|
|
mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
|
|
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
if (c->key_len)
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
|
|
key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
if (k) {
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
|
|
wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
|
|
else
|
|
wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\niv=");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
|
|
return (1);
|
|
err:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
err2:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
|
|
const EVP_MD *hash;
|
|
int num;
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
|
|
(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
|
|
num =
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
|
|
num *= 2;
|
|
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
|
|
|
|
if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(p1);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("client random\n");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
|
|
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
printf("server random\n");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
|
|
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
printf("pre-master\n");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
|
|
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("\nkey block\n");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
|
|
&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
|
|
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
|
|
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
|
|
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
|
|
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
|
|
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (p2) {
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(p2);
|
|
}
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
|
|
* short etc).
|
|
* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
|
|
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
|
|
* an internal error occured.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
|
|
|
|
if (send) {
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
|
|
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
|
|
}
|
|
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
|
|
rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
|
|
enc = NULL;
|
|
else {
|
|
int ivlen;
|
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
|
|
if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
|
|
&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
|
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
|
|
else
|
|
ivlen = 0;
|
|
if (ivlen > 1) {
|
|
if (rec->data != rec->input)
|
|
/*
|
|
* we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
|
|
* happen?? (steve)
|
|
*/
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
|
|
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
|
|
}
|
|
ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
|
|
rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
|
|
enc = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
|
|
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
|
|
rec->input = rec->data;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
l = rec->length;
|
|
bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
|
|
unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
|
|
|
|
seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
|
|
|
|
s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
|
|
memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
|
|
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
|
|
++seq[i];
|
|
if (seq[i] != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf[8] = rec->type;
|
|
buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
|
|
buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
|
|
buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
|
|
buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
|
|
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
|
|
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
|
|
if (pad <= 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (send) {
|
|
l += pad;
|
|
rec->length += pad;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
|
|
i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
|
|
|
|
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
|
|
j = i - 1;
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
|
|
rec->input[k] = j;
|
|
l += i;
|
|
rec->length += i;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long ui;
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
|
|
ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
|
|
ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
|
|
DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
|
|
for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (!send) {
|
|
if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
|
|
? (i < 0)
|
|
: (i == 0))
|
|
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
|
|
rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
|
|
ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
|
|
if (pad && !send)
|
|
rec->length -= pad;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ret;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
|
|
&& EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
|
|
d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!d) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0)
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return ((int)ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
|
|
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
|
|
int idx;
|
|
long mask;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
|
|
q = buf;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
|
|
if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
|
|
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
|
|
if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
|
|
|| hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
|
|
*/
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
|
|
(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
q += hashsize;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else
|
|
return sizeof buf2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
unsigned char *seq;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
|
|
size_t md_size, orig_len;
|
|
int i;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char header[13];
|
|
int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
|
|
: (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
|
|
int t;
|
|
|
|
if (send) {
|
|
rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
|
|
seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
|
|
hash = ssl->write_hash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
|
|
seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
|
|
hash = ssl->read_hash;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
|
|
md_size = t;
|
|
|
|
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
|
|
if (stream_mac) {
|
|
mac_ctx = hash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
mac_ctx = &hmac;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
|
|
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
|
|
|
|
s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
|
|
} else
|
|
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
|
|
*/
|
|
orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
|
|
rec->type &= 0xff;
|
|
|
|
header[8] = rec->type;
|
|
header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
|
|
header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
|
|
header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
|
|
header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
if (!send &&
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
|
|
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
|
|
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
|
|
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
|
|
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
|
|
md, &md_size,
|
|
header, rec->input,
|
|
rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
if (!stream_mac)
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
|
|
if (!stream_mac)
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
|
if (!send && FIPS_mode())
|
|
tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
|
|
mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!stream_mac)
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
|
|
{
|
|
int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
|
|
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
++seq[i];
|
|
if (seq[i] != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (md_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
|
|
int len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
|
|
int col = 0, sol = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
|
|
len);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL
|
|
&& s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL
|
|
&& s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0
|
|
&& s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
|
|
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
|
|
co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
|
|
col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
|
so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
|
|
/*
|
|
* must be same as col (see
|
|
* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
|
|
*/
|
|
sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
co, col,
|
|
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
|
|
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
|
|
p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
|
|
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
|
|
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
|
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen,
|
|
const unsigned char *context,
|
|
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buff;
|
|
unsigned char *val = NULL;
|
|
size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
|
|
s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
|
|
if (buff == NULL)
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
|
|
* than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
|
|
* concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
|
|
*/
|
|
vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
|
|
if (use_context) {
|
|
vallen += 2 + contextlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
|
|
if (val == NULL)
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
currentvalpos = 0;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
|
|
currentvalpos += llen;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (use_context) {
|
|
val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
currentvalpos++;
|
|
val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
|
|
currentvalpos++;
|
|
if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
|
|
* label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
|
|
* the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
|
|
*/
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
|
|
goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
|
|
goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
|
|
goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
|
|
goto err1;
|
|
|
|
rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
val, vallen,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
out, buff, olen);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
err1:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
err2:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
ret:
|
|
if (buff != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buff);
|
|
if (val != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(val);
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (code) {
|
|
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
|
|
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
|
|
return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
|
|
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
|
|
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
|
|
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
|
|
return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
|
|
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
|
|
return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|